If we deny practical computational functionalism (CF), we need to pay a theoretical cost:
1. One such possible cost is that we have to assume that the secret of consciousness lies in some ‘exotic transistors,’ meaning that consciousness depends not on the global properties of the brain, but on small local properties of neurons or their elements (microtubules, neurotransmitter concentrations, etc.).
1a. Such exotic transistors are also internally unobservable. This makes them similar to the idea of soul, as criticized by Locke. He argued that change or replacement of the soul can’t be observed. Thus, Locke’s argument against the soul is similar to the fading qualia argument.
1b. Such exotic transistors should be inside the smallest animals and even bacteria. This paves the way to panpsychism, but strong panpsychism implies that computers are conscious because everything is conscious. (There are theories that a single electron is the carrier of consciousness – see Argonov).
There are theories which suggest something like a “global quantum field” or “quantum computer of consciousness” and thus partially escape the curse of exotic transistors. The assume global physical property which is created by many small exotic transistors.
2 and 3. If we deny exotic transistors, we remain either with exotic computations or soul.
“Soul” here includes non-physicalist world models, e.g., qualia-only world, which is a form of solipsism or requires the existence of God who produces souls and installs them in minds (and can install them in computers).
Exotic computations can be either extremely complex or require very special computational operations (strange loop by Hofstadter).
If we deny practical computational functionalism (CF), we need to pay a theoretical cost:
1. One such possible cost is that we have to assume that the secret of consciousness lies in some ‘exotic transistors,’ meaning that consciousness depends not on the global properties of the brain, but on small local properties of neurons or their elements (microtubules, neurotransmitter concentrations, etc.).
1a. Such exotic transistors are also internally unobservable. This makes them similar to the idea of soul, as criticized by Locke. He argued that change or replacement of the soul can’t be observed. Thus, Locke’s argument against the soul is similar to the fading qualia argument.
1b. Such exotic transistors should be inside the smallest animals and even bacteria. This paves the way to panpsychism, but strong panpsychism implies that computers are conscious because everything is conscious. (There are theories that a single electron is the carrier of consciousness – see Argonov).
There are theories which suggest something like a “global quantum field” or “quantum computer of consciousness” and thus partially escape the curse of exotic transistors. The assume global physical property which is created by many small exotic transistors.
2 and 3. If we deny exotic transistors, we remain either with exotic computations or soul.
“Soul” here includes non-physicalist world models, e.g., qualia-only world, which is a form of solipsism or requires the existence of God who produces souls and installs them in minds (and can install them in computers).
Exotic computations can be either extremely complex or require very special computational operations (strange loop by Hofstadter).