Current thoughts on Russian military objectives, based on comment threads here and my own general models...
Multiple people mentioned that annexation is an unlikely objective for Putin.
Putin could install a puppet government, and then leave. I expect that would be highly unstable; it would only be a matter of time until the Ukrainian populace overthrew a puppet government without a Russian occupation to back it.
Putin could install a puppet government, and then set up a long-term occupation. This is the “Russia’s Iraq/Afghanistan” scenario. Again, I doubt that it would be stable long-term, although with state media trying to make the war look good to the Russian populace it could remain popular for a while.
Putin could dictate terms with the pre-existing Ukrainian government, then leave once a treaty is signed. At a minimum, that treaty would probably include abandoning claim to the predominantly-Russian territories of Ukraine, promising not to join Nato, and probably various other things, with an emphasis on symbolic victories for Russia. This is the most stable outcome I see at the moment, and is probably what I’d be aiming for if I were Putin right now.
Putin might not have an exit strategy at all. This could be either stupidity or (more likely on my models) making a short-term/long-term tradeoff similar to the puppet government scenarios.
The general question of “is Putin accepting a long-term mess for a short-term win?” still seems very central to understanding and predicting the situation. If he’s not, then treating with the current government is the only plausible exit strategy I currently see. I could certainly imagine the treaty-exit adding up to a very popular war, which I currently think is Putin’s main priority here.
My best guess is very similar to you fourth scenario.
I think, that one of the main Putin’s goal (maybe his very terminal goal, but I’m not sure) is to solve the Ukrainian problem, and then quit the game as a triumphant (after president’s election at 2024; but he has option to continue work on it until 2030, if he choose so and nothing changes significantly). Putin’s time is relatively short—he is 69 years old, and there are some rumors (not very reliable, thought) that he is somehow sick. So achieving his main goal in two years is very preferably to him, but there are still another six president’s years, if he need it and can afford it.
Ukraine is one of few ex-USSR republics that is not loyal to Putin’s government, and he obviously perceive that as a big problem. So the main Putin’s current goal, as far as I can assume, is to create artificial loyal states (on the basis of pretending to independence Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine) between Russia and NATO. There are already couple of such states with limited recognition around Russia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are commonly recognized as parts of Georgia), so it is appropriate way for Putin to create a buffer zone.
Installing a puppet government at the Ukraine, as far as I can see, is the secondary goal, but also desired.
Speaking of price of the invasion in terms of Russian economics, there is Russian National Wealth Fund, which continuously grew up during almost all COVID pandemic. There were thoughts earlier, that this NWF was intended for possible war (especially considering, that pandemic was not reason to spend it). Today I say news, that government is planning to spend it to support the economics (personally, I consider it as a relatively good sign—if they started to spend the stock for a rainy day then they currently do not plan to escalate current situation even further).
There are a few dimensions in my general models that have a bearing on the short-term v long-term question, though I am deeply uncertain how they actually shake out. The two that are top-of-mind right now are:
Personal incentives. The background for this is the importance of oligarchs to the conduct of Russian affairs, and the significance of members of this group to Putin specifically. Sanctions from the Crimea affair very publicly took aim at (what were believed to be by the sanctioners) the personal fortunes of people judged important to Putin on the theory that they would apply pressure to him so they could recover their wealth.
Several of these oligarchs are involved in things like the natural gas pipeline which goes through Ukraine, and other questions of trade between Russia and Europe. It seems plausible to me that one of the payoffs Putin expects is effectively being able to distribute opportunities here to his key supporters as spoils, and probably also profit from them himself.
To the extent this is personal profit it is short term; to the extent that it is satisfying key political allies it is long term.
Avoid Eurocentrism or: China. The dimension I want to emphasize here is great power competition in Asia, as distinct from trade relations or diplomacy which are the key concerns for the US and Europe. In particular I point to the Belt and Road Initiative as something designed to bring areas which were traditionally under the political/economic influence of Russia under the political/economic influence of China instead. I cannot claim this directly, but it seems deeply plausible to me that Putin or his cohort judge an increasing China as a bigger threat than Europe, and being a junior economic power on all sides is viewed as intolerable.
It is worth pointing out that while I think that Russia is the biggest loser in China’s rise, I don’t see anything about this from the nominal experts. It just appears inevitable to me according to the historical precedents, and supported by geopolitical logic.
Current thoughts on Russian military objectives, based on comment threads here and my own general models...
Multiple people mentioned that annexation is an unlikely objective for Putin.
Putin could install a puppet government, and then leave. I expect that would be highly unstable; it would only be a matter of time until the Ukrainian populace overthrew a puppet government without a Russian occupation to back it.
Putin could install a puppet government, and then set up a long-term occupation. This is the “Russia’s Iraq/Afghanistan” scenario. Again, I doubt that it would be stable long-term, although with state media trying to make the war look good to the Russian populace it could remain popular for a while.
Putin could dictate terms with the pre-existing Ukrainian government, then leave once a treaty is signed. At a minimum, that treaty would probably include abandoning claim to the predominantly-Russian territories of Ukraine, promising not to join Nato, and probably various other things, with an emphasis on symbolic victories for Russia. This is the most stable outcome I see at the moment, and is probably what I’d be aiming for if I were Putin right now.
Putin might not have an exit strategy at all. This could be either stupidity or (more likely on my models) making a short-term/long-term tradeoff similar to the puppet government scenarios.
The general question of “is Putin accepting a long-term mess for a short-term win?” still seems very central to understanding and predicting the situation. If he’s not, then treating with the current government is the only plausible exit strategy I currently see. I could certainly imagine the treaty-exit adding up to a very popular war, which I currently think is Putin’s main priority here.
My best guess is very similar to you fourth scenario.
I think, that one of the main Putin’s goal (maybe his very terminal goal, but I’m not sure) is to solve the Ukrainian problem, and then quit the game as a triumphant (after president’s election at 2024; but he has option to continue work on it until 2030, if he choose so and nothing changes significantly). Putin’s time is relatively short—he is 69 years old, and there are some rumors (not very reliable, thought) that he is somehow sick. So achieving his main goal in two years is very preferably to him, but there are still another six president’s years, if he need it and can afford it.
Ukraine is one of few ex-USSR republics that is not loyal to Putin’s government, and he obviously perceive that as a big problem. So the main Putin’s current goal, as far as I can assume, is to create artificial loyal states (on the basis of pretending to independence Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast of Ukraine) between Russia and NATO. There are already couple of such states with limited recognition around Russia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are commonly recognized as parts of Georgia), so it is appropriate way for Putin to create a buffer zone.
Installing a puppet government at the Ukraine, as far as I can see, is the secondary goal, but also desired.
Speaking of price of the invasion in terms of Russian economics, there is Russian National Wealth Fund, which continuously grew up during almost all COVID pandemic. There were thoughts earlier, that this NWF was intended for possible war (especially considering, that pandemic was not reason to spend it). Today I say news, that government is planning to spend it to support the economics (personally, I consider it as a relatively good sign—if they started to spend the stock for a rainy day then they currently do not plan to escalate current situation even further).
There are a few dimensions in my general models that have a bearing on the short-term v long-term question, though I am deeply uncertain how they actually shake out. The two that are top-of-mind right now are:
Personal incentives. The background for this is the importance of oligarchs to the conduct of Russian affairs, and the significance of members of this group to Putin specifically. Sanctions from the Crimea affair very publicly took aim at (what were believed to be by the sanctioners) the personal fortunes of people judged important to Putin on the theory that they would apply pressure to him so they could recover their wealth.
Several of these oligarchs are involved in things like the natural gas pipeline which goes through Ukraine, and other questions of trade between Russia and Europe. It seems plausible to me that one of the payoffs Putin expects is effectively being able to distribute opportunities here to his key supporters as spoils, and probably also profit from them himself.
To the extent this is personal profit it is short term; to the extent that it is satisfying key political allies it is long term.
Avoid Eurocentrism or: China. The dimension I want to emphasize here is great power competition in Asia, as distinct from trade relations or diplomacy which are the key concerns for the US and Europe. In particular I point to the Belt and Road Initiative as something designed to bring areas which were traditionally under the political/economic influence of Russia under the political/economic influence of China instead. I cannot claim this directly, but it seems deeply plausible to me that Putin or his cohort judge an increasing China as a bigger threat than Europe, and being a junior economic power on all sides is viewed as intolerable.
It is worth pointing out that while I think that Russia is the biggest loser in China’s rise, I don’t see anything about this from the nominal experts. It just appears inevitable to me according to the historical precedents, and supported by geopolitical logic.