The neural explanation doesn’t seem parsimonious, given that there appears to be a much simpler cognitive “glitch” that causes the tree-falling-in-the-forest argument and the free will argument: our habitual propensity to mistake the communication devices known as words with the actual concepts they correspond to in our own minds. And as a natural consequence, people forget that the concept they associate with a word might be different from the concept another person associates with the same word.
One common result of these errors is that arguers forget to check that their definitions agree. That explains the how of the tree-falling-in-the-forest argument entirely, with no lingering doubts.
Another common result is the tendency you mention, of philosophers to try to answer questions as stated, as if the words must mean something coherent just because they sound like they should. This explains many of the free will arguments, although—here’s the tricky part—every thinker’s arguments would have to be explained via a slightly different manifestation of the error:
Thinker A reified. Thinker B equivocated on the meaning of “free.” Thinker C conflated agents because the words in their argument didn’t distinguish agency clearly enough. Nevertheless, the underlying error is the same. (Needless to say, the fact that everyone will interpret the words and make the argument differently precludes the possibility of a categorical dismissal of all concepts that anyone will ever call “free will.”)
The neural explanation doesn’t seem parsimonious, given that there appears to be a much simpler cognitive “glitch” that causes the tree-falling-in-the-forest argument and the free will argument: our habitual propensity to mistake the communication devices known as words with the actual concepts they correspond to in our own minds. And as a natural consequence, people forget that the concept they associate with a word might be different from the concept another person associates with the same word.
One common result of these errors is that arguers forget to check that their definitions agree. That explains the how of the tree-falling-in-the-forest argument entirely, with no lingering doubts.
Another common result is the tendency you mention, of philosophers to try to answer questions as stated, as if the words must mean something coherent just because they sound like they should. This explains many of the free will arguments, although—here’s the tricky part—every thinker’s arguments would have to be explained via a slightly different manifestation of the error:
Thinker A reified. Thinker B equivocated on the meaning of “free.” Thinker C conflated agents because the words in their argument didn’t distinguish agency clearly enough. Nevertheless, the underlying error is the same. (Needless to say, the fact that everyone will interpret the words and make the argument differently precludes the possibility of a categorical dismissal of all concepts that anyone will ever call “free will.”)