I’m saying that the belief that the world makes sense is equivalent to belief in God.
That still is not right. I can have a theory that the world makes sense, and is describable by general laws. This theory can be supported by the evidence that I am able to generalize my experiences into physical laws that successfully predict future experiences. Faith is not needed for this, in an unlawful universe that doesn’t make sense, scientific rationalism would defeat itself.
To argue that God exists, you don’t need to argue that every conceived idea of God is true.
But you do have explain some observable difference between God existing and not existing that does not contradict our actual observations.
I can have a theory that the world makes sense, and is describable by general laws.
Perhaps, for you, it is a theory. For me, I simply, honestly admit that I believe it even though there are alternatives I can’t eliminate.
But you do have to explain some observable difference between God existing and not existing that does not contradict our actual observations.
When you wrote this comment, I imagined that any scientific evidence that science isn’t absolute would be self-refuting so there couldn’t be any “evidence” of such. But after reading recently about reductionismhere and here and thinking about what the assumptions of reductionism are, I now see that there could be a middle ground, where science is valid almost everywhere, but there are specific places where science doesn’t hold. And there could be rules about where science holds and doesn’t hold so that science isn’t entirely negated. For example, the idea that science could hold everywhere except when it comes to mental entities.
So finally, my answer is that any evidence of non-reductionism would be evidence that my God {God=natural world} isn’t absolute. This is because, as I argue elsewhere, reductionism is equivalent to the natural world being self-contained and self-consistent. Non-reductionism would imply that there is something beyond the natural world (something metaphysical).
So I’m a reductionist, but I experience this theistically. I think it is time to move on from the dichotomy that atheism/theism is justified/unjustified belief and consider what makes a belief theistic or not. (On the inside.)
I now see that there could be a middle ground, where science is valid almost everywhere, but there are specific places where science doesn’t hold.
“Science” can’t “hold” somewhere and “not hold” somewhere else. Science is a process by which we reliably figure out stuff, build tools for figuring out stuff, and establish what is known and what isn’t, what is more certain and what is less certain. It’s not phlogiston that fills territory with knowability essence, it’s a set of human activities, in which anything that works is welcome.
Replace “science” with “the hypothesis that everything is governed by physical laws that are never violated and explain everything”
I agree this hypothesis is not synonymous with science as a process, so I was not being precise.
However, is the hypothesis asserting what you accused me of believing? Is believing in this hypothesis believing in some kind of phlogiston that fills territory with knowability essence?
I’m afraid so. And I’m open to being critical of this.
Replace “science” with “the hypothesis that everything is governed by physical laws that are never violated and explain everything”
It’s also an empty statement. “Physical laws”, at least fundamental ones, is by definition the description of that which governs everything, and at any point you have uncertainty about what’s going to happen. If whatever concept of “physical laws” you have doesn’t explain what happens, then those laws are falsified, so that they have to be modified to accommodate the new info, and probably include newfound uncertainty. If there turns out to be an intelligent tinkerer or goal-driven whatever behind the scenes, it gets included in the fundamental rules of the game, and studied scientifically.
It’s not an empty statement. You gave the definition of physical laws, but the hypothesis is that the physical laws exist.
Is the belief in the existence of governing laws some type of false belief, like believing in a phlogiston of knowability or believing in God?
I’m beginning to think the whole difference between the LW perspective and the theist perspective might (just!) be the difference between a frequentist and Bayesian perspective. Is it possible that our brains are just hard-wired differently and we’re all making some kind of mind projection fallacy? Oops, I meant typical mind fallacy. I can understand both points of view, but I find the frequentist view more natural. And when I understand the Bayesian point of view, it is through some kind of mental acrobatics, like I’m just pushing the frequentist perspective to a higher level of abstraction than the one I’m evaluating.
That still is not right. I can have a theory that the world makes sense, and is describable by general laws. This theory can be supported by the evidence that I am able to generalize my experiences into physical laws that successfully predict future experiences. Faith is not needed for this, in an unlawful universe that doesn’t make sense, scientific rationalism would defeat itself.
But you do have explain some observable difference between God existing and not existing that does not contradict our actual observations.
Perhaps, for you, it is a theory. For me, I simply, honestly admit that I believe it even though there are alternatives I can’t eliminate.
When you wrote this comment, I imagined that any scientific evidence that science isn’t absolute would be self-refuting so there couldn’t be any “evidence” of such. But after reading recently about reductionism here and here and thinking about what the assumptions of reductionism are, I now see that there could be a middle ground, where science is valid almost everywhere, but there are specific places where science doesn’t hold. And there could be rules about where science holds and doesn’t hold so that science isn’t entirely negated. For example, the idea that science could hold everywhere except when it comes to mental entities. So finally, my answer is that any evidence of non-reductionism would be evidence that my God {God=natural world} isn’t absolute. This is because, as I argue elsewhere, reductionism is equivalent to the natural world being self-contained and self-consistent. Non-reductionism would imply that there is something beyond the natural world (something metaphysical).
So I’m a reductionist, but I experience this theistically. I think it is time to move on from the dichotomy that atheism/theism is justified/unjustified belief and consider what makes a belief theistic or not. (On the inside.)
“Science” can’t “hold” somewhere and “not hold” somewhere else. Science is a process by which we reliably figure out stuff, build tools for figuring out stuff, and establish what is known and what isn’t, what is more certain and what is less certain. It’s not phlogiston that fills territory with knowability essence, it’s a set of human activities, in which anything that works is welcome.
Replace “science” with “the hypothesis that everything is governed by physical laws that are never violated and explain everything”
I agree this hypothesis is not synonymous with science as a process, so I was not being precise.
However, is the hypothesis asserting what you accused me of believing? Is believing in this hypothesis believing in some kind of phlogiston that fills territory with knowability essence?
I’m afraid so. And I’m open to being critical of this.
It’s also an empty statement. “Physical laws”, at least fundamental ones, is by definition the description of that which governs everything, and at any point you have uncertainty about what’s going to happen. If whatever concept of “physical laws” you have doesn’t explain what happens, then those laws are falsified, so that they have to be modified to accommodate the new info, and probably include newfound uncertainty. If there turns out to be an intelligent tinkerer or goal-driven whatever behind the scenes, it gets included in the fundamental rules of the game, and studied scientifically.
It’s not an empty statement. You gave the definition of physical laws, but the hypothesis is that the physical laws exist.
Is the belief in the existence of governing laws some type of false belief, like believing in a phlogiston of knowability or believing in God?
I’m beginning to think the whole difference between the LW perspective and the theist perspective might (just!) be the difference between a frequentist and Bayesian perspective. Is it possible that our brains are just hard-wired differently and we’re all making some kind of mind projection fallacy? Oops, I meant typical mind fallacy. I can understand both points of view, but I find the frequentist view more natural. And when I understand the Bayesian point of view, it is through some kind of mental acrobatics, like I’m just pushing the frequentist perspective to a higher level of abstraction than the one I’m evaluating.
No, there is no such “hypothesis”. You just study the world, and the more fundamental of the rules you learn are dubbed “physical laws”.
Well said! -- this and your comments upthread.