Jordan Peterson seems to work within a “meta-narrative” view of the universe, where everything follows a grand plan, but the major difference he has with other “meta-narrative” philosophers is that this grand narrative is what he terms as “Darwinian.” You will find that this “Darwinian” conception of the world to be completely at odds with the optimization view of evolution which is articulated very well in almost all of the evolutionary biology literature. Almost everything he bases his philosophy on seems to be based on a catastrophic (though quite common) misunderstanding of Darwinian evolution—essentially the view that things evolve according to some master plan where everything is constantly improving or moving according to the whims of some evolution fairy. Because he takes an extreme pragmatist view of “truth”, the “truth” has to square with the results of evolution—but this can only work if his understanding of evolution were correct. But given that it’s a gross mischaracterization, it’s fairly easy to see that his particular pragmatist view of truth cannot be correct, or else we would be given numerous examples of conflicting “truths.” For example, one biological adaptation could be useful for survival in one environment and totally useless or even deadly in another. Or, it could be useful for survival in the current situation, but ultimately lead the species to its extinction in the long run. In my mind this totally erases all possibility for a Darwinian meta-narrative.
Jordan Peterson is an excellent speaker and quite interesting to listen to, mostly due to his almost encyclopedic knowledge of mythology and literature. But this makes him an expert of mythology and literature, but I would hesitate to extend his qualities beyond that. I think his popularity is basically due to a few factors, namely, that he possesses some charisma, he fights against identity politics (but doesn’t seem to be far-right in any sense), and his “hero archetype” serves to amplify his perceived qualities in a way (because, as a somewhat theatrical person, he appears to try and emulate that archetype).
I do not see how a directional “meta-narrative” or master plan is needed for an understanding of Peterson’s view. What he is saying is that our mythology preceded rationality and its qualities reflect behavioural patterns and attitudes that allowed adaptation, survival and growth. Morality, for example, did not emerge through rationality but through acting out patterns of behaviours and experiencing the results according to the underlying qualities of nature. The patterns that produced beneficial results were encoded into stories, rituals, myths and religions.
His view of “truth” as discussed in Sam Harris’ podcast is a separate philosophical point that I am not in alignment with myself. I believe that using the word “wisdom” for this kind of truth is much clearer for the purpose of conversation in our current culture. That is what Peterson in the end chose to do during the second podcast with Harris. It is worth noting that when talking about Peterson (or anyone else for that matter) discussing his points is not an all or nothing affair. As it is usual with thinkers he will get some things right and other things wrong. But the things he is getting right (in my estimation) are really important.
If I am missing something in your point could you address some of his more specific claims?
I am not that familiar with the details of the ‘meme’ concept so I will give you my assessment and you can correct me if I have misunderstood.
Peterson has stated that the idea of a meme is Dawkins beginning to understand the concept of an archetype. He will then explain (this is in the “maps of meaning” lectures if I remember correctly) why he did not go deep enough. I will try to give an example but, again, this is complex and Peterson is mapping the concepts in multiple levels including brain functions.
[1] If we take the example of a snake as a symbol we can find that humans have a direct connection with the symbol. There is evidence that our reaction to a snake is encoded directly into our biology in the same way that a rat that has never seen a cat is afraid of it the first time it sees one during its life. This will directly influence our use of the symbol so that we do not use it to represent let’s say security. We will use it to represent something with negative affect.
[2] Now, there is evidence that shows quite clearly that we have first developed capacities for visualisation, imitation and play and only much later verbalisation capabilities and even later rational thought. Tribal cultures have been observed to use ritual and later myth. It is safe to assume that knowledge structures started developing through visualised and ritualised patterns into myths and then into religions. The best “stories” produced the cultures that are now in existence. These are stories that have been developed through thousands of years based on biological structures developed over billions of years.
Taking [1] and [2] together we can ask if there is any relevant information that has been encoded in these kind of practises and stories. In other words maybe the stories are not primitive and to be disposed of and we need to extract the meanings and verbalise them.
You can find a hint on these stories relevance by looking at the instance of morality. If you follow rationality to its end with our current data you will have to end in moral relativism. But instead our societies have retained the meanings of the religious stories with concepts such as virtues and vices, good and evil, lower and higher and are structured around them. At the same time our rationality is (unsuccessfully for the moment) trying to reconcile rationality with morality.
What I just wrote doesn’t even begin to scratch the surface of Peterson’s exposition.
So it seems safe to say that Jordan Peterson is essentially claiming that morality exists external to and independent from minds, a sort of moral objectivism, and that humanity has essentially picked this up over time by evolving in accordance with it.
If you follow rationality to its end with our current data you will have to end in moral relativism.
You will end up with a weaker belief in moral objectivism, yes. But I don’t think you end up with “relativism” in the sense in which it is typically used: To refer to the belief that all cultural mores and taboos are equally true (or false), or equally useful. Rationalists usually come to believe the exact opposite of that.
But instead our societies have retained the meanings of the religious stories with concepts such as virtues and vices, good and evil, lower and higher and are structured around them.
Keep in mind that recorded human society has been around for only a few thousand years, which on an evolutionary timescale is almost nothing. But Peterson seems to be using the observation that we have a lot of similar stories that show up across the centuries to mean that there is some objective moral truth underlying all of it. He appears to be taking what he observes to be a relative constancy over a relatively short time-scale and inferring that that constancy has been around over geological timescales. And what I think he also might be doing is downplaying the significant differences you see in cultures over time—take the difference between Eastern and Western philosophy, for example. I’m sure Peterson could point out a lot of similarities (such as similar archetypes between the myths), but the problem is that he’d be missing the divergence that is most clear when you dig in to what each of the ancient archetypical sages actually taught.
So it seems safe to say that Jordan Peterson is essentially claiming that morality exists external to and independent from minds, a sort of moral objectivism, and that humanity has essentially picked this up over time by evolving in accordance with it.
I haven’t heard of him stating it explicitly but I think it is fair to assume that this is at least partly true. For the moment we can agree that this is, at least, a valid hypothesis/possibility. But I would personally add that there is no need to prematurely extract a universal principle. Let’s say that there are evolved and evolving behavioural patterns of adaptation to reality (as interacted with by humans) which we can call ‘morality’.
You will end up with a weaker belief in moral objectivism, yes. But I don’t think you end up with “relativism” in the sense in which it is typically used.
I don’t see how you can extract objective valence by rational means. You have to presuppose a distinction parallel to good and evil at some level. Could you elaborate?
Keep in mind that recorded human society has been around for only a few thousand years, which on an evolutionary timescale is almost nothing.
Peterson is talking in an evolutionary time scale. He is tracing the emergence of these structures through the evolutionary layers of biological organisms preceding humans. He then gives examples of possible emerging proto-morality in animal behaviour while pointing to the parts of the brain involved and to the existence and identical function of these parts in humans.
(But also I think you are still talking during this paragraph about the existence of objective morality. As I said above I don’t think it is necessary to extract a universal principle at the moment.)
I think he also might be doing is downplaying the significant differences you see in cultures over time—take the difference between Eastern and Western philosophy, for example.
I do not see divergence at the core of Eastern and Western ancient thought. On the contrary I see a quite remarkable statement of the same things. I think you might be confusing the dogmatic and social organisation elements with the underlying concepts. Every formulation needs to be in accordance with the current time and culture in order to work in multiple levels at the same time. This is were “morality” diverges a lot. But there are clear patterns in the emergence of basic distinctions like good and evil and virtues and vices as I stated.
Peterson in his exposition examines the stories in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Tao Te Ching, Alchemy and Christianity. He does not seem to have any knowledge of the Islamic tradition. I happen to have some knowledge of that part and I have to say that there is no dissonance I can detect at least for now (I am still exploring as sceptically as I can).
Jordan Peterson seems to work within a “meta-narrative” view of the universe, where everything follows a grand plan, but the major difference he has with other “meta-narrative” philosophers is that this grand narrative is what he terms as “Darwinian.” You will find that this “Darwinian” conception of the world to be completely at odds with the optimization view of evolution which is articulated very well in almost all of the evolutionary biology literature. Almost everything he bases his philosophy on seems to be based on a catastrophic (though quite common) misunderstanding of Darwinian evolution—essentially the view that things evolve according to some master plan where everything is constantly improving or moving according to the whims of some evolution fairy. Because he takes an extreme pragmatist view of “truth”, the “truth” has to square with the results of evolution—but this can only work if his understanding of evolution were correct. But given that it’s a gross mischaracterization, it’s fairly easy to see that his particular pragmatist view of truth cannot be correct, or else we would be given numerous examples of conflicting “truths.” For example, one biological adaptation could be useful for survival in one environment and totally useless or even deadly in another. Or, it could be useful for survival in the current situation, but ultimately lead the species to its extinction in the long run. In my mind this totally erases all possibility for a Darwinian meta-narrative.
Jordan Peterson is an excellent speaker and quite interesting to listen to, mostly due to his almost encyclopedic knowledge of mythology and literature. But this makes him an expert of mythology and literature, but I would hesitate to extend his qualities beyond that. I think his popularity is basically due to a few factors, namely, that he possesses some charisma, he fights against identity politics (but doesn’t seem to be far-right in any sense), and his “hero archetype” serves to amplify his perceived qualities in a way (because, as a somewhat theatrical person, he appears to try and emulate that archetype).
I do not see how a directional “meta-narrative” or master plan is needed for an understanding of Peterson’s view. What he is saying is that our mythology preceded rationality and its qualities reflect behavioural patterns and attitudes that allowed adaptation, survival and growth. Morality, for example, did not emerge through rationality but through acting out patterns of behaviours and experiencing the results according to the underlying qualities of nature. The patterns that produced beneficial results were encoded into stories, rituals, myths and religions.
His view of “truth” as discussed in Sam Harris’ podcast is a separate philosophical point that I am not in alignment with myself. I believe that using the word “wisdom” for this kind of truth is much clearer for the purpose of conversation in our current culture. That is what Peterson in the end chose to do during the second podcast with Harris. It is worth noting that when talking about Peterson (or anyone else for that matter) discussing his points is not an all or nothing affair. As it is usual with thinkers he will get some things right and other things wrong. But the things he is getting right (in my estimation) are really important.
If I am missing something in your point could you address some of his more specific claims?
How is this view different than, say, Richard Dawkins’ concept of the meme?
I am not that familiar with the details of the ‘meme’ concept so I will give you my assessment and you can correct me if I have misunderstood.
Peterson has stated that the idea of a meme is Dawkins beginning to understand the concept of an archetype. He will then explain (this is in the “maps of meaning” lectures if I remember correctly) why he did not go deep enough. I will try to give an example but, again, this is complex and Peterson is mapping the concepts in multiple levels including brain functions.
[1] If we take the example of a snake as a symbol we can find that humans have a direct connection with the symbol. There is evidence that our reaction to a snake is encoded directly into our biology in the same way that a rat that has never seen a cat is afraid of it the first time it sees one during its life. This will directly influence our use of the symbol so that we do not use it to represent let’s say security. We will use it to represent something with negative affect.
[2] Now, there is evidence that shows quite clearly that we have first developed capacities for visualisation, imitation and play and only much later verbalisation capabilities and even later rational thought. Tribal cultures have been observed to use ritual and later myth. It is safe to assume that knowledge structures started developing through visualised and ritualised patterns into myths and then into religions. The best “stories” produced the cultures that are now in existence. These are stories that have been developed through thousands of years based on biological structures developed over billions of years.
Taking [1] and [2] together we can ask if there is any relevant information that has been encoded in these kind of practises and stories. In other words maybe the stories are not primitive and to be disposed of and we need to extract the meanings and verbalise them.
You can find a hint on these stories relevance by looking at the instance of morality. If you follow rationality to its end with our current data you will have to end in moral relativism. But instead our societies have retained the meanings of the religious stories with concepts such as virtues and vices, good and evil, lower and higher and are structured around them. At the same time our rationality is (unsuccessfully for the moment) trying to reconcile rationality with morality.
What I just wrote doesn’t even begin to scratch the surface of Peterson’s exposition.
So it seems safe to say that Jordan Peterson is essentially claiming that morality exists external to and independent from minds, a sort of moral objectivism, and that humanity has essentially picked this up over time by evolving in accordance with it.
You will end up with a weaker belief in moral objectivism, yes. But I don’t think you end up with “relativism” in the sense in which it is typically used: To refer to the belief that all cultural mores and taboos are equally true (or false), or equally useful. Rationalists usually come to believe the exact opposite of that.
Keep in mind that recorded human society has been around for only a few thousand years, which on an evolutionary timescale is almost nothing. But Peterson seems to be using the observation that we have a lot of similar stories that show up across the centuries to mean that there is some objective moral truth underlying all of it. He appears to be taking what he observes to be a relative constancy over a relatively short time-scale and inferring that that constancy has been around over geological timescales. And what I think he also might be doing is downplaying the significant differences you see in cultures over time—take the difference between Eastern and Western philosophy, for example. I’m sure Peterson could point out a lot of similarities (such as similar archetypes between the myths), but the problem is that he’d be missing the divergence that is most clear when you dig in to what each of the ancient archetypical sages actually taught.
Thank you for the thoughtful points.
I haven’t heard of him stating it explicitly but I think it is fair to assume that this is at least partly true. For the moment we can agree that this is, at least, a valid hypothesis/possibility. But I would personally add that there is no need to prematurely extract a universal principle. Let’s say that there are evolved and evolving behavioural patterns of adaptation to reality (as interacted with by humans) which we can call ‘morality’.
I don’t see how you can extract objective valence by rational means. You have to presuppose a distinction parallel to good and evil at some level. Could you elaborate?
Peterson is talking in an evolutionary time scale. He is tracing the emergence of these structures through the evolutionary layers of biological organisms preceding humans. He then gives examples of possible emerging proto-morality in animal behaviour while pointing to the parts of the brain involved and to the existence and identical function of these parts in humans.
(But also I think you are still talking during this paragraph about the existence of objective morality. As I said above I don’t think it is necessary to extract a universal principle at the moment.)
I do not see divergence at the core of Eastern and Western ancient thought. On the contrary I see a quite remarkable statement of the same things. I think you might be confusing the dogmatic and social organisation elements with the underlying concepts. Every formulation needs to be in accordance with the current time and culture in order to work in multiple levels at the same time. This is were “morality” diverges a lot. But there are clear patterns in the emergence of basic distinctions like good and evil and virtues and vices as I stated.
Peterson in his exposition examines the stories in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Tao Te Ching, Alchemy and Christianity. He does not seem to have any knowledge of the Islamic tradition. I happen to have some knowledge of that part and I have to say that there is no dissonance I can detect at least for now (I am still exploring as sceptically as I can).
Dawkins’ meme is, notably, selfish.