Yes, as it makes clear that what you’re talking about is a useful reduction of “preference”, unrelated to the common, “felt” meaning of “preference”. That alleviates the need to further discuss that portion of the reduction.
The next step of reduction would be to unpack your phrase “determine the world”… because that’s where you’re begging the question that the agent is determining the world, rather than determining the thing it models as “the world”.
So far, I have seen no-one explain how an agent can go beyond its own model of the world, except as perceived by another agent modeling the relationship between that agent and the world. It is simply repeatedly asserted (as you have effectively just done) as an obvious fact.
But if it is an obvious fact, it should be reducible, as “preference” is reducible, should it not?
Yes, as it makes clear that what you’re talking about is a useful reduction of “preference”, unrelated to the common, “felt” meaning of “preference”. That alleviates the need to further discuss that portion of the reduction.
The next step of reduction would be to unpack your phrase “determine the world”… because that’s where you’re begging the question that the agent is determining the world, rather than determining the thing it models as “the world”.
So far, I have seen no-one explain how an agent can go beyond its own model of the world, except as perceived by another agent modeling the relationship between that agent and the world. It is simply repeatedly asserted (as you have effectively just done) as an obvious fact.
But if it is an obvious fact, it should be reducible, as “preference” is reducible, should it not?
Hmm… Okay, this should’ve been easier if the possibility of this agreement was apparent to you. This thread is thereby merged here.