My thesis is that the o3 announcement is timelines-relevant in a strange way. The causation goes from o3 to impressiveness or utility of its successors trained on 1 GW training systems, then to decisions to build 5 GW training systems, and it’s those 5 GW training systems that have a proximate effect on timelines (in comparison to the world only having 1 GW training systems for a few years). The argument goes through even if o3 and its successors don’t particularly move timelines directly through their capabilities, they can remain a successful normal technology.
The funding constraint stopping $150bn training systems previously seemed more plausible, but with o3 it might be lifted. This is timelines-relevant precisely because there aren’t any other constraints that come into play before that point.
My thesis is that the o3 announcement is timelines-relevant in a strange way. The causation goes from o3 to impressiveness or utility of its successors trained on 1 GW training systems, then to decisions to build 5 GW training systems, and it’s those 5 GW training systems that have a proximate effect on timelines (in comparison to the world only having 1 GW training systems for a few years). The argument goes through even if o3 and its successors don’t particularly move timelines directly through their capabilities, they can remain a successful normal technology.
The funding constraint stopping $150bn training systems previously seemed more plausible, but with o3 it might be lifted. This is timelines-relevant precisely because there aren’t any other constraints that come into play before that point.