IAWYC, but I think it sidesteps an important issue.
A perfectly rational community will be able to resist the barbarians. But it’s possible, perhaps likely, that as you increase community rationality, there’s a valley somewhere between barbarian and Bayesian where fighting ability decreases until you climb out of it.
I think the most rational societies currently existing are still within that valley. And that a country with the values and rationality level of 21st century Harvard will with high probability be defeated by a country with the values and rationality level of 13th century Mongolia (holding everything else equal).
I don’t know who you’re arguing against, but I bet they are more interested in this problem than in an ideal case with a country of perfect Bayesians.
I agree such a valley is plausible (though far from obvious: more rational societies have better science and better economies; democracies can give guns to working class soldiers whereas aristocracies had to fear arming their peasants; etc.). To speculate about the underlying phenomenon, it seems plausible that across a range of goals (e.g., increasing one’s income; defending one’s society against barbarian hordes):
Slightly above-average amounts of rationality fairly often make things worse, since increased rationality, like any change in one’s mode of decision-making, can move people out of local optima.
Significantly larger amounts of rationality predictably make things better, since, after awhile, the person/society actually has enough skills to notice the expected benefits of “doing things the way most people do them” (which are often considerable; cultural action-patterns don’t come from nowhere) and to fairly evaluate the expected benefits of potential changes, and to solve the intrapersonal or societal coordination problems necessary to actually implement the action from which best results are expected.
Though I agree with Yvain’s points elsewhere that we need detailed, concrete, empirical arguments regarding the potential benefits claimed from these larger amounts of rationality.
more rational societies have better science and better economies
More-developed societies develop technology; less-developed societies use them without paying the huge costs of development.
It’s not evident which strategy is a win. Historically, it often appears that those who develop tech win. But not always. Japan has for decades been cashing in on American developments in cars, automation, steelmaking, ICs, and other areas.
If American corporations were required to foot the bill for the education needed for technological development, instead of having it paid for by taxpayers and by students, they might choose not to.
More-developed societies develop technology; less-developed societies use them without paying the huge costs of development.
If you patent something, you can charge what you like for the license. Were you suggesting that some countries ignore patent law; or that extenalities (such as failed R&D projects and education costs) don’t get recompensed? Or something else?
But not always. Japan has for decades been cashing in on American developments in cars, automation, steelmaking, ICs, and other areas.
That’s probably unfair. Japan files a lot of patents—more than the US by some measures.
The subject was discussed at Overcoming Bias recently.
I don’t know who you’re arguing against, but I bet they are more interested in this problem than in an ideal case with a country of perfect Bayesians.
IANEY but when I engage in such lines of reasoning I tend to be arguing against people (including myself devils advocating) who assert that even ideal bayesians would lose. Typically they include references to game theory, either the prisoners dillema or the commons.
I actually haven’t yet had the chance to argue with someone who I would bet is more interested in the ‘Havard equivalent rationalist’ society. Not because that isn’t the most practically important situation to consider, rather because their motivation for agument is to justify their own way of thinking. There is also plenty of social status to be had in applauding the anti-spock.
IAWYC, but I think it sidesteps an important issue.
A perfectly rational community will be able to resist the barbarians. But it’s possible, perhaps likely, that as you increase community rationality, there’s a valley somewhere between barbarian and Bayesian where fighting ability decreases until you climb out of it.
I think the most rational societies currently existing are still within that valley. And that a country with the values and rationality level of 21st century Harvard will with high probability be defeated by a country with the values and rationality level of 13th century Mongolia (holding everything else equal).
I don’t know who you’re arguing against, but I bet they are more interested in this problem than in an ideal case with a country of perfect Bayesians.
I agree such a valley is plausible (though far from obvious: more rational societies have better science and better economies; democracies can give guns to working class soldiers whereas aristocracies had to fear arming their peasants; etc.). To speculate about the underlying phenomenon, it seems plausible that across a range of goals (e.g., increasing one’s income; defending one’s society against barbarian hordes):
Slightly above-average amounts of rationality fairly often make things worse, since increased rationality, like any change in one’s mode of decision-making, can move people out of local optima.
Significantly larger amounts of rationality predictably make things better, since, after awhile, the person/society actually has enough skills to notice the expected benefits of “doing things the way most people do them” (which are often considerable; cultural action-patterns don’t come from nowhere) and to fairly evaluate the expected benefits of potential changes, and to solve the intrapersonal or societal coordination problems necessary to actually implement the action from which best results are expected.
Though I agree with Yvain’s points elsewhere that we need detailed, concrete, empirical arguments regarding the potential benefits claimed from these larger amounts of rationality.
More-developed societies develop technology; less-developed societies use them without paying the huge costs of development.
It’s not evident which strategy is a win. Historically, it often appears that those who develop tech win. But not always. Japan has for decades been cashing in on American developments in cars, automation, steelmaking, ICs, and other areas.
If American corporations were required to foot the bill for the education needed for technological development, instead of having it paid for by taxpayers and by students, they might choose not to.
If you patent something, you can charge what you like for the license. Were you suggesting that some countries ignore patent law; or that extenalities (such as failed R&D projects and education costs) don’t get recompensed? Or something else?
That’s probably unfair. Japan files a lot of patents—more than the US by some measures.
The subject was discussed at Overcoming Bias recently.
I’m no economist, but don’t they already pay for it to a certain extent, in the form of the higher wages educated workers demand?
I think that’s more a function of the rarity of the educated individuals of the needed sort, than of the cost of their education.
IANEY but when I engage in such lines of reasoning I tend to be arguing against people (including myself devils advocating) who assert that even ideal bayesians would lose. Typically they include references to game theory, either the prisoners dillema or the commons.
I actually haven’t yet had the chance to argue with someone who I would bet is more interested in the ‘Havard equivalent rationalist’ society. Not because that isn’t the most practically important situation to consider, rather because their motivation for agument is to justify their own way of thinking. There is also plenty of social status to be had in applauding the anti-spock.