In much the same way, saying that ‘Ukraine would have quickly surrendered or suffered a quick defeat’ is only correct in counterfactual realities. You could of course argue that if the West did not help Ukraine structure it’s military prior to the invasion, no help of any kind was delivered (even from Eastern Europe) during the invasion, and magically granted Putin infinite domestic popularity, the war would’ve ended quickly. But at that point we are living in a different reality. A reality where Russia actually had the capability for a Desert Storm esque operation.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it. The claim that giving aid is prolonging the war is implicitly a comparison to the counterfactual in which aid isn’t given. I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help, and I think there are limits to how uncharitably you can impute their views before you are the one engaging in dark arts.
Western aid did not intensify
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
I believe this to be a part of an information gap. Not understanding Russia and Ukraine’s true military capabilities. (understanding them is, of course, a key part of any geopolitical judgement, since otherwise you cannot tell whether a side is on the brink of defeat or victory). If Vivek was not aware of this gap, then he made an unqualified analysis, and if he was then his analysis is clearly wrong.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does. A lot of evidence can be gleaned from which geopolitics experts said what, from which ones changed their mind, and the timing of when they did so, etc. In addition, this being a war of attrition as you pointed out, the key determination to make is who is better situated to win that war of attrition. How many able-bodied, working-age men does Ukraine have left, again?
But by the epistemic standards you have implied, he would need to be a domain expert to hold an opinion, which would leave him strikingly vulnerable to ultra-BS, and more importantly, would cede the whole playing field to technocracy from the get-go. Vivek is part of what could be called the “anti-expert faction”.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.
But point 3 was already a counterfactual by your own formulation of it. The claim that giving aid is prolonging the war is implicitly a comparison to the counterfactual in which aid isn’t given. I suppose that if you are convinced that Ukraine is going to win, then a marginal increase in aid is expected to shorten the war, but there is no reason to suspect that proponents of point 3 mean are referring to marginal adjustments in the amount of help, and I think there are limits to how uncharitably you can impute their views before you are the one engaging in dark arts.
From the standpoint of someone like Vivek — or for that matter from the standpoint of someone who understands how present resources can be converted into revenue streams and vice versa — additional donations to the war effort do constitute an intensification of aid, even if the rate of resource transfers remain the same.
Supposing for the sake of argument that his analysis is conventionally unqualified, it does not imply that he has insufficient evidence to hold the position he does. A lot of evidence can be gleaned from which geopolitics experts said what, from which ones changed their mind, and the timing of when they did so, etc. In addition, this being a war of attrition as you pointed out, the key determination to make is who is better situated to win that war of attrition. How many able-bodied, working-age men does Ukraine have left, again?
But by the epistemic standards you have implied, he would need to be a domain expert to hold an opinion, which would leave him strikingly vulnerable to ultra-BS, and more importantly, would cede the whole playing field to technocracy from the get-go. Vivek is part of what could be called the “anti-expert faction”.
Well, no, it’s not. Because I am speaking about future events (ie: should we give aid or not), not past events.
I’m not. Current battlefield conditions suggest that the war will be a protracted stalemate favoring Russia absent strategically meaningful aid. And by strategically meaningful I mean either providing capabilities that allow retaking of territory or negating a long term weakness (say, shell or manpower shortages). But I digress. In any case, I’m arguing from the perspective of military capability, not as an expert, but as someone who is familiar with expert arguments (I could cite, for instance, oryx, the Insititute for the study of war, Perun, etc). Basic understanding of battlefield dynamics and conditions at a strategic level.
And here again… this doesn’t really address my point, mainly that statements 2 and 3 are essentially statements about relative strategic capability between two state actors, and this is neither domain level expert knowledge nor exceedingly complicated. You cannot argue, for instance, that the US does not have transatlantic power projection (aircraft carriers say hello). In the same way, you cannot argue Russia has a capability to win a quick and decisive war over Ukraine without western aid, because we saw them fail. Empirically speaking they lack a capability, and everyone who follows the conflict is aware of this.
I feel like we’re going in circles now. It could be that I failed to make my points clearly, or you failed to understand them. But in any case my position is that matters of historical military capability (note historical: as in past tense, already occurred) is not up for debate. 2) and 3) fly in the face of it.
In any case I think this is a good place to discontinue, I don’t think we’re getting any benefit from further discussion.