This woefully under appreciates Godel. Although it starts out as being about a particular mathematical system, it’s actually about formal systems in general, so it’s only not relevant if you are trying to suppose a sort of non-systematic epistemology where claims are not related to each other by any kind of rules, including basic “rules” like causality.
I understand that Godel applies to formal systems. But the claim that Godel makes is that some mathematical claims will be unprovable, which seems irrelevant to my arguments, which are not about mathematical claims.
What kinds of statements do you think Godel implies, which my epistemology as laid out in this post cannot handle?
Sure, but why does it present problems for verificationism as I’m using it? I’m saying that the concept of external reality is meaningless, the existence of unprovable math questions seems orthogonal.
Sure. Those things are mathematical claims, and I exempted mathematical claims.
There are no claims of the form “X exists” inside my formal system, and those are the only claims I’m asserting are incoherent. (Or “X doesn’t exist”, etc.)
This seems to imply I should ignore everything you and everyone else says, since if it’s truly meaningless then there’s no point in engaging. Ergo, why are you even in these comments saying anything or bothering to write an article, except as some figment of my imagination here to give me something to do?
My theory produces the exact same predictions as a theory containing the realism postulate. It shouldn’t affect any of your decisions unless your decisions hinge on incoherent claims that are irrelevant to predictions. I think such decision theories are wrong in some sense. Regardless, I don’t think that my arguments have any real relevance to what anyone should or should not do.
Matter in what context? I didn’t discuss decision theory in the post (other than indirectly w.r.t. altruism), Gordon is the first to bring it up, I’m simply saying that I believe that decision theory shouldn’t depend on incoherent claims. My point about predictions is because Gordon asked why something happened, and I’m making the point that both theories predict the same thing happening and explain it just as well.
You don’t have any clear criteria for saying that things are coherent or incoherent.
The general idea of of realism adds value in that explains how science works, where observations come from, and so on. Thats EYs defense of it, and it has been referenced several times in the comments.
There may be specific issues in figuring out which specific theory to believe in, but that’s another matter. There is a stable position where you accept realism, but don’t invest in specific theories.
Given my intuitions about (in)coherence , having to take it in faith that science works, without having any idea why, is less coherent than the alternative!
You don’t have any clear criteria for saying that things exist or don’t exist.
An explanation that depends on incoherent claims isn’t much of an explanation. Which specific post of EY’s are you saying had this defense? I’ve already responded to all of his posts I could find that bear on the issue.
Take it on faith that science works
This is not required, and you’re in exactly the same position whether or not you accept realism. Realism doesn’t imply Occam’s razor, which is required for induction and science more generally. EY has a post justifying Occam that does not require realism. I don’t see what realism adds to the argument. See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/C8nEXTcjZb9oauTCW/where-recursive-justification-hits-bottom
You can’t do it with occam alone. You need a source of data, and that data needs to have some discoverable consistencies. You can’t perform induction on entropy .
Occam applied to the only data we have, which is our direct observations, says that the scientific method has been useful in the past and should be presumed to continue to be useful. EY laid out the argument in the post I linked to.
“The universe exists and is inherently simple, therefore induction tends to work” and “Observations are well predicted by inductive formulas, therefore induction tends to work” are of the same form. The first is incoherent and the second is meaningful, but the conclusions are the same.
What is the exact argument and conclusion for which you’re saying my view cannot reach?
“The universe exists and is inherently simple, therefore induction tends to work” and “Observations are well predicted by inductive formulas, therefore induction tends to work” are of the same form.
But not if the same content. The second doesn’t tell you how induction works.
That’s about mathematical claims, where my argument doesn’t apply.
This woefully under appreciates Godel. Although it starts out as being about a particular mathematical system, it’s actually about formal systems in general, so it’s only not relevant if you are trying to suppose a sort of non-systematic epistemology where claims are not related to each other by any kind of rules, including basic “rules” like causality.
I understand that Godel applies to formal systems. But the claim that Godel makes is that some mathematical claims will be unprovable, which seems irrelevant to my arguments, which are not about mathematical claims.
What kinds of statements do you think Godel implies, which my epistemology as laid out in this post cannot handle?
It seems to me like any system where the term verificationism makes sense has to be a superset of mathematics and is thus subject to Gödel’s findings.
Sure, but why does it present problems for verificationism as I’m using it? I’m saying that the concept of external reality is meaningless, the existence of unprovable math questions seems orthogonal.
According to Gödel any formal system has things that can be true while still not being able to be proved (or verified) within the system.
Sure. Those things are mathematical claims, and I exempted mathematical claims.
There are no claims of the form “X exists” inside my formal system, and those are the only claims I’m asserting are incoherent. (Or “X doesn’t exist”, etc.)
This seems to imply I should ignore everything you and everyone else says, since if it’s truly meaningless then there’s no point in engaging. Ergo, why are you even in these comments saying anything or bothering to write an article, except as some figment of my imagination here to give me something to do?
My theory produces the exact same predictions as a theory containing the realism postulate. It shouldn’t affect any of your decisions unless your decisions hinge on incoherent claims that are irrelevant to predictions. I think such decision theories are wrong in some sense. Regardless, I don’t think that my arguments have any real relevance to what anyone should or should not do.
You haven’t explained why predictions are the only thing that matter.
Matter in what context? I didn’t discuss decision theory in the post (other than indirectly w.r.t. altruism), Gordon is the first to bring it up, I’m simply saying that I believe that decision theory shouldn’t depend on incoherent claims. My point about predictions is because Gordon asked why something happened, and I’m making the point that both theories predict the same thing happening and explain it just as well.
You don’t have any clear criteria for saying that things are coherent or incoherent.
The general idea of of realism adds value in that explains how science works, where observations come from, and so on. Thats EYs defense of it, and it has been referenced several times in the comments.
There may be specific issues in figuring out which specific theory to believe in, but that’s another matter. There is a stable position where you accept realism, but don’t invest in specific theories.
Given my intuitions about (in)coherence , having to take it in faith that science works, without having any idea why, is less coherent than the alternative!
You don’t have any clear criteria for saying that things exist or don’t exist.
An explanation that depends on incoherent claims isn’t much of an explanation. Which specific post of EY’s are you saying had this defense? I’ve already responded to all of his posts I could find that bear on the issue.
This is not required, and you’re in exactly the same position whether or not you accept realism. Realism doesn’t imply Occam’s razor, which is required for induction and science more generally. EY has a post justifying Occam that does not require realism. I don’t see what realism adds to the argument. See https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/C8nEXTcjZb9oauTCW/where-recursive-justification-hits-bottom
So how does science work?
You can’t do it with occam alone. You need a source of data, and that data needs to have some discoverable consistencies. You can’t perform induction on entropy .
Occam applied to the only data we have, which is our direct observations, says that the scientific method has been useful in the past and should be presumed to continue to be useful. EY laid out the argument in the post I linked to.
It doesn’t tell you how it works.
Neither does realism.
“The universe exists and is inherently simple, therefore induction tends to work” and “Observations are well predicted by inductive formulas, therefore induction tends to work” are of the same form. The first is incoherent and the second is meaningful, but the conclusions are the same.
What is the exact argument and conclusion for which you’re saying my view cannot reach?
But not if the same content. The second doesn’t tell you how induction works.
Neither does the first.