Here is a thought experiment. Suppose that explorers arrive in a previously unknown area of the Amazon, where a strange tribe exists. The tribe suffers from a rare genetic anomaly, whereby all of its individuals are physically and cognitively stuck at the age of 3.
They laugh and they cry. They love and they hate. But they have no capacity for complex planning, or normative sophistication. So they live their lives as young children do—on a moment to moment basis—and they have no hope for ever developing beyond that.
If the explorers took these gentle creatures and murdered them—for science, for food, or for fun—would we say, “Oh but those children are not so intelligent, so the violence is ok.” Or would we be even more horrified by the violence, precisely because the children had no capacity to fend for themselves?
I would submit that the argument against animal exploitation is even stronger than the argument against violence in this thought experiment, because we could be quite confident that whatever awareness these children had, it was “less than” what a normal human has. We are comparing the same species after all, and presumably whatever the Amazonian children are missing, due to genetic anomaly, is not made up for in higher or richer awareness in other dimensions.
We cannot say that about other species. A dog may not be able to reason. But perhaps she delights in smells in a way that a less sensitive nose could never understand. Perhaps she enjoys food with a sophistication that a lesser palate cannot begin to grasp. Perhaps she feels loneliness with an intensity that a human being could never appreciate.
Richard Dawkins makes the very important point that cleverness, which we certainly have, gives us no reason to think that animal consciousness is any less rich or intense than human consciousness (http://directactioneverywhere.com/theliberationist/2013/7/18/g2givxwjippfa92qt9pgorvvheired). Indeed, since cleverness is, in a sense, an alternative mechanism for evolutionary survival to feelings (a perfect computational machine would need no feelings, as feelings are just a heuristic), there is a plausible case that clever animals should be given LESS consideration.
But all of this is really irrelevant. Because the basis of political equality, as Peter Singer has argued, has nothing to do with the facts of our experience. Someone who is born without the ability to feel pain does not somehow lose her rights because of that difference. Because equality is not a factual description, it is a normative demand—namely, that every being who crosses the threshold of sentience, every being that could be said to HAVE a will—ought be given the same respect and freedom that we ask for ourselves, as “willing” creatures.
This is a variant of the argument from marginal cases: if there is some quality that makes you count morally, and we can find some example humans (ex: 3 year olds) that have less of that quality than some animals, what do we do?
I’m very sure than an 8 year old human counts morally and that a chicken does not, and while I’m not very clear on where along that spectrum the quality I care about starts getting up to levels where it matters, I think it’s probably something no or almost no animals have and some humans don’t have. Making this distinction among humans, however, would be incredibly socially destructive, especially given how unsure I am about where the line should go, and so I think we end up with a much better society if we treat all humans as morally equal. This means I end up saying things like “value all humans equally; don’t value animals” when that’s not my real distinction, just the closest schelling point).
It seems like your answer to the argument from marginal cases is that maybe the (human) marginal cases don’t matter and “Making this distinction among humans, however, would be incredibly socially destructive.”
That may work for you, but I think it doesn’t work for the vast majority of people who don’t count animals as morally relevant. You are “very sure than an 8 year old human counts morally” (intrinsically, by which I mean “not just because doing otherwise would be socially destructive). I’m not sure if you think 3 year old humans count (intrinsically), but I’m sure that almost everyone does. I know that they count these humans intrinsically (and not just to avoid social destruction), because in fact most people do make these distinctions among humans: For example, median opinion in the US seems to be that humans start counting sometime in the second trimester.
Given this, it’s entirely reasonable to try to figure out what quality makes things count morally, and if you (a) care intrinsically about 3 year old humans (or 1 year old or minus 2 months old or whatever), and (b) find that chickens (or whatever) have more of this quality than 3 year old humans, you should care about chickens.
I’m very sure than an 8 year old human counts morally and that a chicken does not,
Consider an experience which, if had by an eight-year-old human, would be morally very bad, such as an experience of intense suffering. Now suppose that a chicken could have an experience that was phenomenally indistinguishable from that of the child. Would you be “very sure” that it would be very bad for this experience to be had by the human child, but not at all bad to be had by the chicken?
I smell a variation of Pascal’s Mugging here. In Pascal’s Mugging, you are told that you should consider a possibility with a small probability because the large consequence makes up for the fact that the probability is small. Here you are suggesting that someone may not be “very sure” (i.e. that he may have a small degree of uncertainty), but that even a small degree of uncertainty justifies becoming a vegetarian because something about the consequence of being wrong (presumably, multiplying by the high badness, though you don’t explicitly say so) makes up for the fact that the degree of uncertainty is small.
Now suppose that a chicken could have an experience that was phenomenally indistinguishable from that of the child.
“Phenomenally indistinguishable”… to whom?
In other words, what is the mind that’s having both of these experiences and then attempting to distinguish between them?
Thomas Nagel famously pointed out that we can’t know “what it’s like” to be — in his example — a bat; even if we found our mind suddenly transplanted into the body of a bat, all we’d know is what’s it’s like for us to be a bat, not what it’s like for the bat to be a bat. If our mind were transformed into the mind of a bat (and placed in a bat’s body), we could not analyze our experiences in order to compare them with anything, nor, in that form, would we have comprehension of what it had been like to be a human.
Phenomenal properties are always, inherently, relative to a point of view — the point of view of the mind experiencing them. So it is entirely unclear to me what it means for two experiences, instantiated in organisms of very different species, to be “phenomenally indistinguishable”.
In other words, what is the mind that’s having both of these experiences and then attempting to distinguish between them?
When a subject is having a phenomenal experience, certain phenomenal properties are instantiated. In saying that two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable, I simply meant that they instantiate the same phenomenal properties. As should be obvious, there need not be any mind having both experiences in order for them to be indistinguishable from one another. For example, two people looking at the same patch of red may have phenomenally indistinguishable visual experiences—experiences that instantiate the same property of phenomenal redness. I’m simply asking Jeff to imagine a chicken having a painful experience that instantiates the property of unpleasantness to the same degree that a human child does, when we believe that the child’s painful experience is a morally bad thing.
Thomas Nagel famously pointed out that we can’t know “what it’s like” to be — in his example — a bat; even if we found our mind suddenly transplanted into the body of a bat, all we’d know is what’s it’s like for us to be a bat, not what it’s like for the bat to be a bat.
Sorry, but this is not an accurate characterization of Nagel’s argument.
How does this not apply to me imagining that I’m a toaster making toast? I can imagine a toaster having an experience all I want. That doesn’t imply that an actual toaster can have that experience or anything which can be meaningfully compared to a human experience at all.
Are you denying that chickens can have any of the experiences which, if had by a human, we would regard as morally bad? That seems implausible to me. Most people think that it would be very bad, for instance, if a child suffered intensely, and most people agree that chickens can suffer intensely.
That’s a view of phenomenal experience (namely, that phenomenal properties are intersubjectively comparable, and that “phenomenal properties” can be described from a third-person perspective) that is far, far from uncontroversial among professional philosophers, and I, personally, take it to be almost entirely unsupported (and probably unsupportable).
For example, two people looking at the same patch of red may have phenomenally indistinguishable visual experiences—experiences that instantiate the same property of phenomenal redness.
Intersubjective incomparability of color experiences is one of the classic examples of (alleged) intersubjective incomparability in the literature (cf. the huge piles of writing on the inverted spectrum problem, to which even I have contributed).
… imagine a chicken having a painful experience that instantiates the property of unpleasantness to the same degree that a human child does...
I really don’t think this is a coherent thing to imagine. Once again — unpleasantness to whom? “Unpleasant” is not a one-place predicate.
Sorry, but this is not an accurate characterization of Nagel’s argument.
If your objection is that Nagel only says that the structure of our minds and sensory organs does not allow us to imagine the what-it’s-like-ness of being a bat, and does not mention transplantation and the like, then I grant it; but my extension of it is, imo, consistent with his thesis. The point, in any case, is that it doesn’t make sense to speak of one mind having some experience which is generated by another mind (where “mind” is used broadly, in Nagel-esque examples, to include sensory modalities, i.e. sense organs and the brain hardware necessary to process their input; but in our example need not necessarily include input from the external world).
For example, two people looking at the same patch of red may have phenomenally indistinguishable visual experiences—experiences that instantiate the same property of phenomenal redness.
I don’t think there’s a God-given mapping from the set of Alice’s possible subjective experiences to the set of Bob’s possible subjective experiences. (This is why I think the inverted spectrum thing is meaningless.) We can define a mapping that maps each of Alice’s qualia to the one Bob experiences in response to the same kind of sensory input, but 1) there’s no guarantee it’s one-to-one (colours as seen by young, non-colourblind people would be a best case scenario, but think about flavours), and 2) it would make your claim tautological and devoid of empirical content.
Nagel had no problems with taking objective attributes of experience—e.g. indicia of suffering—and comparing them for the purposes of political and moral debate. The equivalence or even comparability of subjective experience (whether between different humans or different species) is not necessary for an equivalence of moral depravity.
Justifying violence against an oppressed group, on the basis of some unobserved and ambiguous quality, is the definition of bigotry.
Have you interacted with a disabled human before? What it is it about them that you think merits less consideration? My best friend growing up was differently abled, at the cognitive capacity of a young child. But he is also probably the most praiseworthy individual I have ever met. Generous to a fault, forgiving even of those who had mistreated him (and there were many of those), and completely lacking in artifice. A world filled with animals such as he would be a good world indeed. So why should he receive any fewer rights than you or I? What is this amorphous quality that he is missing?
Factually, it is not true that human inequality is “socially destructive.” Human civilization has thrived for 10,000 years despite horrific caste systems. And even just a generation prior, disabled humans were systematically mistreated as our moral inferiors. Even lions of the left like Arthur Miller had no qualms about locking up their disabled children and throwing away the key.
Inequality is a terrible thing, if you are on the wrong side of the hierarchy. But there is nothing intrinsically destabilizing about bigotry. Far from it, prejudice against “outsiders” is our natural state.
I think you are technically wrong. A world filled with people at the cognitive capacity of a young child would include a lot of suffering. (Unless there would be also someone else to solve their problems.) Hunger, diseases, predators… and no ability to defend against them.
DxE, I have to ask, and I don’t mean to be hostile: are you using emotionally-charged, question-begging language deliberately (to act as intuition pumps, perhaps)? Would you be able to rephrase your comments in more neutral, objective language?
The language I use is deliberate. It accurately conveys my point of view, including normative judgments. I do not relish the idea of antagonizing anyone. However, the content of certain viewpoints is inherently antagonizing. If I were to factually state that someone were a rapist, for example, I could not phrase that in a neutral, objective way.
For what it’s worth, I actually love jkaufman.. He’s one of the smartest and most solid people I know. But his views on this subject are bigoted.
I see. However, I disagree that your comments accurately convey your point of view, or any point of view; there’s a lot of unpacking I’d have to ask you to do on e.g. the great-grandparent before I could understand exactly what you were saying; and I’m afraid I’m not sufficiently interested to try.
If I were to factually state that someone were a rapist, for example, I could not phrase that in a neutral, objective way.
Couldn’t you? I could. Observe:
Bob has, on several occasions, initiated and carried on sexual intercourse with an unwilling partner, knowing that the person in question was not willing, and understanding his actions to be opposed to the wishes of said person, as well as to the social norms of his society.
There you go. That is, if anything, too neutral; I could make it less verbose and more colloquial without much loss of neutrality; but it showcases my point, I think. If you believe you can’t phrase something in language that doesn’t sound like you’re trying to incite a crowd, you are probably not trying hard enough.
If you like (and only if you like), I could go through your response to jkaufman and point out where and how your choice of language makes it difficult to respond to your comments in any kind of logical or civilized manner. For now, I will say only:
Expressing your normative judgments is not very useful, nor very interesting to most people. What we’re looking for is for you to support those judgments with something. The mere fact that you think something is bad, really very bad, just no good… is not interesting. It’s not anything to talk about.
There’s a difference between making it seem morally neutral and not implying anything about its morality or lack thereof. What SaidAchmiz was trying to do is the latter.
Here is a thought experiment. Suppose that explorers arrive in a previously unknown area of the Amazon, where a strange tribe exists. The tribe suffers from a rare genetic anomaly, whereby all of its individuals are physically and cognitively stuck at the age of 3.
They laugh and they cry. They love and they hate. But they have no capacity for complex planning, or normative sophistication. So they live their lives as young children do—on a moment to moment basis—and they have no hope for ever developing beyond that.
If the explorers took these gentle creatures and murdered them—for science, for food, or for fun—would we say, “Oh but those children are not so intelligent, so the violence is ok.” Or would we be even more horrified by the violence, precisely because the children had no capacity to fend for themselves?
I would submit that the argument against animal exploitation is even stronger than the argument against violence in this thought experiment, because we could be quite confident that whatever awareness these children had, it was “less than” what a normal human has. We are comparing the same species after all, and presumably whatever the Amazonian children are missing, due to genetic anomaly, is not made up for in higher or richer awareness in other dimensions.
We cannot say that about other species. A dog may not be able to reason. But perhaps she delights in smells in a way that a less sensitive nose could never understand. Perhaps she enjoys food with a sophistication that a lesser palate cannot begin to grasp. Perhaps she feels loneliness with an intensity that a human being could never appreciate.
Richard Dawkins makes the very important point that cleverness, which we certainly have, gives us no reason to think that animal consciousness is any less rich or intense than human consciousness (http://directactioneverywhere.com/theliberationist/2013/7/18/g2givxwjippfa92qt9pgorvvheired). Indeed, since cleverness is, in a sense, an alternative mechanism for evolutionary survival to feelings (a perfect computational machine would need no feelings, as feelings are just a heuristic), there is a plausible case that clever animals should be given LESS consideration.
But all of this is really irrelevant. Because the basis of political equality, as Peter Singer has argued, has nothing to do with the facts of our experience. Someone who is born without the ability to feel pain does not somehow lose her rights because of that difference. Because equality is not a factual description, it is a normative demand—namely, that every being who crosses the threshold of sentience, every being that could be said to HAVE a will—ought be given the same respect and freedom that we ask for ourselves, as “willing” creatures.
This is a variant of the argument from marginal cases: if there is some quality that makes you count morally, and we can find some example humans (ex: 3 year olds) that have less of that quality than some animals, what do we do?
I’m very sure than an 8 year old human counts morally and that a chicken does not, and while I’m not very clear on where along that spectrum the quality I care about starts getting up to levels where it matters, I think it’s probably something no or almost no animals have and some humans don’t have. Making this distinction among humans, however, would be incredibly socially destructive, especially given how unsure I am about where the line should go, and so I think we end up with a much better society if we treat all humans as morally equal. This means I end up saying things like “value all humans equally; don’t value animals” when that’s not my real distinction, just the closest schelling point).
It seems like your answer to the argument from marginal cases is that maybe the (human) marginal cases don’t matter and “Making this distinction among humans, however, would be incredibly socially destructive.”
That may work for you, but I think it doesn’t work for the vast majority of people who don’t count animals as morally relevant. You are “very sure than an 8 year old human counts morally” (intrinsically, by which I mean “not just because doing otherwise would be socially destructive). I’m not sure if you think 3 year old humans count (intrinsically), but I’m sure that almost everyone does. I know that they count these humans intrinsically (and not just to avoid social destruction), because in fact most people do make these distinctions among humans: For example, median opinion in the US seems to be that humans start counting sometime in the second trimester.
Given this, it’s entirely reasonable to try to figure out what quality makes things count morally, and if you (a) care intrinsically about 3 year old humans (or 1 year old or minus 2 months old or whatever), and (b) find that chickens (or whatever) have more of this quality than 3 year old humans, you should care about chickens.
Consider an experience which, if had by an eight-year-old human, would be morally very bad, such as an experience of intense suffering. Now suppose that a chicken could have an experience that was phenomenally indistinguishable from that of the child. Would you be “very sure” that it would be very bad for this experience to be had by the human child, but not at all bad to be had by the chicken?
I smell a variation of Pascal’s Mugging here. In Pascal’s Mugging, you are told that you should consider a possibility with a small probability because the large consequence makes up for the fact that the probability is small. Here you are suggesting that someone may not be “very sure” (i.e. that he may have a small degree of uncertainty), but that even a small degree of uncertainty justifies becoming a vegetarian because something about the consequence of being wrong (presumably, multiplying by the high badness, though you don’t explicitly say so) makes up for the fact that the degree of uncertainty is small.
“Phenomenally indistinguishable”… to whom?
In other words, what is the mind that’s having both of these experiences and then attempting to distinguish between them?
Thomas Nagel famously pointed out that we can’t know “what it’s like” to be — in his example — a bat; even if we found our mind suddenly transplanted into the body of a bat, all we’d know is what’s it’s like for us to be a bat, not what it’s like for the bat to be a bat. If our mind were transformed into the mind of a bat (and placed in a bat’s body), we could not analyze our experiences in order to compare them with anything, nor, in that form, would we have comprehension of what it had been like to be a human.
Phenomenal properties are always, inherently, relative to a point of view — the point of view of the mind experiencing them. So it is entirely unclear to me what it means for two experiences, instantiated in organisms of very different species, to be “phenomenally indistinguishable”.
When a subject is having a phenomenal experience, certain phenomenal properties are instantiated. In saying that two experiences are phenomenally indistinguishable, I simply meant that they instantiate the same phenomenal properties. As should be obvious, there need not be any mind having both experiences in order for them to be indistinguishable from one another. For example, two people looking at the same patch of red may have phenomenally indistinguishable visual experiences—experiences that instantiate the same property of phenomenal redness. I’m simply asking Jeff to imagine a chicken having a painful experience that instantiates the property of unpleasantness to the same degree that a human child does, when we believe that the child’s painful experience is a morally bad thing.
Sorry, but this is not an accurate characterization of Nagel’s argument.
How does this not apply to me imagining that I’m a toaster making toast? I can imagine a toaster having an experience all I want. That doesn’t imply that an actual toaster can have that experience or anything which can be meaningfully compared to a human experience at all.
Are you denying that chickens can have any of the experiences which, if had by a human, we would regard as morally bad? That seems implausible to me. Most people think that it would be very bad, for instance, if a child suffered intensely, and most people agree that chickens can suffer intensely.
That’s a view of phenomenal experience (namely, that phenomenal properties are intersubjectively comparable, and that “phenomenal properties” can be described from a third-person perspective) that is far, far from uncontroversial among professional philosophers, and I, personally, take it to be almost entirely unsupported (and probably unsupportable).
Intersubjective incomparability of color experiences is one of the classic examples of (alleged) intersubjective incomparability in the literature (cf. the huge piles of writing on the inverted spectrum problem, to which even I have contributed).
I really don’t think this is a coherent thing to imagine. Once again — unpleasantness to whom? “Unpleasant” is not a one-place predicate.
If your objection is that Nagel only says that the structure of our minds and sensory organs does not allow us to imagine the what-it’s-like-ness of being a bat, and does not mention transplantation and the like, then I grant it; but my extension of it is, imo, consistent with his thesis. The point, in any case, is that it doesn’t make sense to speak of one mind having some experience which is generated by another mind (where “mind” is used broadly, in Nagel-esque examples, to include sensory modalities, i.e. sense organs and the brain hardware necessary to process their input; but in our example need not necessarily include input from the external world).
I don’t think there’s a God-given mapping from the set of Alice’s possible subjective experiences to the set of Bob’s possible subjective experiences. (This is why I think the inverted spectrum thing is meaningless.) We can define a mapping that maps each of Alice’s qualia to the one Bob experiences in response to the same kind of sensory input, but 1) there’s no guarantee it’s one-to-one (colours as seen by young, non-colourblind people would be a best case scenario, but think about flavours), and 2) it would make your claim tautological and devoid of empirical content.
Nagel had no problems with taking objective attributes of experience—e.g. indicia of suffering—and comparing them for the purposes of political and moral debate. The equivalence or even comparability of subjective experience (whether between different humans or different species) is not necessary for an equivalence of moral depravity.
jkaufman,
Justifying violence against an oppressed group, on the basis of some unobserved and ambiguous quality, is the definition of bigotry.
Have you interacted with a disabled human before? What it is it about them that you think merits less consideration? My best friend growing up was differently abled, at the cognitive capacity of a young child. But he is also probably the most praiseworthy individual I have ever met. Generous to a fault, forgiving even of those who had mistreated him (and there were many of those), and completely lacking in artifice. A world filled with animals such as he would be a good world indeed. So why should he receive any fewer rights than you or I? What is this amorphous quality that he is missing?
Factually, it is not true that human inequality is “socially destructive.” Human civilization has thrived for 10,000 years despite horrific caste systems. And even just a generation prior, disabled humans were systematically mistreated as our moral inferiors. Even lions of the left like Arthur Miller had no qualms about locking up their disabled children and throwing away the key.
Inequality is a terrible thing, if you are on the wrong side of the hierarchy. But there is nothing intrinsically destabilizing about bigotry. Far from it, prejudice against “outsiders” is our natural state.
I think you are technically wrong. A world filled with people at the cognitive capacity of a young child would include a lot of suffering. (Unless there would be also someone else to solve their problems.) Hunger, diseases, predators… and no ability to defend against them.
DxE, I have to ask, and I don’t mean to be hostile: are you using emotionally-charged, question-begging language deliberately (to act as intuition pumps, perhaps)? Would you be able to rephrase your comments in more neutral, objective language?
The language I use is deliberate. It accurately conveys my point of view, including normative judgments. I do not relish the idea of antagonizing anyone. However, the content of certain viewpoints is inherently antagonizing. If I were to factually state that someone were a rapist, for example, I could not phrase that in a neutral, objective way.
For what it’s worth, I actually love jkaufman.. He’s one of the smartest and most solid people I know. But his views on this subject are bigoted.
I see. However, I disagree that your comments accurately convey your point of view, or any point of view; there’s a lot of unpacking I’d have to ask you to do on e.g. the great-grandparent before I could understand exactly what you were saying; and I’m afraid I’m not sufficiently interested to try.
Couldn’t you? I could. Observe:
Bob has, on several occasions, initiated and carried on sexual intercourse with an unwilling partner, knowing that the person in question was not willing, and understanding his actions to be opposed to the wishes of said person, as well as to the social norms of his society.
There you go. That is, if anything, too neutral; I could make it less verbose and more colloquial without much loss of neutrality; but it showcases my point, I think. If you believe you can’t phrase something in language that doesn’t sound like you’re trying to incite a crowd, you are probably not trying hard enough.
If you like (and only if you like), I could go through your response to jkaufman and point out where and how your choice of language makes it difficult to respond to your comments in any kind of logical or civilized manner. For now, I will say only:
Expressing your normative judgments is not very useful, nor very interesting to most people. What we’re looking for is for you to support those judgments with something. The mere fact that you think something is bad, really very bad, just no good… is not interesting. It’s not anything to talk about.
So what you are demonstrating is that it is possible (and apparently, in your eyes, desirable) to whitewash rape and make it seem morally neutral.
No thanks.
There’s a difference between making it seem morally neutral and not implying anything about its morality or lack thereof. What SaidAchmiz was trying to do is the latter.