Yes. If there is a fact in what your actual decision is, say it’s actually A, and you are uncertain about what it’ll be, then the assumption A=B is logically false, inconsistent, even if you don’t know that it is.
Where is the inconsistency?
If you assume both that the actual action (A) and the possible, but not actual, action (B) you have an inconsistency.
But if you assume only B; ie. you assume a world as similar to this one as possible where you are such that you will choose action B, then it is perfectly consistent.
hen you reason about what happens if A=B, not knowing that it’s a false statement, you are reasoning from a false premise, and everything logically follows from a false premise. This is the relevance of this description.
But, as I have already explained, reasoning about counterfactuals is not, in fact, reasoning in such a way. The statement “If I am in front of you, I am punching you in the face” is true. The statement “If I were in front of you, I would be punching you in the face” is a different, false, statement.
Similarly “If I did not post this comment you are a pizza” is true, but “If I had not posted this comment, you would be a pizza” is false
Until you are willing to grapple with your confusion on this issue, I don’t see this conversation being productive.
If you assume both that the actual action (A) and the possible, but not actual, action (B) you have an inconsistency.
Yes.
But if you assume only B; ie. you assume a world as similar to this one as possible where you are such that you will choose action B, then it is perfectly consistent.
You need to show that this other “similar” world has any relevance to reasoning about the actual world. You are not justified in considering a problem statement that stars a non-actual world unless you explain how that helps in reasoning about the actual world.
Of course we know that intuitively that’s how it works, but it’s not clear why, and “just so” doesn’t help in understanding this mystery. Also, it’s not clear how to generally construct those counterfactuals, even if we leave the question of their relevance aside. Where is the “you” that ought to be replaced in the environment? What about the thoughts about you in other people’s minds, should they be modified as well? If not you run into pitfalls of CDT.
Until you are willing to grapple with your confusion on this issue, I don’t see this conversation being productive.
I’m trying to argue that you should be confused, just as I am confused. Notice your own confusion and all.
You need to show that this other “similar” world has any relevance to reasoning about the actual world.
It allows you to think about cause and effect, and it is a necessity in making rational choices. You cannot make a rational choice without thinking through the consequences of different (counterfactual) possible choices.
You are not justified in considering a problem statement that stars a non-actual world unless you explain how that helps in reasoning about the actual world.
In reasoning with counterfactuals, the counterfactual worlds aren’t “stars” and the certainly aren’t “problem statement”s. They’re tools for thinking about the world and making choices.
but it’s not clear why,
You keep on making it less clear for yourself, by bringing in things like the principle of explosion, which is irrelevant.
Also, it’s not clear how to generally construct those counterfactuals, even if we leave the question of their relevance aside.
I’ve explained a general method for constructing the counterfactuals already. You assume the smallest possible divergence that could lead to the specific divergence you’re interested in.
Where is the “you” that ought to be replaced in the environment?
That’s a problem with personal identity, not counterfactuals. Sure, it’s an important problem, but adding more confusions to this discussion will not help you to understand counterfactuals.
What about the thoughts about you in other people’s minds, should they be modified as well?
To the extent that they were caused by the properties you had at the time.
I’m trying to argue that you should be confused, just as I am confused. Notice your own confusion and all.
But all the reasons you’ve given for your confusion seem to be trivially irrelevant, or incorrect. The reasons for your confusion seem to be confusions, not good reasons.
Curious. I was arguing motivation for study of TDT/UDT/ADT, without betraying any knowledge about results that are already known. And you’ve managed to rule out all combinations of confusions these theories are intended to resolve as being irrelevant. The general pattern I see here is that any individual question has an “obvious” intuitive answer, especially if you don’t go into detail, and you refuse to either consider multiple questions at once (since they are “unrelated”), or to go deeply enough into each of them individually (since if you assume the intuitive understanding of the other questions, they provide strong enough support for not being confused about this one too).
In other words, you are trapped in the net of intuitive understanding of multiple concepts that help in understanding each other, and are comfortable with this level of understanding, which makes any attempt to look deeper into their nature preposterous to you.
You were arguing from a position whereby you couldn’t tell the difference between the statements “If I had precommitted to not give into blackmail I wouldn’t have been blackmailed” and “If I had precommitted to call upon the FSM for help, the FSM would exist”
That is a very confused position. I have since explained the difference between those things.
Every confusion you have actually brought to the fore, I have clarified; with the exception of the confusion of “what makes personal identity”; because that wasn’t the topic at hand. It’s a big and complicated, and seperable, issue. And yes, the personal identity issue leads to some changes in decision theory. But we’re not talking about decision theory at the moment.
If you think I haven’t clarified one of your confusions, please point it out? Because, honestly, you seem to be just plain ignoring any attempts at clarification.
Because, honestly, you seem to be just plain ignoring any attempts at clarification.
Informal, intuitive attempts at clarifications. Attempts at clarification that don’t give deep understanding of what’s going on. The standard of understanding I was aiming at, in particular by refusing to accept less formal explanations.
So you say, but you don’t point out any difficulty with them.
You simply dismiss them like that.
Your confusions are faux-logical (talking about worlds being logically impossible, when they’re not; talking about the principle of explosion, when it doesn’t apply); if you want a thorough clarification, give a thorough problem.
Where is the inconsistency?
If you assume both that the actual action (A) and the possible, but not actual, action (B) you have an inconsistency.
But if you assume only B; ie. you assume a world as similar to this one as possible where you are such that you will choose action B, then it is perfectly consistent.
But, as I have already explained, reasoning about counterfactuals is not, in fact, reasoning in such a way. The statement “If I am in front of you, I am punching you in the face” is true. The statement “If I were in front of you, I would be punching you in the face” is a different, false, statement.
Similarly “If I did not post this comment you are a pizza” is true, but “If I had not posted this comment, you would be a pizza” is false
Until you are willing to grapple with your confusion on this issue, I don’t see this conversation being productive.
Yes.
You need to show that this other “similar” world has any relevance to reasoning about the actual world. You are not justified in considering a problem statement that stars a non-actual world unless you explain how that helps in reasoning about the actual world.
Of course we know that intuitively that’s how it works, but it’s not clear why, and “just so” doesn’t help in understanding this mystery. Also, it’s not clear how to generally construct those counterfactuals, even if we leave the question of their relevance aside. Where is the “you” that ought to be replaced in the environment? What about the thoughts about you in other people’s minds, should they be modified as well? If not you run into pitfalls of CDT.
I’m trying to argue that you should be confused, just as I am confused. Notice your own confusion and all.
It allows you to think about cause and effect, and it is a necessity in making rational choices. You cannot make a rational choice without thinking through the consequences of different (counterfactual) possible choices.
In reasoning with counterfactuals, the counterfactual worlds aren’t “stars” and the certainly aren’t “problem statement”s. They’re tools for thinking about the world and making choices.
You keep on making it less clear for yourself, by bringing in things like the principle of explosion, which is irrelevant.
I’ve explained a general method for constructing the counterfactuals already. You assume the smallest possible divergence that could lead to the specific divergence you’re interested in.
That’s a problem with personal identity, not counterfactuals. Sure, it’s an important problem, but adding more confusions to this discussion will not help you to understand counterfactuals.
To the extent that they were caused by the properties you had at the time.
But all the reasons you’ve given for your confusion seem to be trivially irrelevant, or incorrect. The reasons for your confusion seem to be confusions, not good reasons.
Curious. I was arguing motivation for study of TDT/UDT/ADT, without betraying any knowledge about results that are already known. And you’ve managed to rule out all combinations of confusions these theories are intended to resolve as being irrelevant. The general pattern I see here is that any individual question has an “obvious” intuitive answer, especially if you don’t go into detail, and you refuse to either consider multiple questions at once (since they are “unrelated”), or to go deeply enough into each of them individually (since if you assume the intuitive understanding of the other questions, they provide strong enough support for not being confused about this one too).
In other words, you are trapped in the net of intuitive understanding of multiple concepts that help in understanding each other, and are comfortable with this level of understanding, which makes any attempt to look deeper into their nature preposterous to you.
You were arguing from a position whereby you couldn’t tell the difference between the statements “If I had precommitted to not give into blackmail I wouldn’t have been blackmailed” and “If I had precommitted to call upon the FSM for help, the FSM would exist”
That is a very confused position. I have since explained the difference between those things.
Every confusion you have actually brought to the fore, I have clarified; with the exception of the confusion of “what makes personal identity”; because that wasn’t the topic at hand. It’s a big and complicated, and seperable, issue. And yes, the personal identity issue leads to some changes in decision theory. But we’re not talking about decision theory at the moment.
If you think I haven’t clarified one of your confusions, please point it out? Because, honestly, you seem to be just plain ignoring any attempts at clarification.
Informal, intuitive attempts at clarifications. Attempts at clarification that don’t give deep understanding of what’s going on. The standard of understanding I was aiming at, in particular by refusing to accept less formal explanations.
So you say, but you don’t point out any difficulty with them.
You simply dismiss them like that.
Your confusions are faux-logical (talking about worlds being logically impossible, when they’re not; talking about the principle of explosion, when it doesn’t apply); if you want a thorough clarification, give a thorough problem.