Actually, your comment and Vladimir’s comment highlight a potential opportunity for me to improve my rationality.
•I’ve noticed that when I believe A and when somebody presents me with credible evidence against A, I have a tendency to alter my belief to “not A” even when the evidence against A is too small to warrant such a transition.
I think that my thought process is something like “I said that I believe A, and in response person X presented credible evidence against A which I wasn’t aware of. The fact that person X has evidence against A which I wasn’t aware of is evidence that person X is thinking more clearly about the topic than I am. The fact that person X took the time to convey evidence against A is an indication that person X does not believe A. Therefore, I should not believe A either.”
This line of thought is not totally without merit, but I take it too far.
(1) Just because somebody makes a point that didn’t occur to me doesn’t mean that that they’re thinking more clearly about the topic than I am.
(2) Just because somebody makes a point that pushes against my current view doesn’t mean that the person disagrees with my current view.
On (2), if Vladimir had prefaced his remarks with the disclaimer “I still think that it’s worthwhile to think about attracting the attention of aliens as an existential risk, but here are some reasons why it might not be as worthwhile as it presently looks to you” then I would not have had such a volatile reaction to his remark—the strength of my reaction was somehow predicated on the idea that he believed that I was wrong to draw attention to “attracting the attention of aliens as an existential risk.”
If possible, I would like to overcome the issue labeled with a • above. I don’t know whether I can, but I would welcome any suggestions. Do you know of any specific Less Wrong posts that might be relevant?
Changing your mind too often is better than changing your mind too rarely, if on the net you manage to be confluent: if you change your mind by mistake, you can change it back later.
(I do believe that it’s not worthwhile to worry about attracting attention of aliens—if that isn’t clear—though it’s a priori worthwhile to think about whether it’s a risk. I’d guess Eliezer will be more conservative on such an issue and won’t rely on an apparently simple conclusion that it’s safe, declaring it dangerous until FAI makes a competent decision either way. I agree that it’s a negative-utility action though, just barely negative due to unknown unknowns.)
Just because somebody makes a point that pushes against my current view doesn’t mean that the person disagrees with my current view.
Actually that is a good heuristic for understanding most people. Only horribly pedantic people like myself tend to volunteer evidence against our own beliefs.
Yes, I think you’re right. The people on LessWrong are unusual. Even so, even when speaking to members of the general population, sometimes one will misinterpret the things that they say as evidence of certain beliefs. (They may be offering evidence to support their beliefs, but I may misinterpret which of their beliefs they’re offering evidence in support of).
Actually, your comment and Vladimir’s comment highlight a potential opportunity for me to improve my rationality.
•I’ve noticed that when I believe A and when somebody presents me with credible evidence against A, I have a tendency to alter my belief to “not A” even when the evidence against A is too small to warrant such a transition.
I think that my thought process is something like “I said that I believe A, and in response person X presented credible evidence against A which I wasn’t aware of. The fact that person X has evidence against A which I wasn’t aware of is evidence that person X is thinking more clearly about the topic than I am. The fact that person X took the time to convey evidence against A is an indication that person X does not believe A. Therefore, I should not believe A either.”
This line of thought is not totally without merit, but I take it too far.
(1) Just because somebody makes a point that didn’t occur to me doesn’t mean that that they’re thinking more clearly about the topic than I am.
(2) Just because somebody makes a point that pushes against my current view doesn’t mean that the person disagrees with my current view.
On (2), if Vladimir had prefaced his remarks with the disclaimer “I still think that it’s worthwhile to think about attracting the attention of aliens as an existential risk, but here are some reasons why it might not be as worthwhile as it presently looks to you” then I would not have had such a volatile reaction to his remark—the strength of my reaction was somehow predicated on the idea that he believed that I was wrong to draw attention to “attracting the attention of aliens as an existential risk.”
If possible, I would like to overcome the issue labeled with a • above. I don’t know whether I can, but I would welcome any suggestions. Do you know of any specific Less Wrong posts that might be relevant?
Changing your mind too often is better than changing your mind too rarely, if on the net you manage to be confluent: if you change your mind by mistake, you can change it back later.
(I do believe that it’s not worthwhile to worry about attracting attention of aliens—if that isn’t clear—though it’s a priori worthwhile to think about whether it’s a risk. I’d guess Eliezer will be more conservative on such an issue and won’t rely on an apparently simple conclusion that it’s safe, declaring it dangerous until FAI makes a competent decision either way. I agree that it’s a negative-utility action though, just barely negative due to unknown unknowns.)
Actually that is a good heuristic for understanding most people. Only horribly pedantic people like myself tend to volunteer evidence against our own beliefs.
Yes, I think you’re right. The people on LessWrong are unusual. Even so, even when speaking to members of the general population, sometimes one will misinterpret the things that they say as evidence of certain beliefs. (They may be offering evidence to support their beliefs, but I may misinterpret which of their beliefs they’re offering evidence in support of).
And in any case, my point (1) above still stands.