Now, you are free to choose to bite the bullet that it has never been about getting the correct betting odds in the first place. For some reason, people bite all kind of ridiculous bullets specifically in anthropic reasoning, and so I hoped that re-framing the issue as a recipe for purple paint may snap you out of it, which, apparently, failed to be the case.
By what standard do you judge some betting odds as “correct” here? If it’s ex ante optimality, I don’t see the motivation for that (as discussed in the post), and I’m unconvinced by just calling the verdict a “ridiculous bullet.” If it’s about matching the frequency of awakenings, I just don’t see why the decision should only count N once here — and there doesn’t seem to be a principled epistemology that guarantees you’ll count N exactly once if you use EDT, as I note in “Aside: Non-anthropically updating EDT sometimes ‘fails’ these cases.”
I gave independent epistemic arguments for anthropic updating at the end of the post, which you haven’t addressed, so I’m unconvinced by your insistence that SIA (and I presume you also mean to include max-RC-SSA?) is clearly wrong.
This subsection is another example of “two wrongs make a right” reasoning. You pointing out at some problems of EDT not related to antropic updating and then conclude that then the fact that EDT with anthropic updating has similar problems is okay. This doesn’t make sense. If a theory has a flaw we need to fix the flaw, not treat it as a license to add more flaws to the theory.
I gave independent epistemic arguments for anthropic updating at the end of the post, which you haven’t addressed
I’m sorry but I don’t see any substance in your argument to address. This step renders all the chain of reasoning meaningless:
What is P(w1,i|w1;I(Ω)), i.e., assuming I exist in the given world, how likely am I to be in a given index? Min-RC-SSA would say, “‘I’ am just guaranteed to be in whichever index corresponds to the person ‘I’ am.” This view has some merit (see, e.g., here and Builes (2020)). But it’s not obvious we should endorse it — I think a plausible alternative is that “I” am defined by some first-person perspective.[19] And this perspective, absent any other information, is just as likely to be each of the indices of observers in the world. On this alternative view,P(w1,i|w1;I(Ω))=1/n(Ow1).
You are saying that there is a view 1. that has some merits, but it’s not obvious that it is true so… you just assume the view 2., instead. Why? Why would you do it? What’s the argument that you should assume that? You don’t give any. Just make an ungrounded assumption and go with your reasoning further.
By what standard do you judge some betting odds as “correct” here? If it’s ex ante optimality, I don’t see the motivation for that (as discussed in the post), and I’m unconvinced by just calling the verdict a “ridiculous bullet.” If it’s about matching the frequency of awakenings, I just don’t see why the decision should only count N once here — and there doesn’t seem to be a principled epistemology that guarantees you’ll count N exactly once if you use EDT, as I note in “Aside: Non-anthropically updating EDT sometimes ‘fails’ these cases.”
I gave independent epistemic arguments for anthropic updating at the end of the post, which you haven’t addressed, so I’m unconvinced by your insistence that SIA (and I presume you also mean to include max-RC-SSA?) is clearly wrong.
The same as always. Correct betting odds systematically lead to winning.
The motivation is that you don’t need to invent extraordinary ways to wiggle out from being dutch booked, of course.
Do you systematically use this kind of reasoning in regards to betting odds? If so, what is your reasons to endourse EDT in the first place?
This subsection is another example of “two wrongs make a right” reasoning. You pointing out at some problems of EDT not related to antropic updating and then conclude that then the fact that EDT with anthropic updating has similar problems is okay. This doesn’t make sense. If a theory has a flaw we need to fix the flaw, not treat it as a license to add more flaws to the theory.
I’m sorry but I don’t see any substance in your argument to address. This step renders all the chain of reasoning meaningless:
You are saying that there is a view 1. that has some merits, but it’s not obvious that it is true so… you just assume the view 2., instead. Why? Why would you do it? What’s the argument that you should assume that? You don’t give any. Just make an ungrounded assumption and go with your reasoning further.