Reply to Objection 3. Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.
Is that just a theist version of compatibilist free will? Or an assertion that somehow you could create something without being responsible for its future actions, either by creating the policy that decided them or making them dependent on a source of randomness?
As Jack says, it’s the “theist version” of compatibilist free will, but you can replace “God” with “the universe” and the point goes through, Aquinas uses God because he’s trying to build up a coherent metaphysics. And quite successfully! He gave the “right answer” to the “free will problem” off-the-cuff as if it was no big deal. This raises my confidence that Aquinas is also insightful when he discusses things I don’t yet understand, like faith.
It doesn’t really have the form of a “rationality quote”. It’s too long to be quotable, not directly bearing on rationality, and doesn’t give rationality-warm-fuzzies like “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”.
It doesn’t really have the form of a “rationality quote”. It’s too long to be quotable, not directly bearing on rationality, and doesn’t give rationality-warm-fuzzies like “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”.
I think it is hard to dispute that several such statements have been upvoted in recent rationality quote threads.
Well, I downvoted it because it essentially replaces one ungrounded assumption (or rather, the answer to a wrong question,) with another ungrounded assumption. It’s an exercise in rationalization, not rationality.
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Question 83, Article 1
Is that just a theist version of compatibilist free will? Or an assertion that somehow you could create something without being responsible for its future actions, either by creating the policy that decided them or making them dependent on a source of randomness?
As Jack says, it’s the “theist version” of compatibilist free will, but you can replace “God” with “the universe” and the point goes through, Aquinas uses God because he’s trying to build up a coherent metaphysics. And quite successfully! He gave the “right answer” to the “free will problem” off-the-cuff as if it was no big deal. This raises my confidence that Aquinas is also insightful when he discusses things I don’t yet understand, like faith.
Aquinas gives all his answers off-the-cuff as if they were no big deal.
As far as early compatibilists go I prefer Chrysippus.
The former.
Is this down voted because it has the word “God” in it?
It doesn’t really have the form of a “rationality quote”. It’s too long to be quotable, not directly bearing on rationality, and doesn’t give rationality-warm-fuzzies like “that which can be destroyed by the truth should be”.
That said, probably yes.
I think it is hard to dispute that several such statements have been upvoted in recent rationality quote threads.
Well, I downvoted it because it essentially replaces one ungrounded assumption (or rather, the answer to a wrong question,) with another ungrounded assumption. It’s an exercise in rationalization, not rationality.