I don’t see why it would be at all difficult or mysterious for Omega to predict that I one-box. I mean, it’s not like my thought processes there are at all difficult to understand or predict.
My point is exactly that it is not mysterious. Omega used some concrete method to win his game, much in the same way that the fellow in question uses a particular method to win the punching game. The interesting question in the Newcomb problem is (a) what is the method, and (b) is the method defeatable. The punching game is defeatable. Giving up too early on the punching game is a missed chance to learn something about volition.
The right response to a “magic trick” is to try to learn how the trick works, not go around for the rest of one’s life assuming strangers can always pick out the ace of spades.
Omega’s not dumb. As soon as Omega knows you’re trying to “come up with a method to defeat him”, Omega knows your conclusion—coming to it by some clever line of reasoning isn’t going to change anything. The trick can’t be defeated by some future insight because there’s nothing mysterious about it.
Free-will-based causal decision theory: The simultaneous belief that two-boxing is the massively obvious, overdetermined answer output by a simple decision theory that everyone should adopt for reasons which seem super clear to you, and that Omega isn’t allowed to predict how many boxes you’re going to take by looking at you.
I am not saying anything weird, merely that the statements of the Newcomb’s problem I heard do not specify how Omega wins the game, merely that it wins a high percentage (all?) of the previous attempts. The same can be said for the punching game, played by a human (who, while quite smart about the volition of punching, is still defeatable).
There are algorithms that Omega could follow that are not defeatable (people like to discuss simulating players, and some others are possible too). Others might be defeatable. The correct decision theory in the punching game would learn how to defeat the punching game and walk away with $$$. The right decision theory in the Newcomb’s problem ought to first try to figure out if Omega is using a defeatable algorithm, and only one box if it is not, or if it is not possible to figure this out.
Okay, let’s try and defeat Omega. The goal is to do better than Eliezer Yudkowsky, which seems to be trustworthy about doing what he publicly says all over the place. Omega will definitely predict that Eliezer will one-box, and Eliezer will get the million.
The only way to do better is to two-box while making Omega believe that we will one-box, so we can get the $1001000 with more than 99.9% certainty. And of course,
Omega has access to our brain schematics
We don’t have access to Omega’s schematics. (optional)
Omega has way more processing power than we do.
Err, short of building an AI to beat the crap out of Omega, that looks pretty impossible. $1000 is not enough to make me do the impossible.
Omega used some concrete method to win his game, much in the same way that the fellow in question uses a particular method to win the punching game.
A crucial difference is that the punching game is real, while Newcomb’s problem is fiction, a thought experiment.
In the punching game, you can try to learn how the trick is done and how to defeat the opponent, and you are still engaged in the punching game.
In Newcomb’s problem, Omega is not a real thing that you could discover something about, in the way that there is something to discover about a real choshi dori master. There is no such thing as what Omega is really doing. If you think up different things that an Omega-like entity might be doing, and how these might be defeated to win $1,001,000, then you are no longer thinking about Newcomb’s problem, but about a different thought experiment in some class of Newcomb-like problems. I expect a lot of such thinking goes on at MIRI, and is more useful than endlessly debating the original problem, but it is not the sort of thing that you are doing to defeat choshi dori.
The right response to a “magic trick” is to try to learn how the trick works, not go around for the rest of one’s life assuming strangers can always pick out the ace of spades.
Here is a trivial model of the “trick” being fool-proof (and I do mean “fool” literally), which I believe has been discussed here a time or ten. Omega runs a perfect simulation of you, terminates it right after you make your selection or if you refuse to choose (he is a mean one), checks what it outputs, uses it to place money in the boxes. Omega won’t even offer the real you the game if you are one of those stubborn non-choosers. The termination clause is to prevent you from enjoying the spoils in case YOU are that simulation, so only the “real you” will know if he won or not. And to avoid any basilisk-like acausal trade. He is not that mean.
EDIT: if you think that the termination is a cruel cold-blooded murder, note that you do that all the time when evaluating what other people would do, then stop thinking about it, once you have your answer. The only difference is the fidelity level. If you don’t require 100% accuracy, you don’t need a perfect simulation.
I don’t see why it would be at all difficult or mysterious for Omega to predict that I one-box. I mean, it’s not like my thought processes there are at all difficult to understand or predict.
My point is exactly that it is not mysterious. Omega used some concrete method to win his game, much in the same way that the fellow in question uses a particular method to win the punching game. The interesting question in the Newcomb problem is (a) what is the method, and (b) is the method defeatable. The punching game is defeatable. Giving up too early on the punching game is a missed chance to learn something about volition.
The right response to a “magic trick” is to try to learn how the trick works, not go around for the rest of one’s life assuming strangers can always pick out the ace of spades.
Omega’s not dumb. As soon as Omega knows you’re trying to “come up with a method to defeat him”, Omega knows your conclusion—coming to it by some clever line of reasoning isn’t going to change anything. The trick can’t be defeated by some future insight because there’s nothing mysterious about it.
Free-will-based causal decision theory: The simultaneous belief that two-boxing is the massively obvious, overdetermined answer output by a simple decision theory that everyone should adopt for reasons which seem super clear to you, and that Omega isn’t allowed to predict how many boxes you’re going to take by looking at you.
I am not saying anything weird, merely that the statements of the Newcomb’s problem I heard do not specify how Omega wins the game, merely that it wins a high percentage (all?) of the previous attempts. The same can be said for the punching game, played by a human (who, while quite smart about the volition of punching, is still defeatable).
There are algorithms that Omega could follow that are not defeatable (people like to discuss simulating players, and some others are possible too). Others might be defeatable. The correct decision theory in the punching game would learn how to defeat the punching game and walk away with $$$. The right decision theory in the Newcomb’s problem ought to first try to figure out if Omega is using a defeatable algorithm, and only one box if it is not, or if it is not possible to figure this out.
Okay, let’s try and defeat Omega. The goal is to do better than Eliezer Yudkowsky, which seems to be trustworthy about doing what he publicly says all over the place. Omega will definitely predict that Eliezer will one-box, and Eliezer will get the million.
The only way to do better is to two-box while making Omega believe that we will one-box, so we can get the $1001000 with more than 99.9% certainty. And of course,
Omega has access to our brain schematics
We don’t have access to Omega’s schematics. (optional)
Omega has way more processing power than we do.
Err, short of building an AI to beat the crap out of Omega, that looks pretty impossible. $1000 is not enough to make me do the impossible.
A crucial difference is that the punching game is real, while Newcomb’s problem is fiction, a thought experiment.
In the punching game, you can try to learn how the trick is done and how to defeat the opponent, and you are still engaged in the punching game.
In Newcomb’s problem, Omega is not a real thing that you could discover something about, in the way that there is something to discover about a real choshi dori master. There is no such thing as what Omega is really doing. If you think up different things that an Omega-like entity might be doing, and how these might be defeated to win $1,001,000, then you are no longer thinking about Newcomb’s problem, but about a different thought experiment in some class of Newcomb-like problems. I expect a lot of such thinking goes on at MIRI, and is more useful than endlessly debating the original problem, but it is not the sort of thing that you are doing to defeat choshi dori.
Here is a trivial model of the “trick” being fool-proof (and I do mean “fool” literally), which I believe has been discussed here a time or ten. Omega runs a perfect simulation of you, terminates it right after you make your selection or if you refuse to choose (he is a mean one), checks what it outputs, uses it to place money in the boxes. Omega won’t even offer the real you the game if you are one of those stubborn non-choosers. The termination clause is to prevent you from enjoying the spoils in case YOU are that simulation, so only the “real you” will know if he won or not. And to avoid any basilisk-like acausal trade. He is not that mean.
EDIT: if you think that the termination is a cruel cold-blooded murder, note that you do that all the time when evaluating what other people would do, then stop thinking about it, once you have your answer. The only difference is the fidelity level. If you don’t require 100% accuracy, you don’t need a perfect simulation.