I found this post very disturbing, so I thought for a bit about why. It reads very much like some kind of SF dystopia, and indeed if it were necessary to agree to this lottery to be part of the hypothetical rationalist community/country, then I wouldn’t wish to be a part of it. One of my core values is liberty - that means the ability of each individual to make his or her own decisions and live his or her life accordingly (so long as it’s not impeding anyone else’s right to do the same). No government should have the right to compel its citizens to become soldiers, and that’s what it would become, after the first generation, unless you’re going to choose to exile anyone who reaches adulthood there and then opts out.
Offering financial incentives for becoming a soldier, as has already been discussed in the comments, seems a fairer idea. Consider also that the more objectively evil the Evil Barbarians are, the more people will independently decide that fighting is the better decision. If not enough people support your war, maybe that in itself is a sign that it’s not a good idea. If most of the rationalists would rather lose than fight, that tells you something.
It’s quite difficult to know the right tone of response to take here—the Evil Barbarians are obviously pure thought-experiment, but presumably most of us would view a rationalist country as a good thing. Not if it made decisions like this, though. Sacrificing the individual for the collective isn’t always irrational, but it needs to be the individual who makes that choice based on his or her own values, not due to some perceived social contact. Otherwise you might as well be sacrificed to make more paperclips.
If it was intended as pure metaphor, it’s a disquieting one.
Oh, my first downvote. Interesting. Bad Leisha, you’ve violated some community norm or other. But given that I’m new here and still trying to determine whether or not this community is a good fit for me, I’m curious about the specifics. I wonder what I did wrong.
Necroposting? Disagreeing with the OP? Taking the OP too literally and engaging with the scenario? Talking about my emotional response or personal values? The fact that I do value individual liberty over the collective? Some flaw in my chain of reasoning? (possible, but if so, why not point it out directly so that I can respond to the criticism?)
Note: This post is a concerted rational effort to overcome the cached thought ‘oh no, someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote :( ’ and should be taken in that spirit.
Oh, my first downvote. Interesting. Bad Leisha, you’ve violated some community norm or other. But given that I’m new here and still trying to determine whether or not this community is a good fit for me, I’m curious about the specifics. I wonder what I did wrong.
A single downvote is not an expression of a community norm. It is an expression by a single person that there was something, and it could be pretty much anything, about your post that that one person did not like. I wouldn’t worry until a post gets to −5 or so, and −1 isn’t very predictive that it will.
Note: This post is a concerted rational effort to overcome the cached thought ‘oh no, someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote :( ’ and should be taken in that spirit.
The “someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote” part is accurate. You don’t need the “oh no” and “:(” parts. Just because someone disagrees with you, doesn’t mean that you are wrong.
Personally (and I did not vote on your post either way), I don’t think you are quite engaging with the problem posed, which is that each of these hypothetical rationalists would rather win without being in the army themselves than win with being in the army, but would much prefer either of those to losing the war. Straw-man rationality, which Eliezer has spent many words opposing, including these ones, would have each rationalist decline to join up, leaving the dirty work to others. The others do the same, and they all lose the war. The surviving rationalists under occupation by barbarians then get to moan that they were too smart to win. But rationality that consistently loses is not worth the name. It is up to rationalists to find a way to organise collective actions that require a large number of participants for any chance of success, but which everyone would rather leave to everyone else.
Some possible ways look like freely surrendering, for a while, some of one’s freedom. A general principle that Freedom is Good has little to say about such situations.
A single downvote is not an expression of a community norm. It is an expression by a single person that there was something, and it could be pretty much anything, about your post that that one person did not like.
It’s not just one person though. Having −1 points also means that nobody else thought it deserves more than that, or at least it’s not worth their effort to vote it back up to 0. So if you have reason to think the comment has been read by more than a few people after it was downvoted, even −1 points does reflect the community judgement to some extent.
Generally, the only types of comments that are below −3 that I upvote are ones which I think add a perspective to the conversation which should be there but should have a different proponent. It’s rare that I find a comment at less than −3 which I would fully endorse (but I have my settings set to display all comments).
Thank you for your response! It does help to be able to discuss these things, even if it seems a little meta.
A single downvote is not an expression of a community norm.
Point taken.
The “someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote” part is accurate. You don’t need the “oh no” and “:(” parts.
Sure, I don’t need them. I included them as evidence of the type of flawed thinking I’m trying to get away from (If you’re familiar with Myers-Briggs, I’m an F-type trying to strengthen her T-function. It doesn’t come naturally).
Personally (and I did not vote on your post either way), I don’t think you are quite engaging with the problem posed...
You’re right. I noted that problem, but evaluated it as being less significant than the specifics of the extended example, which struck me as both morally suspect and, in a sense, odd: it didn’t seem to fit with the tone of most of the other posts I’ve read here. See my reply to dbc for more on that.
It is up to rationalists to find a way to organise collective actions that require a large number of participants for any chance of success, but which everyone would rather leave to everyone else.
I agree. I’d add that those actions need to be collectively decided, but I agree with the principle.
One of my core values is liberty—that means the ability of each individual to make his or her own decisions and live his or her life accordingly
A very sensible value in a heterogenous society, I think. But in this hypothetical nation, everyone is a very good rationalist. So they all, when they shut up and multiply, agree that being a soldier and winning the war is preferable to any outcome involving losing the war, and they all agree that the best thing to do as a group is to have a lottery, and so they all precommit to accepting the results.
No point in giving people the liberty to make their own individual decisions when everyone comes to the same decision anyway. Or more accurately, the society is fully respecting everyone’s individual autonomy, but due to the very unlikely nature of the nation, the effect ends up being one of 100% compliance anyway.
One of my core values is liberty—that means the ability of each individual to make his or her own decisions and live his or her life accordingly (so long as it’s not impeding anyone else’s right to do the same)
It’s psychologically understandable, but morally wrong, provided the deserter entered into an uncoerced agreement with the organization he or she is deserting. If you know the terms before you sign up, you shouldn’t renege on them.
In cases of coercion or force (e.g. the draft) desertion is quite justified.
The topic of this article is how rational agents should solve a particular tragedy of the commons. Certainly, a common moral code is one solution to this problem: an army will have no deserters if each soldier morally refuses to desert. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to think that common morality is the best, or perhaps only solution.
I think Eliezer is more interested in situations where this solution is impractical. Perhaps the rationalists are a society composed of people with vastly differing moral codes, but even in this case, they should still be capable of agreeing to coordinate, even if that means giving up things that they individually value.
Yes, I see a common moral framework as a better solution, and I would also assert that a group needs at least a rudimentary version of such a framework in order to maintain cohesion. I assumed that was the case here.
The rational solution to the tragedy of the commons is indeed worth discussing. However, in this case the principle behind the parable was obscured due to its rather objectionable content. I focused on the specifics as they remained more fixed in my mind after reading than the underlying principle. A less controversial example such as advertising or over-grazing would have prevented that outcome.
I know that’s a personal preference, though, and it seems to be a habit of Eliezer’s to choose extreme examples on occasion—I ran into the same problem with Three Worlds Collide. It’s an aspect of his otherwise very valuable writing that I find detracts from, rather than illuminates the points he’s making. I recognize that others may disagree.
With that in mind, I’m happy to close this line of discussion on the grounds that it’s veering off-topic for this thread.
In the least convenient possible world, in which winning like this and losing are the only options, does losing the war to barbarian invaders really bring more liberty than being drafted into a war?
I found this post very disturbing, so I thought for a bit about why. It reads very much like some kind of SF dystopia, and indeed if it were necessary to agree to this lottery to be part of the hypothetical rationalist community/country, then I wouldn’t wish to be a part of it. One of my core values is liberty - that means the ability of each individual to make his or her own decisions and live his or her life accordingly (so long as it’s not impeding anyone else’s right to do the same). No government should have the right to compel its citizens to become soldiers, and that’s what it would become, after the first generation, unless you’re going to choose to exile anyone who reaches adulthood there and then opts out.
Offering financial incentives for becoming a soldier, as has already been discussed in the comments, seems a fairer idea. Consider also that the more objectively evil the Evil Barbarians are, the more people will independently decide that fighting is the better decision. If not enough people support your war, maybe that in itself is a sign that it’s not a good idea. If most of the rationalists would rather lose than fight, that tells you something.
It’s quite difficult to know the right tone of response to take here—the Evil Barbarians are obviously pure thought-experiment, but presumably most of us would view a rationalist country as a good thing. Not if it made decisions like this, though. Sacrificing the individual for the collective isn’t always irrational, but it needs to be the individual who makes that choice based on his or her own values, not due to some perceived social contact. Otherwise you might as well be sacrificed to make more paperclips.
If it was intended as pure metaphor, it’s a disquieting one.
Oh, my first downvote. Interesting. Bad Leisha, you’ve violated some community norm or other. But given that I’m new here and still trying to determine whether or not this community is a good fit for me, I’m curious about the specifics. I wonder what I did wrong.
Necroposting? Disagreeing with the OP? Taking the OP too literally and engaging with the scenario? Talking about my emotional response or personal values? The fact that I do value individual liberty over the collective? Some flaw in my chain of reasoning? (possible, but if so, why not point it out directly so that I can respond to the criticism?)
Note: This post is a concerted rational effort to overcome the cached thought ‘oh no, someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote :( ’ and should be taken in that spirit.
A single downvote is not an expression of a community norm. It is an expression by a single person that there was something, and it could be pretty much anything, about your post that that one person did not like. I wouldn’t worry until a post gets to −5 or so, and −1 isn’t very predictive that it will.
The “someone at LW doesn’t like what I wrote” part is accurate. You don’t need the “oh no” and “:(” parts. Just because someone disagrees with you, doesn’t mean that you are wrong.
Personally (and I did not vote on your post either way), I don’t think you are quite engaging with the problem posed, which is that each of these hypothetical rationalists would rather win without being in the army themselves than win with being in the army, but would much prefer either of those to losing the war. Straw-man rationality, which Eliezer has spent many words opposing, including these ones, would have each rationalist decline to join up, leaving the dirty work to others. The others do the same, and they all lose the war. The surviving rationalists under occupation by barbarians then get to moan that they were too smart to win. But rationality that consistently loses is not worth the name. It is up to rationalists to find a way to organise collective actions that require a large number of participants for any chance of success, but which everyone would rather leave to everyone else.
Some possible ways look like freely surrendering, for a while, some of one’s freedom. A general principle that Freedom is Good has little to say about such situations.
It’s not just one person though. Having −1 points also means that nobody else thought it deserves more than that, or at least it’s not worth their effort to vote it back up to 0. So if you have reason to think the comment has been read by more than a few people after it was downvoted, even −1 points does reflect the community judgement to some extent.
Indeed, my quality threshold to upvote comments at −1 is much lower than my quality threshold to upvote comments at 0.
What function describes your threshold as the negative values go below −1?
Generally, the only types of comments that are below −3 that I upvote are ones which I think add a perspective to the conversation which should be there but should have a different proponent. It’s rare that I find a comment at less than −3 which I would fully endorse (but I have my settings set to display all comments).
Thank you for your response! It does help to be able to discuss these things, even if it seems a little meta.
Point taken.
Sure, I don’t need them. I included them as evidence of the type of flawed thinking I’m trying to get away from (If you’re familiar with Myers-Briggs, I’m an F-type trying to strengthen her T-function. It doesn’t come naturally).
You’re right. I noted that problem, but evaluated it as being less significant than the specifics of the extended example, which struck me as both morally suspect and, in a sense, odd: it didn’t seem to fit with the tone of most of the other posts I’ve read here. See my reply to dbc for more on that.
I agree. I’d add that those actions need to be collectively decided, but I agree with the principle.
A very sensible value in a heterogenous society, I think. But in this hypothetical nation, everyone is a very good rationalist. So they all, when they shut up and multiply, agree that being a soldier and winning the war is preferable to any outcome involving losing the war, and they all agree that the best thing to do as a group is to have a lottery, and so they all precommit to accepting the results.
No point in giving people the liberty to make their own individual decisions when everyone comes to the same decision anyway. Or more accurately, the society is fully respecting everyone’s individual autonomy, but due to the very unlikely nature of the nation, the effect ends up being one of 100% compliance anyway.
How do you feel about desertion?
It’s psychologically understandable, but morally wrong, provided the deserter entered into an uncoerced agreement with the organization he or she is deserting. If you know the terms before you sign up, you shouldn’t renege on them.
In cases of coercion or force (e.g. the draft) desertion is quite justified.
The topic of this article is how rational agents should solve a particular tragedy of the commons. Certainly, a common moral code is one solution to this problem: an army will have no deserters if each soldier morally refuses to desert. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to think that common morality is the best, or perhaps only solution.
I think Eliezer is more interested in situations where this solution is impractical. Perhaps the rationalists are a society composed of people with vastly differing moral codes, but even in this case, they should still be capable of agreeing to coordinate, even if that means giving up things that they individually value.
Yes, I see a common moral framework as a better solution, and I would also assert that a group needs at least a rudimentary version of such a framework in order to maintain cohesion. I assumed that was the case here.
The rational solution to the tragedy of the commons is indeed worth discussing. However, in this case the principle behind the parable was obscured due to its rather objectionable content. I focused on the specifics as they remained more fixed in my mind after reading than the underlying principle. A less controversial example such as advertising or over-grazing would have prevented that outcome.
I know that’s a personal preference, though, and it seems to be a habit of Eliezer’s to choose extreme examples on occasion—I ran into the same problem with Three Worlds Collide. It’s an aspect of his otherwise very valuable writing that I find detracts from, rather than illuminates the points he’s making. I recognize that others may disagree.
With that in mind, I’m happy to close this line of discussion on the grounds that it’s veering off-topic for this thread.
In the least convenient possible world, in which winning like this and losing are the only options, does losing the war to barbarian invaders really bring more liberty than being drafted into a war?