Have you given even a moment’s thought to what Vivek might say in response to your objections? I get the impression that you haven’t, and that you know essentially nothing about the views of the opposing side on this issue.
The three bullet points in your summary of his argument are not an example of dark arts just on account of seeming unconvincing to you. They are actual arguments that you may disagree with, and which you consider obviously stupid simply because you have no clue what response he would give to your objections, and so you blithely assume that he would have no response and that there is no more substance behind his arguments than what he is able to provide in that particular debate forum. That assumption is flatly incorrect.
Here are a few examples:
Promotion of liberal/democratic values
That’s literally the exoteric party line that even the people of your side do not believe in, if they are in-the-know. It’s not about promoting liberal/democratic values, it’s about safeguarding the pax americana to preserve a progressive technocracy within USA. One that is more Rousseauvian than liberal. Read some Mahan, Brzezinski, hell even Walter Lippmann or for that matter even Noam Chomsky should be fully sufficient to dispel this illusion.
Russian actions aren’t unique, however. Rather, history shows Russia acted very similarly in Georgia, where military force was used in response to threats of European integration. Yet, curiously, we do not see the same force applied to NATO member states. Finland’s accession did not spark a military invasion. The Baltics still remain safe from Russian military aggression. If there has been a consistent deterrent to Russia, it has been military force, vis-a-vis NATO membership.
Finland was already part of the geopolitical west as evidenced by its membership in the EU. Becoming a member of NATO did not constitute a threatening expansionist move the way that Ukraine’s prospective membership does.
In all cases, we see countries asking to join NATO, not the other way around, because those countries understand that to defend their national sovereignty they need NATO membership as a safeguard against Russian invasion.
“Sovereignty” here being an interesting euphemism for being a protectorate of USA and the international order. What is the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty again? Let’s ask Emer de Vattel, hm… Oops.
Well at least now we know why European covid policy, monetary policy, government spending, etc. is practically a carbon copy of USA. You may want to rethink some conclusions of which nations exactly are sovereign.
So appeasement doesn’t work. Who’d have guessed?
Ah there we have it, the cult of Churchill. Appeasement was a highly idealistic doctrine with its own fair share of issues compared to the geopolitics of the pre-Wilsonian era, but compared to the deranged foreign policy USA is pursuing these days, it works like a charm, and would have sufficed in WW2 as well if followed in a principled manner. See eg. Human Smoke by Nicholson Baker or Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War by Pat Buchanan. Incidentally, Pat Buchanan got that phrase, “the unnecessary war”, from none other than Churchill, who was indeed referencing WW2 which he deemed unnecessary in hindsight. Even Churchill himself, the absolute maniac, was not quite maniacal enough to be a Churchillian.
If Ukraine falls, the Baltics are likely next, and the world will face the terrifying prospect of a clash between nuclear powers. And, as America is distracted, maybe a Taiwan Strait Crisis as well.
It is facing that prospect as it is. Being excessively bellicose does not diminish the danger, or at least not so obviously as you seem to be implying.
What about Ukraine? Ukrainians have died in the hundreds of thousands to defend their country. Civil society has mobilized for a total war. Zelensky retains overwhelming popular support, and by and large the populace is committed to a long war.
Is this the picture of a people about to give up? I think not.
Indeed not; it is the picture of sunk cost fallacy in a case with tragically high stakes.
Though wrong, his answers are straightforward, and reflect a clear, internally cohesive narrative. The uninformed judge cannot tell him from someone with a genuine understanding of geopolitics. In fact, he’s far more convincing than his opposing candidates, who defend Ukraine aid with overt emotional appeals.
Because his opposing candidates, with their “overt emotional appeals” are the dark side, and Vivek is constrained by the debate medium and by time limitations. Likewise, I am constrained by having to get at very deep disagreements and a profoundly distorted view of history held by the establishment, more than can possibly be overcome in a comment, or even a post. It would require several entire books, or at least many very lengthy conversations in a very different spirit than some hot button debate about a pressing topic.
So I understand if this comment seems annoying on account of just referencing a bunch of books. But the point I am trying to make is not really about the geopolitics of the Ukraine situation, but rather about the fact that these books do exist, that you have very little familiarity with them and yet consider yourself informed on the issue, that even if Vivek has not read these books, the ideas they contain are part of the discourse in his political sphere.
You have not shown a way to defend against the dark arts. You have shown a way to defend the dark arts.
Have you given even a moment’s thought to what Vivek might say in response to your objections? I get the impression that you haven’t, and that you know essentially nothing about the views of the opposing side on this issue.
Well… yes. It’s essentially covered by what I went over. In my view at least, me and Vivek have a narrative disagreement, as opposed to a dispute over a single set or series of facts. In any case, I imagine the points of contest would be
The benefit of Ukraine aid for US foreign policy
The costs imposed on the US
Moral concerns with more vague ideas like ‘supporting democracy’
There’s many rebuttals I could foresee him giving, such as poor battlefield outcomes in Ukraine, relatively more pressing domestic concerns at home, or some variation of realist foreign policy values. In any case I find those arguments unconvincing, which I’ve tried to articulate.
I could respond to your arguments, but then I doubt it’s much use to explain my position on books I haven’t read and thinkers I’m not familiar with. I’m still not entirely sure what exactly you’re arguing for, only that you believe my argument is wrong. Can you present a coherent narrative independently rather than simply citing people?
In the interests of moving forward the discussion, let me try to summarize what I feel you’ve attempted to communicate.
Continued efforts by the Ukranian military and state are likely doomed to fail
Aiding Ukraine does not meaningfully diminish the threat to eastern europe or europe in general
Finland’s Accession to NATO was not a meaningful security dilemma for Russia, but Ukraine is
Historically speaking, it would have been better for Great Britain to make peace with Hitler. Appeasement is a viable strategy.
Is this correct? I am comfortable having a longer discussion if you like, but then it’s not a focus of this post, only a subpoint. If you’d like to have a debate in private messages I’m open, but otherwise I think I’ve answered your main question. Yes, I did consider counterarguments and competing narratives. I commonly do so in regular debate. I did not find them convincing.
Sort of, but you’re missing my main point, which is simply that what Vivek did is not actually dark arts, and that what you are doing is.
His arguments, as you summarised them into bullet points, are topical and in good faith. They are at worst erroneous and not an example of bullshitting. You have convinced yourself that if he were to contend with your objections, he’d resort to surface level arguments about battlefield outcomes, pressing domestic concerns, etc., which actually would fall under your category of ultra-bullshit. Ie. you did in fact assume that he does not have substantive arguments in favour of, say, paleoconservative geopolitical principles, and you accuse him of practising dark arts simply on account of the response you assume he would come up with.
Sort of, but you’re missing my main point, which is simply that what Vivek did is not actually dark arts, and that what you are doing is. His arguments, as you summarised them into bullet points, are topical and in good faith. They are at worst erroneous and not an example of bullshitting.
Ah, ok. Allow me a clarification then.
In typical terms, ultra-BS is lying. (as in, you know you are wrong and speak as if you’re right anyways). In my view, however, there’s also an extension to that. If you are aware that you don’t have knowledge on a topic and make wild assertions anyhow to support a narrative (say, if I declared that Kremlin whisperers are considering a coup against Putin) I would also be ‘BS-ing’. I’m not lying in the traditional sense, as it’s certainly possible I’m correct (however unlikely). But if I clearly don’t have information then I can’t act as if I do. Thus I’d consider some ‘erroneous’ arguments by Vivek to be bullshit, because it displays an information gap I have trouble believing he wasn’t aware of.
So, in the interest of clarity. Consider again the points Vivek made:
Aid doesn’t serve American interests
The war effort is doomed
Aid prolongs the war (a peace deal is better)
My assessment of 1) is still the same, although you’re right. It’s possible Vivek has different politics. So I’m comfortable believing this is merely erroneous rather than bullshit. The same cannot be said for 2) and 3), however.
To say that aid doesn’t serve American interests legitimately is a qualified assessment. You must have an understanding of American interests, and the specific geopolitical situation at hand. That by proxy means an understanding of Ukraine, it’s geopolitical significance, it’s battlefield dynamics and how an outcome of the war may effect the U.S. If you do not understand geopolitics, and simply cherrypick arguments, I’d contend that you’re still using ultra-BS, because even though yourover all point is legitimate the process you used to defend it is not.
With knowledge about the specific situation in Ukraine, you cannot reasonably believe 2) and 3). In effect, it ignores defense economics, long run battlefield outcomes, historical precedent, and a variety of other things which is a prerequisite for making a proper geopolitical argument.
Imagine for example of an anti war protestor arguing that the U.S should withdraw from Vietnam because
It doesn’t serve American interests
The U.S, in pure military terms, is losing the war
Ho Chi Minh was legitimately democratic
I would believe this argument is ‘BS’, as said protestor clearly doesn’t understand the Vietnam war, regardless of whether his geopolitics are correct. He is applying (or more likely, borrowing) analysis he didn’t critically think about to a situation he doesn’t understand. The U.S was clearly not losing the war in military terms, as we can observe with casualty figures. Ho Chi Minh’s multiple antidemocratic practices (intimidating voters, purging opposition) are likewise also ignored.
Much the same with Vivek. Either he had the necessary information to make a qualified analysis, or he did not. I find it implausible he studied the issue and still had an information gap. On the contrary, if he analyzed the situation without first studying it (which I find more likely) it would also be ‘BS’.
In typical terms, ultra-BS is lying. (as in, you know you are wrong and speak as if you’re right anyways). In my view, however, there’s also an extension to that. If you are aware that you don’t have knowledge on a topic and make wild assertions anyhow to support a narrative (say, if I declared that Kremlin whisperers are considering a coup against Putin) I would also be ‘BS-ing’. I’m not lying in the traditional sense, as it’s certainly possible I’m correct (however unlikely). But if I clearly don’t have information then I can’t act as if I do. Thus I’d consider some ‘erroneous’ arguments by Vivek to be bullshit, because it displays an information gap I have trouble believing he wasn’t aware of.
I understand how you use the terms, but my point is that Vivek does not in fact demonstrate the information gap you impute to him. I am confident he would be easily able to address your objections.
The same cannot be said for 2) and 3), however.
The fact that the war has persisted for so long seems sufficient proof that, in the absence of the aid, Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or at worst suffered a quick defeat. In either case, the war would have been shorter. Point 3 is unambiguously correct, and even most people on your side of the issue would agree with that (ie. they believe that a large part of the reason Ukraine has been able to fight so long has been the aid)
With knowledge about the specific situation in Ukraine, you cannot reasonably believe 2) and 3).
There are lots of people of the realist school of geopolitics who know a lot about the specific situation in Ukraine and who nevertheless at least claim to believe 2. Are they all liars? I don’t think so. I guess you could argue that they are all unreasonable and thus capable of believing it despite contrary evidence, but such a stance is again merely arguing that point 2 is erroneous, not that it is dark arts.
Is my position more clear now?
No. Your position was already quite clear from the original post. It’s just incorrect, not unclear.
I understand how you use the terms, but my point is that Vivek does not in fact demonstrate the information gap you impute to him. I am confident he would be easily able to address your objections.
Ok. Let me address this then.
The fact that the war has persisted for so long seems sufficient proof that, in the absence of the aid, Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or at worst suffered a quick defeat. In either case, the war would have been shorter. Point 3 is unambiguously correct, and even most people on your side of the issue would agree with that (ie. they believe that a large part of the reason Ukraine has been able to fight so long has been the aid)
I’ll contend this is either part of an information gap or a very strange interpretation of events.
Consider the following series of statements: As the Russian army has more mass and equipment than the Baltic states, the Russians can take the Baltics whenever they please. Therefore, it’s inevitable that Russia will emerge victorious, and defending the Baltics is pointless.
On paper, this would seem to be roughly accurate, except of course it completely ignores the NATO intervention which will likely happen, NATO troops forward positioned in the Baltics, as well as Russia’s existing commitments in Ukraine.
In much the same way, saying that ‘Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or suffered a quick defeat’ is only correct in counterfactual realities. You could of course argue that if the West did not help Ukraine structure it’s military prior to the invasion, no help of any kind was delivered (even from Eastern Europe) during the invasion, and magically granted Putin infinite domestic popularity, the war would’ve ended quickly. But at that point we are living in a different reality. A reality where Russia actually had the capability for a Desert Storm esque operation.
This is, to the best of my knowledge, not even something the realists argued after the initial invasion failed. While prior to the invasion this was the narrative, afterwards this was clearly shown to be false.
Western aid did not intensify to a meaningfully significant degree prior to the battle of Kyiv, which was Russia’s only hope of a ‘quick victory’. While stingers, NLAWs, and other anti tank equipment was useful, the West primarily aimed to supply Ukraine for the purposes of a protracted insurgency, not a conventional war. We did not see deliveries of heavy equipment, and even now we’re still waiting on F-16s.
The results of Western aid have also been mixed. While humanitarian and financial support has allowed the Ukranian state and economy to continue on life support, we see that much of NATO’s doctrine does not apply in Ukraine, as Ukraine doesn’t have the air superiority necessary for combined arms operations. Some systems, like air defense, HIGHMARS, and long range strike missiles (Storm Shadow, ATACAMS) have played a key role, but they neither provided a decisive strategic advantage nor negated one on the part of the Russians. (partly because they were delivered in insufficient quantities) You can argue that Ukraine would suffer greatly if they lacked these options, but arguing they would’ve suffered quick, decisive defeat runs completely contradictory to reality, as they lacked these capabilities prior to the push on Kyiv and survived anyhow. (if you want to argue Russia ‘wins’ a quick and decisive victory without taking Kyiv or holding most of Ukraine’s territory, be my guest, but I think we can both agree that would be ridiculous)
Overall, if Russia had shown a capability to win (the VKS secures air dominance, Russian logistics could secure a sustained push deep into the Ukranian heartland, Russian deployments significantly exceeded Ukraine’s mobilization pool) you may have a case Ukraine would’ve lost quickly. But anybody who has observed the retreat from Kyiv can understand that Russia simply doesn’t have that capability. They are not the U.S military, and the VKS is not the USAF. They do not have the air superiority necessary for blitzkrieg. This war is primarily an attritional battle, and if Ukraine’s effort did not collapse prior to delivery of NATO aid it’s rather contradictory to argue they would collapse immediately after. (indeed, they performed well on the Kharkiv counteroffensive while aid was still ramping up)
I believe this to be a part of an information gap. Not understanding Russia and Ukraine’s true military capabilities. (understanding them is, of course, a key part of any geopolitical judgement, since otherwise you cannot tell whether a side is on the brink of defeat or victory). If Vivek was not aware of this gap, then he made an unqualified analysis, and if he was then his analysis is clearly wrong.
The realists argue that regardless of Ukraine’s military potential Ukranian statehood is not a relevant concern, and should be handed over to Russia (likely along with Eastern Europe to broker an alliance against China). Even this aside, they do not believe Russia has a decisive capability advantage. Only an attritional advantage. Thus they can believe 2) and 3), but only assuming the absence of aid. I thus don’t believe Vivek is actually arguing for the realist position, but if you believe he is feel free to find sources. I have not seen any indication of this being the case.
In much the same way, saying that ‘Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or suffered a quick defeat’ is only correct in counterfactual realities. You could of course argue that if the West did not help Ukraine structure it’s military prior to the invasion, no help of any kind was delivered (even from Eastern Europe) during the invasion, and magically granted Putin infinite domestic popularity, the war would’ve ended quickly. But at that point we are living in a different reality. A reality where Russia actually had the capability for a Desert Storm esque operation.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it. The claim that giving aid is prolonging the war is implicitly a comparison to the counterfactual in which aid isn’t given. I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help, and I think there are limits to how uncharitably you can impute their views before you are the one engaging in dark arts.
Western aid did not intensify
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
I believe this to be a part of an information gap. Not understanding Russia and Ukraine’s true military capabilities. (understanding them is, of course, a key part of any geopolitical judgement, since otherwise you cannot tell whether a side is on the brink of defeat or victory). If Vivek was not aware of this gap, then he made an unqualified analysis, and if he was then his analysis is clearly wrong.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does. A lot of evidence can be gleaned from which geopolitics experts said what, from which ones changed their mind, and the timing of when they did so, etc. In addition, this being a war of attrition as you pointed out, the key determination to make is who is better situated to win that war of attrition. How many able-bodied, working-age men does Ukraine have left, again?
But by the epistemic standards you have implied, he would need to be a domain expert to hold an opinion, which would leave him strikingly vulnerable to ultra-BS, and more importantly, would cede the whole playing field to technocracy from the get-go. Vivek is part of what could be called the “anti-expert faction”.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.
Have you given even a moment’s thought to what Vivek might say in response to your objections? I get the impression that you haven’t, and that you know essentially nothing about the views of the opposing side on this issue.
The three bullet points in your summary of his argument are not an example of dark arts just on account of seeming unconvincing to you. They are actual arguments that you may disagree with, and which you consider obviously stupid simply because you have no clue what response he would give to your objections, and so you blithely assume that he would have no response and that there is no more substance behind his arguments than what he is able to provide in that particular debate forum. That assumption is flatly incorrect.
Here are a few examples:
That’s literally the exoteric party line that even the people of your side do not believe in, if they are in-the-know. It’s not about promoting liberal/democratic values, it’s about safeguarding the pax americana to preserve a progressive technocracy within USA. One that is more Rousseauvian than liberal. Read some Mahan, Brzezinski, hell even Walter Lippmann or for that matter even Noam Chomsky should be fully sufficient to dispel this illusion.
Finland was already part of the geopolitical west as evidenced by its membership in the EU. Becoming a member of NATO did not constitute a threatening expansionist move the way that Ukraine’s prospective membership does.
“Sovereignty” here being an interesting euphemism for being a protectorate of USA and the international order. What is the difference between suzerainty and sovereignty again? Let’s ask Emer de Vattel, hm… Oops.
Well at least now we know why European covid policy, monetary policy, government spending, etc. is practically a carbon copy of USA. You may want to rethink some conclusions of which nations exactly are sovereign.
Ah there we have it, the cult of Churchill. Appeasement was a highly idealistic doctrine with its own fair share of issues compared to the geopolitics of the pre-Wilsonian era, but compared to the deranged foreign policy USA is pursuing these days, it works like a charm, and would have sufficed in WW2 as well if followed in a principled manner. See eg. Human Smoke by Nicholson Baker or Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War by Pat Buchanan. Incidentally, Pat Buchanan got that phrase, “the unnecessary war”, from none other than Churchill, who was indeed referencing WW2 which he deemed unnecessary in hindsight. Even Churchill himself, the absolute maniac, was not quite maniacal enough to be a Churchillian.
It is facing that prospect as it is. Being excessively bellicose does not diminish the danger, or at least not so obviously as you seem to be implying.
Indeed not; it is the picture of sunk cost fallacy in a case with tragically high stakes.
Because his opposing candidates, with their “overt emotional appeals” are the dark side, and Vivek is constrained by the debate medium and by time limitations. Likewise, I am constrained by having to get at very deep disagreements and a profoundly distorted view of history held by the establishment, more than can possibly be overcome in a comment, or even a post. It would require several entire books, or at least many very lengthy conversations in a very different spirit than some hot button debate about a pressing topic.
So I understand if this comment seems annoying on account of just referencing a bunch of books. But the point I am trying to make is not really about the geopolitics of the Ukraine situation, but rather about the fact that these books do exist, that you have very little familiarity with them and yet consider yourself informed on the issue, that even if Vivek has not read these books, the ideas they contain are part of the discourse in his political sphere.
You have not shown a way to defend against the dark arts. You have shown a way to defend the dark arts.
Well… yes. It’s essentially covered by what I went over. In my view at least, me and Vivek have a narrative disagreement, as opposed to a dispute over a single set or series of facts. In any case, I imagine the points of contest would be
The benefit of Ukraine aid for US foreign policy
The costs imposed on the US
Moral concerns with more vague ideas like ‘supporting democracy’
There’s many rebuttals I could foresee him giving, such as poor battlefield outcomes in Ukraine, relatively more pressing domestic concerns at home, or some variation of realist foreign policy values. In any case I find those arguments unconvincing, which I’ve tried to articulate.
I could respond to your arguments, but then I doubt it’s much use to explain my position on books I haven’t read and thinkers I’m not familiar with. I’m still not entirely sure what exactly you’re arguing for, only that you believe my argument is wrong. Can you present a coherent narrative independently rather than simply citing people?
In the interests of moving forward the discussion, let me try to summarize what I feel you’ve attempted to communicate.
Continued efforts by the Ukranian military and state are likely doomed to fail
Aiding Ukraine does not meaningfully diminish the threat to eastern europe or europe in general
Finland’s Accession to NATO was not a meaningful security dilemma for Russia, but Ukraine is
Historically speaking, it would have been better for Great Britain to make peace with Hitler. Appeasement is a viable strategy.
Is this correct? I am comfortable having a longer discussion if you like, but then it’s not a focus of this post, only a subpoint. If you’d like to have a debate in private messages I’m open, but otherwise I think I’ve answered your main question. Yes, I did consider counterarguments and competing narratives. I commonly do so in regular debate. I did not find them convincing.
Sort of, but you’re missing my main point, which is simply that what Vivek did is not actually dark arts, and that what you are doing is.
His arguments, as you summarised them into bullet points, are topical and in good faith. They are at worst erroneous and not an example of bullshitting. You have convinced yourself that if he were to contend with your objections, he’d resort to surface level arguments about battlefield outcomes, pressing domestic concerns, etc., which actually would fall under your category of ultra-bullshit. Ie. you did in fact assume that he does not have substantive arguments in favour of, say, paleoconservative geopolitical principles, and you accuse him of practising dark arts simply on account of the response you assume he would come up with.
Ah, ok. Allow me a clarification then.
In typical terms, ultra-BS is lying. (as in, you know you are wrong and speak as if you’re right anyways). In my view, however, there’s also an extension to that. If you are aware that you don’t have knowledge on a topic and make wild assertions anyhow to support a narrative (say, if I declared that Kremlin whisperers are considering a coup against Putin) I would also be ‘BS-ing’. I’m not lying in the traditional sense, as it’s certainly possible I’m correct (however unlikely). But if I clearly don’t have information then I can’t act as if I do. Thus I’d consider some ‘erroneous’ arguments by Vivek to be bullshit, because it displays an information gap I have trouble believing he wasn’t aware of.
So, in the interest of clarity. Consider again the points Vivek made:
Aid doesn’t serve American interests
The war effort is doomed
Aid prolongs the war (a peace deal is better)
My assessment of 1) is still the same, although you’re right. It’s possible Vivek has different politics. So I’m comfortable believing this is merely erroneous rather than bullshit. The same cannot be said for 2) and 3), however.
To say that aid doesn’t serve American interests legitimately is a qualified assessment. You must have an understanding of American interests, and the specific geopolitical situation at hand. That by proxy means an understanding of Ukraine, it’s geopolitical significance, it’s battlefield dynamics and how an outcome of the war may effect the U.S. If you do not understand geopolitics, and simply cherrypick arguments, I’d contend that you’re still using ultra-BS, because even though yourover all point is legitimate the process you used to defend it is not.
With knowledge about the specific situation in Ukraine, you cannot reasonably believe 2) and 3). In effect, it ignores defense economics, long run battlefield outcomes, historical precedent, and a variety of other things which is a prerequisite for making a proper geopolitical argument.
Imagine for example of an anti war protestor arguing that the U.S should withdraw from Vietnam because
It doesn’t serve American interests
The U.S, in pure military terms, is losing the war
Ho Chi Minh was legitimately democratic
I would believe this argument is ‘BS’, as said protestor clearly doesn’t understand the Vietnam war, regardless of whether his geopolitics are correct. He is applying (or more likely, borrowing) analysis he didn’t critically think about to a situation he doesn’t understand. The U.S was clearly not losing the war in military terms, as we can observe with casualty figures. Ho Chi Minh’s multiple antidemocratic practices (intimidating voters, purging opposition) are likewise also ignored.
Much the same with Vivek. Either he had the necessary information to make a qualified analysis, or he did not. I find it implausible he studied the issue and still had an information gap. On the contrary, if he analyzed the situation without first studying it (which I find more likely) it would also be ‘BS’.
Is my position more clear now?
I understand how you use the terms, but my point is that Vivek does not in fact demonstrate the information gap you impute to him. I am confident he would be easily able to address your objections.
The fact that the war has persisted for so long seems sufficient proof that, in the absence of the aid, Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or at worst suffered a quick defeat. In either case, the war would have been shorter. Point 3 is unambiguously correct, and even most people on your side of the issue would agree with that (ie. they believe that a large part of the reason Ukraine has been able to fight so long has been the aid)
There are lots of people of the realist school of geopolitics who know a lot about the specific situation in Ukraine and who nevertheless at least claim to believe 2. Are they all liars? I don’t think so. I guess you could argue that they are all unreasonable and thus capable of believing it despite contrary evidence, but such a stance is again merely arguing that point 2 is erroneous, not that it is dark arts.
No. Your position was already quite clear from the original post. It’s just incorrect, not unclear.
Ok. Let me address this then.
I’ll contend this is either part of an information gap or a very strange interpretation of events.
Consider the following series of statements: As the Russian army has more mass and equipment than the Baltic states, the Russians can take the Baltics whenever they please. Therefore, it’s inevitable that Russia will emerge victorious, and defending the Baltics is pointless.
On paper, this would seem to be roughly accurate, except of course it completely ignores the NATO intervention which will likely happen, NATO troops forward positioned in the Baltics, as well as Russia’s existing commitments in Ukraine.
In much the same way, saying that ‘Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or suffered a quick defeat’ is only correct in counterfactual realities. You could of course argue that if the West did not help Ukraine structure it’s military prior to the invasion, no help of any kind was delivered (even from Eastern Europe) during the invasion, and magically granted Putin infinite domestic popularity, the war would’ve ended quickly. But at that point we are living in a different reality. A reality where Russia actually had the capability for a Desert Storm esque operation.
This is, to the best of my knowledge, not even something the realists argued after the initial invasion failed. While prior to the invasion this was the narrative, afterwards this was clearly shown to be false.
Western aid did not intensify to a meaningfully significant degree prior to the battle of Kyiv, which was Russia’s only hope of a ‘quick victory’. While stingers, NLAWs, and other anti tank equipment was useful, the West primarily aimed to supply Ukraine for the purposes of a protracted insurgency, not a conventional war. We did not see deliveries of heavy equipment, and even now we’re still waiting on F-16s.
The results of Western aid have also been mixed. While humanitarian and financial support has allowed the Ukranian state and economy to continue on life support, we see that much of NATO’s doctrine does not apply in Ukraine, as Ukraine doesn’t have the air superiority necessary for combined arms operations. Some systems, like air defense, HIGHMARS, and long range strike missiles (Storm Shadow, ATACAMS) have played a key role, but they neither provided a decisive strategic advantage nor negated one on the part of the Russians. (partly because they were delivered in insufficient quantities) You can argue that Ukraine would suffer greatly if they lacked these options, but arguing they would’ve suffered quick, decisive defeat runs completely contradictory to reality, as they lacked these capabilities prior to the push on Kyiv and survived anyhow. (if you want to argue Russia ‘wins’ a quick and decisive victory without taking Kyiv or holding most of Ukraine’s territory, be my guest, but I think we can both agree that would be ridiculous)
Overall, if Russia had shown a capability to win (the VKS secures air dominance, Russian logistics could secure a sustained push deep into the Ukranian heartland, Russian deployments significantly exceeded Ukraine’s mobilization pool) you may have a case Ukraine would’ve lost quickly. But anybody who has observed the retreat from Kyiv can understand that Russia simply doesn’t have that capability. They are not the U.S military, and the VKS is not the USAF. They do not have the air superiority necessary for blitzkrieg. This war is primarily an attritional battle, and if Ukraine’s effort did not collapse prior to delivery of NATO aid it’s rather contradictory to argue they would collapse immediately after. (indeed, they performed well on the Kharkiv counteroffensive while aid was still ramping up)
I believe this to be a part of an information gap. Not understanding Russia and Ukraine’s true military capabilities. (understanding them is, of course, a key part of any geopolitical judgement, since otherwise you cannot tell whether a side is on the brink of defeat or victory). If Vivek was not aware of this gap, then he made an unqualified analysis, and if he was then his analysis is clearly wrong.
The realists argue that regardless of Ukraine’s military potential Ukranian statehood is not a relevant concern, and should be handed over to Russia (likely along with Eastern Europe to broker an alliance against China). Even this aside, they do not believe Russia has a decisive capability advantage. Only an attritional advantage. Thus they can believe 2) and 3), but only assuming the absence of aid. I thus don’t believe Vivek is actually arguing for the realist position, but if you believe he is feel free to find sources. I have not seen any indication of this being the case.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it. The claim that giving aid is prolonging the war is implicitly a comparison to the counterfactual in which aid isn’t given. I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help, and I think there are limits to how uncharitably you can impute their views before you are the one engaging in dark arts.
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does. A lot of evidence can be gleaned from which geopolitics experts said what, from which ones changed their mind, and the timing of when they did so, etc. In addition, this being a war of attrition as you pointed out, the key determination to make is who is better situated to win that war of attrition. How many able-bodied, working-age men does Ukraine have left, again?
But by the epistemic standards you have implied, he would need to be a domain expert to hold an opinion, which would leave him strikingly vulnerable to ultra-BS, and more importantly, would cede the whole playing field to technocracy from the get-go. Vivek is part of what could be called the “anti-expert faction”.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.