This, kind of feels like cheating. You use all its predictions but never give it credit for making them.
I don’t know what you mean by “give credit”. I’m happy to hand out all sorts of credit.
If I don’t have a criticism of using all QMs predictions, then I’ll use them. That someone doesn’t understand QM isn’t a criticism of this. That’s only a criticism of explanations of QM.
If this was correct it would mean that scientific truth is partly dependant on human minds,
It would mean that what ideas are valuable is partly dependent on what people exist to care about them.
Yudkowsky doesn’t use ‘definitely’ to mean ‘with certainty’.
What does it mean?
He shouldn’t write stuff that, using the dictionary definitions, is a myth about Popper, and not clarify. Even if you’re right he isn’t excused.
Weak criticisms are important, because they add up to strong ones and sometimes they are all we have to decide by.
I think they can’t and don’t. I think this is a big like saying 3 wrong answers add up to a right answer.
If an argument is false, why should it count for anything? Why would you ever want a large number of false arguments (false as best you can judge them) to trump one true argument (true as best you judge it)?
I wasn’t asking what you would do in pragmatic terms, I was asking at which point would you consider the theory refuted.
I would tentatively, fallibly consider the theory “it is a fair coin” refuted after, say, 20 flips. Why 20? I conjectured 20 and don’t have a criticism of it. For coin flipping in particular, if I had any rigorous needs, I would use some math in accordance with them.
It would mean that what ideas are valuable is partly dependent on what people exist to care about them.
Be careful with arguing that an idea’s value is a different thing to its truth, you’re starting to sound like an apologist.
If I don’t have a criticism of using all QMs predictions, then I’ll use them. That someone doesn’t understand QM isn’t a criticism of this. That’s only a criticism of explanations of QM.
If those explanations are helpful to some people they shouldn’t be rejected simply because they are not helpful to others. After all, without them we would never have the predictions.
He shouldn’t write stuff that, using the dictionary definitions, is a myth about Popper, and not clarify. Even if you’re right he isn’t excused.
I don’t know about the dictionary definitions, but in everyday conversation ‘definitely’ doesn’t mean ‘with certainty’. As Wittgenstein pointed out, these words are frequently used in contexts where the speaker might be wrong for dozens of reasons, and knows it. For instance, “I definitely left my keys by the microwave” is frequently false, and is generally only said by people who are feeling uncertain about it.
I would tentatively, fallibly consider the theory “it is a fair coin” refuted after, say, 20 flips. Why 20? I conjectured 20 and don’t have a criticism of it. For coin flipping in particular, if I had any rigorous needs, I would use some math in accordance with them.
I conjecture 21, you don’t have any criticism of that either. I now have a criticism of 20, which is that it fails to explain why my conjecture is wrong.
I think they can’t and don’t. I think this is a big like saying 3 wrong answers add up to a right answer.
If an argument is false, why should it count for anything? Why would you ever want a large number of false arguments (false as best you can judge them) to trump one true argument (true as best you judge it)?
A weak criticism is not the same as an invalid criticism. It just means a criticism that slightly erodes a position, without single-handedly bringing the whole thing crashing down.
If those explanations are helpful to some people they shouldn’t be rejected simply because they are not helpful to others
You are taking rejection as a bigger deal than it is. The theory that “X is the perfect explanation” for X that confuses some people is false.
So we reject it.
We can accept other theories, e.g. that X is flawed but, for some particular purpose, is appropriate to use.
I don’t know about the dictionary definitions,
It means “without doubt”. Saying things like “I have no doubt that X” when there is doubt is just dumb.
I conjecture 21, you don’t have any criticism of that either. I now have a criticism of 20, which is that it fails to explain why my conjecture is wrong.
The problem situation is under specified. When you ask ambiguous questions like what should I do in [under specified situation] then you get multiple possible answers and it’s hard to do much in the way of criticizing.
In real world situations (which have rich context), it’s not so hard to decide. But when I gave an example like that you objected.
I can’t criticize 20 vs 21 unless I have some goal in mind, some problem we are trying to solve. (If there is no problem to be solved, I won’t flip at all.) If the problem is figuring out if the coin is fair, with certainty, that is not solvable, so I won’t flip at all. If it is figuring it out with a particular probability, given a few reasonable background assumptions, then I will look up the right math to use. If it’s something else, what?
A weak criticism is not the same as an invalid criticism. It just means a criticism that slightly erodes a position, without single-handedly bringing the whole thing crashing down.
This is an important issue. I think your statement here is imprecise.
A criticism might demolish one single idea which is part of a bigger idea.
If it demolishes zero individual ideas, then where is the erosion?
If it demolishes one little idea, then that idea is refuted. And the big idea needs to replace it with something else which is not refuted, or find a way to do without.
You are taking rejection as a bigger deal than it is. The theory that “X is the perfect explanation” for X that confuses some people is false.
Maybe QM is exactly right, and maybe it is just too complicated for some people to understand. There is no need to be so harsh in your criticism process, why not just admit that a theory can be right without being perfect in every other respect.
It means “without doubt”. Saying things like “I have no doubt that X” when there is doubt is just dumb.
Yet everyone does it. Language is a convention, not a science. If you are using a word differently from everyone else then you are wrong, the dictionary has no authority on the matter.
The problem situation is under specified. When you ask ambiguous questions like what should I do in [under specified situation] then you get multiple possible answers and it’s hard to do much in the way of criticizing.
This is a flaw. Bayes can handle any level of information.
I can’t criticize 20 vs 21 unless I have some goal in mind, some problem we are trying to solve. (If there is no problem to be solved, I won’t flip at all.) If the problem is figuring out if the coin is fair, with certainty, that is not solvable, so I won’t flip at all. If it is figuring it out with a particular probability, given a few reasonable background assumptions, then I will look up the right math to use. If it’s something else, what?
Can you really not see why the above is moving the goal posts. Earlier, you said that you think by coming up with conjectures, and criticising them, and only then make decisions. Now you are putting the decision making process in the driving seat and saying that everything is based on that. So is Popperianism purely pragmatic? Is the whole conjecture and criticism thing not really the important part, and in fact its all based on decision strategies. Or do you use the conjecture-criticism thing to try and reach the correct answer, as you have previously stated, and then use that for decision making.
If it demolishes zero individual ideas, then where is the erosion?
It makes the idea less likely, less plausible, by a small amount. The coin flip is intended to illustrate it. Saying that you will use Bayes in the coin flip example and nowhere else is like saying you believe Newton’s laws work ‘inside the laboratory’ but you’re going to keep using Aristotle outside.
I don’t know what you mean by “give credit”. I’m happy to hand out all sorts of credit.
If I don’t have a criticism of using all QMs predictions, then I’ll use them. That someone doesn’t understand QM isn’t a criticism of this. That’s only a criticism of explanations of QM.
It would mean that what ideas are valuable is partly dependent on what people exist to care about them.
What does it mean?
He shouldn’t write stuff that, using the dictionary definitions, is a myth about Popper, and not clarify. Even if you’re right he isn’t excused.
I think they can’t and don’t. I think this is a big like saying 3 wrong answers add up to a right answer.
If an argument is false, why should it count for anything? Why would you ever want a large number of false arguments (false as best you can judge them) to trump one true argument (true as best you judge it)?
I would tentatively, fallibly consider the theory “it is a fair coin” refuted after, say, 20 flips. Why 20? I conjectured 20 and don’t have a criticism of it. For coin flipping in particular, if I had any rigorous needs, I would use some math in accordance with them.
Be careful with arguing that an idea’s value is a different thing to its truth, you’re starting to sound like an apologist.
If those explanations are helpful to some people they shouldn’t be rejected simply because they are not helpful to others. After all, without them we would never have the predictions.
I don’t know about the dictionary definitions, but in everyday conversation ‘definitely’ doesn’t mean ‘with certainty’. As Wittgenstein pointed out, these words are frequently used in contexts where the speaker might be wrong for dozens of reasons, and knows it. For instance, “I definitely left my keys by the microwave” is frequently false, and is generally only said by people who are feeling uncertain about it.
I conjecture 21, you don’t have any criticism of that either. I now have a criticism of 20, which is that it fails to explain why my conjecture is wrong.
A weak criticism is not the same as an invalid criticism. It just means a criticism that slightly erodes a position, without single-handedly bringing the whole thing crashing down.
The coin-flip thing was intended as an example.
You are taking rejection as a bigger deal than it is. The theory that “X is the perfect explanation” for X that confuses some people is false.
So we reject it.
We can accept other theories, e.g. that X is flawed but, for some particular purpose, is appropriate to use.
It means “without doubt”. Saying things like “I have no doubt that X” when there is doubt is just dumb.
The problem situation is under specified. When you ask ambiguous questions like what should I do in [under specified situation] then you get multiple possible answers and it’s hard to do much in the way of criticizing.
In real world situations (which have rich context), it’s not so hard to decide. But when I gave an example like that you objected.
I can’t criticize 20 vs 21 unless I have some goal in mind, some problem we are trying to solve. (If there is no problem to be solved, I won’t flip at all.) If the problem is figuring out if the coin is fair, with certainty, that is not solvable, so I won’t flip at all. If it is figuring it out with a particular probability, given a few reasonable background assumptions, then I will look up the right math to use. If it’s something else, what?
This is an important issue. I think your statement here is imprecise.
A criticism might demolish one single idea which is part of a bigger idea.
If it demolishes zero individual ideas, then where is the erosion?
If it demolishes one little idea, then that idea is refuted. And the big idea needs to replace it with something else which is not refuted, or find a way to do without.
Maybe QM is exactly right, and maybe it is just too complicated for some people to understand. There is no need to be so harsh in your criticism process, why not just admit that a theory can be right without being perfect in every other respect.
Yet everyone does it. Language is a convention, not a science. If you are using a word differently from everyone else then you are wrong, the dictionary has no authority on the matter.
This is a flaw. Bayes can handle any level of information.
Can you really not see why the above is moving the goal posts. Earlier, you said that you think by coming up with conjectures, and criticising them, and only then make decisions. Now you are putting the decision making process in the driving seat and saying that everything is based on that. So is Popperianism purely pragmatic? Is the whole conjecture and criticism thing not really the important part, and in fact its all based on decision strategies. Or do you use the conjecture-criticism thing to try and reach the correct answer, as you have previously stated, and then use that for decision making.
It makes the idea less likely, less plausible, by a small amount. The coin flip is intended to illustrate it. Saying that you will use Bayes in the coin flip example and nowhere else is like saying you believe Newton’s laws work ‘inside the laboratory’ but you’re going to keep using Aristotle outside.