This woefully under appreciates Godel. Although it starts out as being about a particular mathematical system, it’s actually about formal systems in general, so it’s only not relevant if you are trying to suppose a sort of non-systematic epistemology where claims are not related to each other by any kind of rules, including basic “rules” like causality.
I understand that Godel applies to formal systems. But the claim that Godel makes is that some mathematical claims will be unprovable, which seems irrelevant to my arguments, which are not about mathematical claims.
What kinds of statements do you think Godel implies, which my epistemology as laid out in this post cannot handle?
This woefully under appreciates Godel. Although it starts out as being about a particular mathematical system, it’s actually about formal systems in general, so it’s only not relevant if you are trying to suppose a sort of non-systematic epistemology where claims are not related to each other by any kind of rules, including basic “rules” like causality.
I understand that Godel applies to formal systems. But the claim that Godel makes is that some mathematical claims will be unprovable, which seems irrelevant to my arguments, which are not about mathematical claims.
What kinds of statements do you think Godel implies, which my epistemology as laid out in this post cannot handle?