I suppose that is a tension between epistemic and instrumental rationality.
Put in terms of a microeconomic trade-off: The marginal value of having correct beliefs diminishes beyond a certain threshold. Eventually, the marginal value of increasing one’s epistemic accuracy dips below the marginal value that comes from retaining one’s mistaken belief. At that point, an instrumentally rational agent may stop increasing accuracy.
On the other hand, it may be a problem of local-versus-global optima: The marginal value of accuracy may creep up again. Or maybe those who see it as a problem can fix it with the right augmentation.
I suppose that is a tension between epistemic and instrumental rationality.
There is no tension. Epistemic rationality is merely instrumental, while instrumental rationality is not. They are different kinds of things. Means to an end don’t compete with what the end is.
I suppose that is a tension between epistemic and instrumental rationality.
Put in terms of a microeconomic trade-off: The marginal value of having correct beliefs diminishes beyond a certain threshold. Eventually, the marginal value of increasing one’s epistemic accuracy dips below the marginal value that comes from retaining one’s mistaken belief. At that point, an instrumentally rational agent may stop increasing accuracy.
On the other hand, it may be a problem of local-versus-global optima: The marginal value of accuracy may creep up again. Or maybe those who see it as a problem can fix it with the right augmentation.
There is no tension. Epistemic rationality is merely instrumental, while instrumental rationality is not. They are different kinds of things. Means to an end don’t compete with what the end is.
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