To be asked for “evidence” that cognition requires computation resources is something I find bizarre. It is not something I know how to respond to. When multiple people need to see evidence that cognition requires computation resources, this may be the wrong forum for me to discuss such things.
If smart people disagree so bizarrely, smart money’s on a misunderstanding, not a disagreement. e.g. here, cousin_it said:
However there must be certain computational functions that must be accomplished for consciousness to be experienced.
The same question applies: how on Earth do you know that? Where’s your evidence? Sharing opinions only gets us so far!
What might he have meant that’s not insane? Perhaps that he wants evidence that there must be certain computational functions, rather than that he wants evidence that there must be certain computational functions.
GuySrinivasan, I really can’t figure out what is being meant.
In my next sentence I say I am not trying to describe all computations that are necessary, and in the sentence after that I start talking about entity detection computation structures being necessary.
First an entity must have a “self detector”; a pattern recognition computation structure which it uses to recognizes its own state of being an entity and of being the same entity over time. If an entity is unable to recognize itself as an entity, then it can’t be conscious that it is an entity.
I think that is a pretty clear description of a certain cognitive structure that requires computational resources for an entity to self-recognize itself.
What is it that cousin_it is disputing and wants me to provide evidence for? That an entity doesn’t need a “self-detector” to recognize itself? That a “self-detector” doesn’t require pattern recognition? That pattern recognition doesn’t require computation?
I really don’t understand. But some other people must have understood it because they up voted the comment, maybe some of those people could explain it to me.
What is it that cousin_it is disputing and wants me to provide evidence for?
That consciousness requires a self detector thingy. This may or may not be true—you haven’t given enough evidence either way. Sure, humans are conscious and they can also self-detect; so what? At this stage it’s like claiming that flight requires flapping your wings.
It is your contention that an entity can be conscious without being aware that it is conscious?
There are entities that are not aware of being conscious. To me, if an entity is not aware of being conscious (i.e. is unconscious of being conscious), then it is unconscious.
By my understanding of the term, the one thing an entity must be aware of to be conscious is its own consciousness. I see that as an inherent part of the definition. I can not conceive of a definition of “consciousness” that allows for a conscious entity to be unaware that it is conscious.
Could you give me a definition of “consciousness” that allows for being unaware of being conscious?
if all that consciousness entails is being aware of being conscious, it doesn’t mean anything at all, does it? We could just as well say:
“My machine is fepton! I know this because it’s aware of being fepton; just ask, and it well tell you that it’s fepton! What’s fepton, you ask? Well, it’s the property of being aware of being fepton!”
I’m not allowed, under your definition, to posit a conscious being that is aware of every fact about the universe except the fact of its own consciousness, only because a being with such a description would be unconscious, by definition. It seems to be a pretty useless thing to be aware of.
If a being is not aware of being conscious, then it is not conscious no matter what else it is aware of.
I am not saying that all consciousness entails is being aware of being conscious, but it does at a minimum entail that. If an entity does not have self-awareness, then it is not conscious, no matter what other properties that entity has.
You are free to make up any hypothetical entities and states that you want, but the term “consciousness” has a generally recognized meaning. If you want to deviate from that meaning you have to tell me what you mean by the term, otherwise my default is the generally recognized meaning.
Could you give me a definition of “consciousness” that allows for being unaware of being conscious?
Could you give me a definition of “consciousness” that allows for being unaware of being conscious?
10 seconds ago I was unaware of being conscious: my attention was directed elsewhere. Does that mean I was unconscious? How about a creature who spends all its life like that? - will you claim that it’s only conscious because it has a potential possibility of noticing its own consciousness, or something?
Yes, if you are not aware of being conscious then you are unconscious. You may have the capacity to be conscious, but if you are not using that capacity, because you are asleep, are under anesthesia, or because you have sufficiently dissociated from being conscious, then you are not conscious at that moment.
There are states where people do “black-out”, that is where they seemingly function appropriately but have no memory later of those periods. Those states can occur due to drug use, they can also happen via psychogenic processes called a fugue state.
There is also the term semiconscious. Maybe that would be the appropriate term to use when an entity capable of consciousness is not using that capacity.
Yes. I would consider those states to be “unconscious”. I am not using “conscious” or “unconscious” as pejorative terms or as terms with any type of value, but purely as descriptive terms that describe the state of an entity. If an entity is not self-aware in the moment, then it is not conscious.
People are not self-aware of the data processing their visual cortex is doing (at least I am not). When you are not aware of the data processing you are doing, the outcome of that data processing is “transparent” to you, that is the output is achieved without an understanding of the path by which the output was achieved. Because you don’t have the ability to influence the data processing your visual cortex is doing, the output is susceptible to optical illusions.
Dissociation is not uncommon. In thinking about it, I think I dissociate quite a bit, and that it is fairly easy for me to dissociate. I do my best intellectual work when I am in what I call a “dissociative focus”. Where I really am quite oblivious to a lot of extraneous things and even about my physical state, hunger, fatigue, those kinds of things.
I think that entering a dissociative state is not uncommon, particularly under conditions of very high stress. I think there is a reason for that, under conditions of very high stress, all computational resources of the brain are needed to deal with what ever is causing that stress. Spending computational resources being conscious or self-aware is a luxury that an entity can’t afford while it is “running from a bear” (to use my favorite extreme stress state).
I haven’t looked at the living luminously sequences carefully, but I think I mostly disagree with it as something to strive for. It is ok, and if that is what you want to do that is fine, but I don’t aspire to think that way. Trying to think that way would interfere with what I am trying to accomplish.
I see living while being extremely conscious of self (i.e. what I understand to be the luminous state), and being dissociated from being conscious as two extremes along a continuum, what I consider thinking with your “theory of mind” (the self-conscious luminous state) and thinking with your “theory of reality”, what I consider to be the dissociative state. I discuss that in great detail on my blog about autism.
If you are not in a mode where you are thinking about entities, then you are not using your “theory of mind”. If you are thinking about things in purely non-anthropomorphic terms, you are not using your “theory of mind”.
I think these two different states are useful for thinking about different kinds of problems. Interpersonal problems, interactions with other people, communication are best dealt with by the “theory of mind”. All the examples in the Seven Shining Stories are what I would consider pretty much pure theory of mind-type problems. Theory of reality-type problems are like the traveling salesman problem, multiplying numbers, running more algorithmey-type problems like counting. Problems where there is little or no interpersonal or communication component.
Yes, if you are not aware of being conscious then you are unconscious. You may have the capacity to be conscious, but if you are not using that capacity, because you are asleep, are under anesthesia, or because you have sufficiently dissociated from being conscious, then you are not conscious at that moment.
There are states where people do “black-out”, that is where they seemingly function appropriately but have no memory later of those periods. Those states can occur due to drug use, they can also happen via psychogenic processes called a fugue state.
There is also the term semiconscious. Maybe that would be the appropriate term to use when an entity capable of consciousness is not using that capacity.
If smart people disagree so bizarrely, smart money’s on a misunderstanding, not a disagreement. e.g. here, cousin_it said:
What might he have meant that’s not insane? Perhaps that he wants evidence that there must be certain computational functions, rather than that he wants evidence that there must be certain computational functions.
GuySrinivasan, I really can’t figure out what is being meant.
In my next sentence I say I am not trying to describe all computations that are necessary, and in the sentence after that I start talking about entity detection computation structures being necessary.
I think that is a pretty clear description of a certain cognitive structure that requires computational resources for an entity to self-recognize itself.
What is it that cousin_it is disputing and wants me to provide evidence for? That an entity doesn’t need a “self-detector” to recognize itself? That a “self-detector” doesn’t require pattern recognition? That pattern recognition doesn’t require computation?
I really don’t understand. But some other people must have understood it because they up voted the comment, maybe some of those people could explain it to me.
That consciousness requires a self detector thingy. This may or may not be true—you haven’t given enough evidence either way. Sure, humans are conscious and they can also self-detect; so what? At this stage it’s like claiming that flight requires flapping your wings.
It is your contention that an entity can be conscious without being aware that it is conscious?
There are entities that are not aware of being conscious. To me, if an entity is not aware of being conscious (i.e. is unconscious of being conscious), then it is unconscious.
By my understanding of the term, the one thing an entity must be aware of to be conscious is its own consciousness. I see that as an inherent part of the definition. I can not conceive of a definition of “consciousness” that allows for a conscious entity to be unaware that it is conscious.
Could you give me a definition of “consciousness” that allows for being unaware of being conscious?
if all that consciousness entails is being aware of being conscious, it doesn’t mean anything at all, does it? We could just as well say:
“My machine is fepton! I know this because it’s aware of being fepton; just ask, and it well tell you that it’s fepton! What’s fepton, you ask? Well, it’s the property of being aware of being fepton!”
I’m not allowed, under your definition, to posit a conscious being that is aware of every fact about the universe except the fact of its own consciousness, only because a being with such a description would be unconscious, by definition. It seems to be a pretty useless thing to be aware of.
If a being is not aware of being conscious, then it is not conscious no matter what else it is aware of.
I am not saying that all consciousness entails is being aware of being conscious, but it does at a minimum entail that. If an entity does not have self-awareness, then it is not conscious, no matter what other properties that entity has.
You are free to make up any hypothetical entities and states that you want, but the term “consciousness” has a generally recognized meaning. If you want to deviate from that meaning you have to tell me what you mean by the term, otherwise my default is the generally recognized meaning.
Could you give me a definition of “consciousness” that allows for being unaware of being conscious?
10 seconds ago I was unaware of being conscious: my attention was directed elsewhere. Does that mean I was unconscious? How about a creature who spends all its life like that? - will you claim that it’s only conscious because it has a potential possibility of noticing its own consciousness, or something?
Yes, if you are not aware of being conscious then you are unconscious. You may have the capacity to be conscious, but if you are not using that capacity, because you are asleep, are under anesthesia, or because you have sufficiently dissociated from being conscious, then you are not conscious at that moment.
There are states where people do “black-out”, that is where they seemingly function appropriately but have no memory later of those periods. Those states can occur due to drug use, they can also happen via psychogenic processes called a fugue state.
There is also the term semiconscious. Maybe that would be the appropriate term to use when an entity capable of consciousness is not using that capacity.
Do you consider flow states (being so fascinated by something that you forget yourself and the passage of time) as not being conscious?
Yes. I would consider those states to be “unconscious”. I am not using “conscious” or “unconscious” as pejorative terms or as terms with any type of value, but purely as descriptive terms that describe the state of an entity. If an entity is not self-aware in the moment, then it is not conscious.
People are not self-aware of the data processing their visual cortex is doing (at least I am not). When you are not aware of the data processing you are doing, the outcome of that data processing is “transparent” to you, that is the output is achieved without an understanding of the path by which the output was achieved. Because you don’t have the ability to influence the data processing your visual cortex is doing, the output is susceptible to optical illusions.
Dissociation is not uncommon. In thinking about it, I think I dissociate quite a bit, and that it is fairly easy for me to dissociate. I do my best intellectual work when I am in what I call a “dissociative focus”. Where I really am quite oblivious to a lot of extraneous things and even about my physical state, hunger, fatigue, those kinds of things.
I think that entering a dissociative state is not uncommon, particularly under conditions of very high stress. I think there is a reason for that, under conditions of very high stress, all computational resources of the brain are needed to deal with what ever is causing that stress. Spending computational resources being conscious or self-aware is a luxury that an entity can’t afford while it is “running from a bear” (to use my favorite extreme stress state).
I haven’t looked at the living luminously sequences carefully, but I think I mostly disagree with it as something to strive for. It is ok, and if that is what you want to do that is fine, but I don’t aspire to think that way. Trying to think that way would interfere with what I am trying to accomplish.
I see living while being extremely conscious of self (i.e. what I understand to be the luminous state), and being dissociated from being conscious as two extremes along a continuum, what I consider thinking with your “theory of mind” (the self-conscious luminous state) and thinking with your “theory of reality”, what I consider to be the dissociative state. I discuss that in great detail on my blog about autism.
If you are not in a mode where you are thinking about entities, then you are not using your “theory of mind”. If you are thinking about things in purely non-anthropomorphic terms, you are not using your “theory of mind”.
I think these two different states are useful for thinking about different kinds of problems. Interpersonal problems, interactions with other people, communication are best dealt with by the “theory of mind”. All the examples in the Seven Shining Stories are what I would consider pretty much pure theory of mind-type problems. Theory of reality-type problems are like the traveling salesman problem, multiplying numbers, running more algorithmey-type problems like counting. Problems where there is little or no interpersonal or communication component.
Yes, if you are not aware of being conscious then you are unconscious. You may have the capacity to be conscious, but if you are not using that capacity, because you are asleep, are under anesthesia, or because you have sufficiently dissociated from being conscious, then you are not conscious at that moment.
There are states where people do “black-out”, that is where they seemingly function appropriately but have no memory later of those periods. Those states can occur due to drug use, they can also happen via psychogenic processes called a fugue state.
There is also the term semiconscious. Maybe that would be the appropriate term to use when an entity capable of consciousness is not using that capacity.