He is probably talking about the hard problem of consciousness, e.g. whether qualia exists. While it’s possible conceptually to have empirical tests for subjective consciousness, it’s seems extremely unlikely.
We can already imagine a computational simulation of the brain, and empirical test for qualia seems impossible pretty much by definition. Sure, it’s possible to test whether the simulation has self-awareness from a computational point (and it will have that since it’s a human brain simulation).
If there is a (physical) cause for qualia, such that qualia occur if and only if that cause is present, and we work out what that cause is, then we have an empirical test for subjective conciousness.
Yet qualia cannot be measured empirically (atleast that’s the consensus), which makes such tests extremely unlikely. And this discussion seems to turn into a regular qualia debate. I’m not sure if that’s desirable.
empirical test for qualia seems impossible pretty much by definition
I completely share your reluctance to start yet another discussion about qualia, but there’s an important meta-issue here. No nontrivial statement about the real world (e.g. the impossibility of something) can ever be true “by definition”, because that would make dictionaries capable of sympathetic magic.
He is probably talking about the hard problem of consciousness, e.g. whether qualia exists. While it’s possible conceptually to have empirical tests for subjective consciousness, it’s seems extremely unlikely.
We can already imagine a computational simulation of the brain, and empirical test for qualia seems impossible pretty much by definition. Sure, it’s possible to test whether the simulation has self-awareness from a computational point (and it will have that since it’s a human brain simulation).
If there is a (physical) cause for qualia, such that qualia occur if and only if that cause is present, and we work out what that cause is, then we have an empirical test for subjective conciousness.
I wouldn’t call that, “extremely unlikely”.
Yet qualia cannot be measured empirically (atleast that’s the consensus), which makes such tests extremely unlikely. And this discussion seems to turn into a regular qualia debate. I’m not sure if that’s desirable.
Yet. No one knows what science doesn’t know.
I agree that it’s not desirable.
I completely share your reluctance to start yet another discussion about qualia, but there’s an important meta-issue here. No nontrivial statement about the real world (e.g. the impossibility of something) can ever be true “by definition”, because that would make dictionaries capable of sympathetic magic.