Huh, really? I think there are fairly standard operating procedures for “how to converse in good faith”, that are pretty common in rationalist circles, and should be common/expected in rationalist circles, and if people are failing to live up to them I’d expect a given conversation to be less productive.
I think we might be using different definitions of “trust”, as a consequence of assigning different levels of importance to different aspects of the underlying concept.
I.e. I am thinking of trust as more something along the lines of “I expect the other person to actually have my well-being in mind”, whereas you might be pointing at one of the followng “I expect the other person is not going to accidentally hurt me/ doesn’t have an intention of hurting me/ is following a process that makes adversarial behavior inconvenient”
Huh, really? I think there are fairly standard operating procedures for “how to converse in good faith”, that are pretty common in rationalist circles, and should be common/expected in rationalist circles, and if people are failing to live up to them I’d expect a given conversation to be less productive.
I think we might be using different definitions of “trust”, as a consequence of assigning different levels of importance to different aspects of the underlying concept.
I.e. I am thinking of trust as more something along the lines of “I expect the other person to actually have my well-being in mind”, whereas you might be pointing at one of the followng “I expect the other person is not going to accidentally hurt me/ doesn’t have an intention of hurting me/ is following a process that makes adversarial behavior inconvenient”
Ah, yes. That is what I meant in this case.