The topic of this article is how rational agents should solve a particular tragedy of the commons. Certainly, a common moral code is one solution to this problem: an army will have no deserters if each soldier morally refuses to desert. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to think that common morality is the best, or perhaps only solution.
I think Eliezer is more interested in situations where this solution is impractical. Perhaps the rationalists are a society composed of people with vastly differing moral codes, but even in this case, they should still be capable of agreeing to coordinate, even if that means giving up things that they individually value.
Yes, I see a common moral framework as a better solution, and I would also assert that a group needs at least a rudimentary version of such a framework in order to maintain cohesion. I assumed that was the case here.
The rational solution to the tragedy of the commons is indeed worth discussing. However, in this case the principle behind the parable was obscured due to its rather objectionable content. I focused on the specifics as they remained more fixed in my mind after reading than the underlying principle. A less controversial example such as advertising or over-grazing would have prevented that outcome.
I know that’s a personal preference, though, and it seems to be a habit of Eliezer’s to choose extreme examples on occasion—I ran into the same problem with Three Worlds Collide. It’s an aspect of his otherwise very valuable writing that I find detracts from, rather than illuminates the points he’s making. I recognize that others may disagree.
With that in mind, I’m happy to close this line of discussion on the grounds that it’s veering off-topic for this thread.
The topic of this article is how rational agents should solve a particular tragedy of the commons. Certainly, a common moral code is one solution to this problem: an army will have no deserters if each soldier morally refuses to desert. I don’t want to put words in your mouth, but you seem to think that common morality is the best, or perhaps only solution.
I think Eliezer is more interested in situations where this solution is impractical. Perhaps the rationalists are a society composed of people with vastly differing moral codes, but even in this case, they should still be capable of agreeing to coordinate, even if that means giving up things that they individually value.
Yes, I see a common moral framework as a better solution, and I would also assert that a group needs at least a rudimentary version of such a framework in order to maintain cohesion. I assumed that was the case here.
The rational solution to the tragedy of the commons is indeed worth discussing. However, in this case the principle behind the parable was obscured due to its rather objectionable content. I focused on the specifics as they remained more fixed in my mind after reading than the underlying principle. A less controversial example such as advertising or over-grazing would have prevented that outcome.
I know that’s a personal preference, though, and it seems to be a habit of Eliezer’s to choose extreme examples on occasion—I ran into the same problem with Three Worlds Collide. It’s an aspect of his otherwise very valuable writing that I find detracts from, rather than illuminates the points he’s making. I recognize that others may disagree.
With that in mind, I’m happy to close this line of discussion on the grounds that it’s veering off-topic for this thread.