Have I ever said anything else? I believe I mentioned agents that come into existence precommitted, and my very first post in this thread mentioned such a fully general, indistiguishable-from-strategy precommmitment. The case I described is the one where “precommitted first” makes sense. Which is also the sort of case in the original post. Obviously the precise timing of a fully general precommitment before the actors even learn about each other doesn’t matter.
Agreed. (I assume by non-general precommitments—timing of which matters—you refer to specific nonconditional strategies that don’t take into account anything—obviously you won’t want to make such a precommitment too early, or too late. I still think it’s a misleading concept, as it suggests that precommitment imposes additional limitation on one’s actions, while as you agree it doesn’t when it isn’t rational—that is when you’ve made a “general precommitment” to avoid that.)
(I assume by non-general precommitments—timing of which matters—you refer to specific nonconditional strategies that don’t take into account anything
I meant things like “I commit to one-box in Newcomb’s problem” or “I commit not to respond to Baron Chastity’s blackmail”, specific precommitments you can only make after anticipating that situation. As a human it seems to be a good idea to make such a specific precommitment in addition to the general precommitment for the psychological effect (this is also more obvious in time travel scenarios), so I disagree that this is a misleading concept.
Why should rational agents deliberately sabotage their ability to understand humans? Merely having a concept of something doesn’t imply applying it to yourself. Not that I even see any noticeable harm in a rational agent applying the concept of a specific precommitment to itself. It might be useful for e. g. modeling itself in hypothesis testing.
Have I ever said anything else? I believe I mentioned agents that come into existence precommitted, and my very first post in this thread mentioned such a fully general, indistiguishable-from-strategy precommmitment. The case I described is the one where “precommitted first” makes sense. Which is also the sort of case in the original post. Obviously the precise timing of a fully general precommitment before the actors even learn about each other doesn’t matter.
Agreed. (I assume by non-general precommitments—timing of which matters—you refer to specific nonconditional strategies that don’t take into account anything—obviously you won’t want to make such a precommitment too early, or too late. I still think it’s a misleading concept, as it suggests that precommitment imposes additional limitation on one’s actions, while as you agree it doesn’t when it isn’t rational—that is when you’ve made a “general precommitment” to avoid that.)
I meant things like “I commit to one-box in Newcomb’s problem” or “I commit not to respond to Baron Chastity’s blackmail”, specific precommitments you can only make after anticipating that situation. As a human it seems to be a good idea to make such a specific precommitment in addition to the general precommitment for the psychological effect (this is also more obvious in time travel scenarios), so I disagree that this is a misleading concept.
For humans, certainty it’s a useful concept. For rational agents, exceptions overwhelm.
Why should rational agents deliberately sabotage their ability to understand humans? Merely having a concept of something doesn’t imply applying it to yourself. Not that I even see any noticeable harm in a rational agent applying the concept of a specific precommitment to itself. It might be useful for e. g. modeling itself in hypothesis testing.
Obviously.