So if I’m not a Yudkowskian rationalist and I want to say that if, in Game of Life, the configuration of cells had been different (so instead of configuration1, it had been configuration2), the outcome would’ve also been different (outcome2 instead of outcome1), that’s not a counterfactual? (Since it’s not defined in terms of subjective or objective probability.)
One of the problems Rationalists have with counterfactuals is motivational: why would you think of an alternate history of a game of life, when there is zero probability that it started in a different state?
So you’re saying that it is a counterfactual (despite not involving subjective or objective probability), but you’re saying there is a problem in nobody being motivated to think about said counterfactual?
So you’re neither saying it’s not a counterfactual (despite it not involving either subjective or objective probability), nor you’re saying there is a problem with nobody being motivated to think about them.
In a deterministic universe (the jury is still out as to whether the indeterminism of our universe impacts our decisions), free will is hidden in the other if-branches of the computation-which-is-you. It could’ve made another decision, but it didn’t. You can imagine that as another possible world with that computation being slightly different (such that it makes another decision).
Counterfactuals don’t have ontological existence. We talk about them to talk about other possible worlds which are similar to ours in some aspects and different in others.
Off course zero not being a probability means that you don’t know with infinite strength which one is the real history of game of life. There is a perspective that probablities fundamentally are thinkresource allocations, giving a low probablity means you don’t/shouldn’t think with/about it.
So if I’m not a Yudkowskian rationalist and I want to say that if, in Game of Life, the configuration of cells had been different (so instead of configuration1, it had been configuration2), the outcome would’ve also been different (outcome2 instead of outcome1), that’s not a counterfactual? (Since it’s not defined in terms of subjective or objective probability.)
One of the problems Rationalists have with counterfactuals is motivational: why would you think of an alternate history of a game of life, when there is zero probability that it started in a different state?
So you’re saying that it is a counterfactual (despite not involving subjective or objective probability), but you’re saying there is a problem in nobody being motivated to think about said counterfactual?
I’m saying the Rationalists are saying that …I don’t have a problem with counterfactuals myself.
So you’re neither saying it’s not a counterfactual (despite it not involving either subjective or objective probability), nor you’re saying there is a problem with nobody being motivated to think about them.
So what are you saying?
If you want to think about the outcomes of a a counterfactual its just a conditional whose antecedent didn’t happen.
But thats not the problem Rationalists have.
Indeed.
So what is the problem?
The motivational problem is “why think about alternative decisions when you could only have made one decision?”.
The ontological problem is “where do counterfactuals exist?”
In a deterministic universe (the jury is still out as to whether the indeterminism of our universe impacts our decisions), free will is hidden in the other if-branches of the computation-which-is-you. It could’ve made another decision, but it didn’t. You can imagine that as another possible world with that computation being slightly different (such that it makes another decision).
Counterfactuals don’t have ontological existence. We talk about them to talk about other possible worlds which are similar to ours in some aspects and different in others.
Off course zero not being a probability means that you don’t know with infinite strength which one is the real history of game of life. There is a perspective that probablities fundamentally are thinkresource allocations, giving a low probablity means you don’t/shouldn’t think with/about it.