I am curious about the frequency with which the second and fourth points get brought up as advantages. In the historical case, multipolar conflicts are the most destructive. Forestalling an arms race by giving away technology also sets that technology as the mandatory minimum.
As a result, every country that has a computer science department in their universities is now a potential belligerent, and violent conflict without powerful AI has been effectively ruled out.
As a result, every country that has a computer science department in their universities is now a potential belligerent, and violent conflict without powerful AI has been effectively ruled out.
Also as a result every country that has a computer science department can try and build something to protect itself if any other country messes up the control problem. If you have a moderate take off scenario that can be pretty important.
As a result, every country that has a computer science department in their universities is now a potential belligerent, and violent conflict without powerful AI has been effectively ruled out.
“Powerful AI” is really a defense-favoring technique, in any “belligerent” context. Think about it, one of the things “AIs” are expected to be really good at is prediction and spotting suspicious circumstances (this is quite true even in current ML systems). So predicting and defending against future attacks becomes much easier, while the attacking side is not really improved in any immediately useful way. (You can try and tell stories about how AI might make offense easier, but the broader point is, each of these attacks plausibly has countermeasures, even if these are not obvious to you!)
The closest historical analogy here is probably the first stages of WWI, where the superiority of trench warfare also heavily favored defense. The modern ‘military-industrial complexes’ found in most developed countries today are also a ‘defensive’ response to subsequent developments in military history. In both cases, you’re basically tying up a whole lot of resources and manpower, but that’s little more than an annoyance economically. Especially compared to the huge benefits of (broadly ‘friendly’) AI in any other context!
AI in conflict is still only an optimization process; it remains constrained by the physical realities of the problem.
Defense is a fundamentally harder problem than offense.
The simple illustration is geometry; defending a territory requires 360 degrees * 90 degrees of coverage, whereas the attacker gets to choose their vector.
This drives a scenario where the security trap prohibits non-deployment of military AI, and the fundamental problem of defense means the AIs will privilege offensive solutions to security problems. The customary response is to develop resilient offensive ability, like second-strike...which leaves us with a huge surplus of distributed offensive power.
My confidence is low that catastrophic conflict can be averted in such a case.
The simple illustration is geometry; defending a territory requires 360 degrees * 90 degrees of coverage, whereas the attacker gets to choose their vector.
But attacking a territory requires long supply lines, whereas defenders are on their home turf.
But defending a territory requires constant readiness, whereas attackers can make a single focused effort on a surprise attack.
But attacking a territory requires mobility for every single weapons system, whereas defenders can plug their weapons straight into huge power plants or incorporate mountains into their armor.
But defending against violence requires you to keep targets in good repair, whereas attackers have entropy on their side.
But attackers have to break a Schelling point, thereby risking retribution from otherwise neutral third parties, whereas defenders are less likely to face a coalition.
But defenders have to make enough of their military capacity public for the public knowledge to serve as a deterrent, whereas attackers can keep much of their capabilities a secret until the attack begins.
But attackers have to leave their targets in an economically useful state and/or in an immediately-militarily-crippled state for a first strike to be profitable, whereas defenders can credibly precommit to purely destructive retaliation.
I could probably go on for a long time in this vein.
Overall I’d still say you’re more likely to be right than wrong, but I have no confidence in the accuracy of that.
None of these are hypotheticals, you realize. The prior has been established through a long and brutal process of trial and error.
Any given popular military authority can be read, but if you’d like a specialist in defense try Vaubon. Since we are talking about AI, the most relevant (and quantitative) information is found in the work done on nuclear conflict; Von Neumann did quite a bit of work aside from the bomb, including coining the phrase Mutually Assured Destruction. Also of note would be Herman Kahn.
Defense is a fundamentally harder problem than offense.
What matters is not whether defense is “harder” than offense, but what AI is most effective at improving. One of the things AIs are expected to be good at is monitoring those “360 * 90 degrees” for early signs of impending attacks, and thus enabling appropriate responses. You can view this as an “offensive” solution since it might very well require some sort of “second strike” reaction in order to neuter the attack, but most people would nonetheless regard such a response as part of “defense”. And “a huge surplus of distributed offensive power” is of little or no consequence if the equilibrium is such that the “offensive” power can be easily countered.
I am curious about the frequency with which the second and fourth points get brought up as advantages. In the historical case, multipolar conflicts are the most destructive. Forestalling an arms race by giving away technology also sets that technology as the mandatory minimum.
As a result, every country that has a computer science department in their universities is now a potential belligerent, and violent conflict without powerful AI has been effectively ruled out.
Also as a result every country that has a computer science department can try and build something to protect itself if any other country messes up the control problem. If you have a moderate take off scenario that can be pretty important.
“Powerful AI” is really a defense-favoring technique, in any “belligerent” context. Think about it, one of the things “AIs” are expected to be really good at is prediction and spotting suspicious circumstances (this is quite true even in current ML systems). So predicting and defending against future attacks becomes much easier, while the attacking side is not really improved in any immediately useful way. (You can try and tell stories about how AI might make offense easier, but the broader point is, each of these attacks plausibly has countermeasures, even if these are not obvious to you!)
The closest historical analogy here is probably the first stages of WWI, where the superiority of trench warfare also heavily favored defense. The modern ‘military-industrial complexes’ found in most developed countries today are also a ‘defensive’ response to subsequent developments in military history. In both cases, you’re basically tying up a whole lot of resources and manpower, but that’s little more than an annoyance economically. Especially compared to the huge benefits of (broadly ‘friendly’) AI in any other context!
I disagree, for two reasons.
AI in conflict is still only an optimization process; it remains constrained by the physical realities of the problem.
Defense is a fundamentally harder problem than offense.
The simple illustration is geometry; defending a territory requires 360 degrees * 90 degrees of coverage, whereas the attacker gets to choose their vector.
This drives a scenario where the security trap prohibits non-deployment of military AI, and the fundamental problem of defense means the AIs will privilege offensive solutions to security problems. The customary response is to develop resilient offensive ability, like second-strike...which leaves us with a huge surplus of distributed offensive power.
My confidence is low that catastrophic conflict can be averted in such a case.
But attacking a territory requires long supply lines, whereas defenders are on their home turf.
But defending a territory requires constant readiness, whereas attackers can make a single focused effort on a surprise attack.
But attacking a territory requires mobility for every single weapons system, whereas defenders can plug their weapons straight into huge power plants or incorporate mountains into their armor.
But defending against violence requires you to keep targets in good repair, whereas attackers have entropy on their side.
But attackers have to break a Schelling point, thereby risking retribution from otherwise neutral third parties, whereas defenders are less likely to face a coalition.
But defenders have to make enough of their military capacity public for the public knowledge to serve as a deterrent, whereas attackers can keep much of their capabilities a secret until the attack begins.
But attackers have to leave their targets in an economically useful state and/or in an immediately-militarily-crippled state for a first strike to be profitable, whereas defenders can credibly precommit to purely destructive retaliation.
I could probably go on for a long time in this vein.
Overall I’d still say you’re more likely to be right than wrong, but I have no confidence in the accuracy of that.
None of these are hypotheticals, you realize. The prior has been established through a long and brutal process of trial and error.
Any given popular military authority can be read, but if you’d like a specialist in defense try Vaubon. Since we are talking about AI, the most relevant (and quantitative) information is found in the work done on nuclear conflict; Von Neumann did quite a bit of work aside from the bomb, including coining the phrase Mutually Assured Destruction. Also of note would be Herman Kahn.
What matters is not whether defense is “harder” than offense, but what AI is most effective at improving. One of the things AIs are expected to be good at is monitoring those “360 * 90 degrees” for early signs of impending attacks, and thus enabling appropriate responses. You can view this as an “offensive” solution since it might very well require some sort of “second strike” reaction in order to neuter the attack, but most people would nonetheless regard such a response as part of “defense”. And “a huge surplus of distributed offensive power” is of little or no consequence if the equilibrium is such that the “offensive” power can be easily countered.