So, if human beings have a philosophical oversight that is self-shadowing, like that of a Bayesian that keeps two-boxing on Newcomb and defecting against copies of itself in PD, we wouldn’t notice it. Ever.
So the question is not “why don’t we have any self-shadowing blind-spots”, it is “why do we have a nontrivial set of non-self-shadowing blind spots?” (non-self-shadowing blind spots being those that we can actually notice at some point)
So the question is not “why don’t we have any self-shadowing blind-spots”, it is “why do we have a nontrivial set of non-self-shadowing blind spots?”
Agreed, but I think it’s also, “why do we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect, given what we know about how evolution works?”
And while you’re right that we can’t be sure at this point that we have zero self-shadowing blind-spots (philosophical oversights that we’ll never detect), I think there’s a reasonable chance that’s in fact the case. ETA: My argument for this belief is that one possible reason why we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect is that there is a single “ability to philosophize” that is sufficient (given enough raw intelligence) to overcome all such blind spots.
If some of the heuristics are failing and some are succeeding, they are producing different results. Which process determines which results are correct? Should this be called “philosophical ability”?
It doesn’t necessarily have to be cenralized. Some heuristics could have different weights than others, and stronger ones win out. Or there could be a reflective equilibrium among them.
we can’t be sure at this point that we have zero self-shadowing blind-spots, I think there’s a reasonable chance that’s in fact the case.
there is a single “ability to philosophize” that is sufficient (given enough raw intelligence) to overcome all such blind spots.
So, one way to attack this position would be to construct a toy-model of a system that has an “ability to philosophize” but that still fails in some cases.
An example would be the bayesian AI that self-modifies to one-box on all newcomblike problems where omega examines it after that self-modification event. So it realizes that it is better to be “rationally irrational”, but only in a limited sense.
A less controversial example is the case where some devout catholics were convinced that even thinking about whether or not god might not exist would cause them to be sent straight to hell.
For any agent or community of agents, there are some cherished beliefs that the agent/community refuses to challenge. Sometimes for good reason. Even I have some, and LW certainly has some.
In this latter case, a false belief shields itself from criticism by convincing the community or agent involved that even the act of questioning the belief is of highly negative value.
And my own answer to this question is that we’re a fragmented philosopher, with many different humans, each of whom has many different intuitions. In the example given of Bayesian Updating versus UDT, we have both timeless intuitions and Bayesian ones. The timeless/updateless/acausal intuitions come from the human intuitions about pride, dignity, honor, etc, which were developed because humans interacted with other humans.
The timeless/updateless/acausal intuitions come from the human intuitions about pride, dignity, honor, etc, which were developed because humans interacted with other humans.
Umm… I first thought of the updateless idea while trying to figure out anthropic reasoning. I fail to see how that had anything to do with pride, dignity, honor, etc.
I think this is correct. Using my formulation, the Bayseian system is what I call a “theory of reality”, the timeless one is the “theory of mind”, which I see as the trade-off along the autism spectrum.
So, if human beings have a philosophical oversight that is self-shadowing, like that of a Bayesian that keeps two-boxing on Newcomb and defecting against copies of itself in PD, we wouldn’t notice it. Ever.
So the question is not “why don’t we have any self-shadowing blind-spots”, it is “why do we have a nontrivial set of non-self-shadowing blind spots?” (non-self-shadowing blind spots being those that we can actually notice at some point)
Agreed, but I think it’s also, “why do we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect, given what we know about how evolution works?”
And while you’re right that we can’t be sure at this point that we have zero self-shadowing blind-spots (philosophical oversights that we’ll never detect), I think there’s a reasonable chance that’s in fact the case. ETA: My argument for this belief is that one possible reason why we have fewer self-shadowing blind-spots than we might expect is that there is a single “ability to philosophize” that is sufficient (given enough raw intelligence) to overcome all such blind spots.
The opposite explanation also works: we use so many unrelated heuristics that there’s no single area where they all fail simultaneously.
If some of the heuristics are failing and some are succeeding, they are producing different results. Which process determines which results are correct? Should this be called “philosophical ability”?
(non-rhetorical questions)
It doesn’t necessarily have to be cenralized. Some heuristics could have different weights than others, and stronger ones win out. Or there could be a reflective equilibrium among them.
...not that there’s any evidence for any of this.
So, one way to attack this position would be to construct a toy-model of a system that has an “ability to philosophize” but that still fails in some cases.
An example would be the bayesian AI that self-modifies to one-box on all newcomblike problems where omega examines it after that self-modification event. So it realizes that it is better to be “rationally irrational”, but only in a limited sense.
A less controversial example is the case where some devout catholics were convinced that even thinking about whether or not god might not exist would cause them to be sent straight to hell.
For any agent or community of agents, there are some cherished beliefs that the agent/community refuses to challenge. Sometimes for good reason. Even I have some, and LW certainly has some.
In this latter case, a false belief shields itself from criticism by convincing the community or agent involved that even the act of questioning the belief is of highly negative value.
And my own answer to this question is that we’re a fragmented philosopher, with many different humans, each of whom has many different intuitions. In the example given of Bayesian Updating versus UDT, we have both timeless intuitions and Bayesian ones. The timeless/updateless/acausal intuitions come from the human intuitions about pride, dignity, honor, etc, which were developed because humans interacted with other humans.
Umm… I first thought of the updateless idea while trying to figure out anthropic reasoning. I fail to see how that had anything to do with pride, dignity, honor, etc.
I think this is correct. Using my formulation, the Bayseian system is what I call a “theory of reality”, the timeless one is the “theory of mind”, which I see as the trade-off along the autism spectrum.