I think I used to think things like this, and… I dunno maybe I still do.
But I feel quite confused about the fact that, historically, economic and military advantage seems temporary – both for literal empires and companies.
And on one hand, I can think of reasons why this is a special case for humans (who have particular kinds of coordination failures that occur on the timescale of generations), and might be less true for AI. On the other hand, if I were reasoning from first principles at the time, I might have assumed Rome would never fall because it had such an initial advantage.
I am strongly convinced this boils down to bad decisions.
There’s a post over at the Scholar’s Stage about national strategy for the United States [low politics warning], and largely it addresses the lack of regional expertise. The part about Rome:
None of these men received any special training in foreign languages, cultures, diplomacy, or statecraft before attaining high rank. Men were more likely to be chosen for their social status than proven experience or familiarity with the region they were assigned to govern. The education of these officials was in literature, grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, and their ability to govern was often judged on their literary merits. The historian Susan Mattern discusses one example of this in her masterful study of Roman strategy, Rome and the Enemy. The key passage comes from Tacitus, who reports that the Emperor Nero was better placed to deal with Parthian shenanigans in Armenia than Cladius, for he was advised by Burrus and Seneca, “men known for their expertise in such matters” (Annals 13.6).
And later:
This had significant strategic implications. Between the conquest of Dalmatia in the early days of the Principate and the arrival of the Huns in the days of Late Antiquity, it is difficult to find an enemy on Rome’s northern borders that was not created by Rome itself. Rehman has already noted that the greatest defeat of the Principate, that of Teutoburg Forest, was the work of man in Rome’s employ. Teutoburg is but one point in a pattern that repeated for centuries. Most Germanic barbarian groups did not live in oppida, as the Celts did, and had little political hierarchy to speak of. When Romans selected local leaders to negotiate with, favor with trade or other boons, and use as auxiliary allies in war they were transforming petty chiefs into kings. Roman diplomatic norms, combined with unrelenting Roman military pressure, created the very military threats they were hoping to forestall.
The same pattern happened to China with the steppe, and (in my opinion) it matches pretty closely what is happening with the United States in Central Asia and the Middle East.
I think I used to think things like this, and… I dunno maybe I still do.
But I feel quite confused about the fact that, historically, economic and military advantage seems temporary – both for literal empires and companies.
And on one hand, I can think of reasons why this is a special case for humans (who have particular kinds of coordination failures that occur on the timescale of generations), and might be less true for AI. On the other hand, if I were reasoning from first principles at the time, I might have assumed Rome would never fall because it had such an initial advantage.
I am strongly convinced this boils down to bad decisions.
There’s a post over at the Scholar’s Stage about national strategy for the United States [low politics warning], and largely it addresses the lack of regional expertise. The part about Rome:
And later:
The same pattern happened to China with the steppe, and (in my opinion) it matches pretty closely what is happening with the United States in Central Asia and the Middle East.