(I’m not doubting you have a good reason, but the weight of the word “suffer” is essential to what morality’s about IMO. I think it’s valuable to be able to explain your views without using the word, but not necessary. If necessary “experience pain” works just as well.)
I’m not doubting you have a good reason, but the weight of the word “suffer” is essential to what morality’s about IMO.
So, this is what Nietzsche called the morality of timidity. He enjoyed contrasting moralities that were about seeking X and moralities that were about avoiding Y- and I think that’s a pretty good way to look at moralities (though I don’t agree with his approach very strongly). A morality that pursues pleasure- even at the cost of pain- strikes me as more vibrant than a morality that pursues lack of pain- even at the cost of pleasure. Now, that’s not an argument for happy vegetarians to become carnivores, but it is an argument for happy carnivores to not care about unhappy animals.
I don’t know this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought well at all, but this seems to be a case where he was just completely wrong. What metaethics makes judgments based on whether some ethical system is more “vibrant” than some other? What does that mean? Can moralities really be consistently classified into “seeking” and “avoiding”? What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
One could see it as an extension of natural selection. I agree with you it’s odd- but metaethics is even more slippery than ethics, so I am reluctant to pass judgments instead of making descriptions.
What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
If I recall correctly, he had significant affection for the likes of Genghis Khan. I don’t think he would sympathize very much with the petty robber but considers the mighty and powerful as operating on a different level from normal people, with correspondingly different morality. But it’s been a while since I’ve read his work along those lines, and so I’m not entirely confident about that. I do recall a passage where Zarathustra claimed his favorite animals were the eagle and the snake, and he approves of predation in general, I suspect.
With due respect to your wit, I would point out that although Slytherin the fictional character lived centuries ago, he was, in fact, invented after Nietzsche, and it is possible the correlation is noncoincidental and begins with Nietzsche as a cause.
Interestingly, Nietzsche’s famous last rational action was interposing himself between a horse and its owner, who was beating it.
I’m a little leery of the whole idea that the powerful have a different set of moral standards applied to them (as opposed to their having a different morality, which seems psychologically likely). Praising the great and powerful no matter what they do while still condemning Leopold and Loeb as monsters is a very convenient stance to take.
Could you clarify what moral system you use without using pain, suffering or related words? (I honestly cannot think of a way to do so for mine, but that may just be me being new to the Taboo concept).
If your moral system doesn’t care about suffering at all (human or otherwise) than there is no contradiction.
The thrust of my reply to these questions is that we don’t need to have fully general answers to them in order to be pretty sure—i.e., sure enough to stop doing it—that killing animals and eating them is wrong. All you need to know is that (a) you and your fellow humans experience the thing we call pain, (b) that it is wrong to cause other humans needless pain, and (c) that other animals are not sufficiently neurologically different from humans that you can be sure that killing them doesn’t cause them the same pain that it would be wrong to cause a human.
It is hard to explain a non sequitur. And the worse the reasoning used the harder it is to give an explanation more precise than “WTF? Um, no.”. Fortunately your argument is not that bad—it is just missing a premise “it is wrong to cause pain to animals”.
That’s the premise I am trying not to use, because I don’t think there is a supportable reason to draw a distinction between humans and animals when it comes to the acceptability of causing them pain and suffering. Let me rephrase.
I think it’s wrong to needlessly cause the-thing-we-know-as-pain to any creature capable of experiencing it. We know this includes humans, because we ourselves feel pain and can communicate that fact to others. We have every reason to think this includes a whole lot of non-human animals, because their physiology and behavior are similar enough to ours that it is very likely.
While we can’t live up to this moral guideline in every respect, some things—like not killing animals to eat them—are low-hanging fruit.
What’s the “same pain”? The same degree of pain? The same type? I think this might be a sticking point in your argument, along with the one wedrifrid has pointed out (unless it turns out that the answer to my question also clears up wedrifid’s objection).
Why?
(I’m not doubting you have a good reason, but the weight of the word “suffer” is essential to what morality’s about IMO. I think it’s valuable to be able to explain your views without using the word, but not necessary. If necessary “experience pain” works just as well.)
So, this is what Nietzsche called the morality of timidity. He enjoyed contrasting moralities that were about seeking X and moralities that were about avoiding Y- and I think that’s a pretty good way to look at moralities (though I don’t agree with his approach very strongly). A morality that pursues pleasure- even at the cost of pain- strikes me as more vibrant than a morality that pursues lack of pain- even at the cost of pleasure. Now, that’s not an argument for happy vegetarians to become carnivores, but it is an argument for happy carnivores to not care about unhappy animals.
I don’t know this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought well at all, but this seems to be a case where he was just completely wrong. What metaethics makes judgments based on whether some ethical system is more “vibrant” than some other? What does that mean? Can moralities really be consistently classified into “seeking” and “avoiding”? What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
One could see it as an extension of natural selection. I agree with you it’s odd- but metaethics is even more slippery than ethics, so I am reluctant to pass judgments instead of making descriptions.
If I recall correctly, he had significant affection for the likes of Genghis Khan. I don’t think he would sympathize very much with the petty robber but considers the mighty and powerful as operating on a different level from normal people, with correspondingly different morality. But it’s been a while since I’ve read his work along those lines, and so I’m not entirely confident about that. I do recall a passage where Zarathustra claimed his favorite animals were the eagle and the snake, and he approves of predation in general, I suspect.
So basically he’s the real-world version of Salazar Slytherin?
With due respect to your wit, I would point out that although Slytherin the fictional character lived centuries ago, he was, in fact, invented after Nietzsche, and it is possible the correlation is noncoincidental and begins with Nietzsche as a cause.
I lolled. Apparently, yes.
Interestingly, Nietzsche’s famous last rational action was interposing himself between a horse and its owner, who was beating it.
I’m a little leery of the whole idea that the powerful have a different set of moral standards applied to them (as opposed to their having a different morality, which seems psychologically likely). Praising the great and powerful no matter what they do while still condemning Leopold and Loeb as monsters is a very convenient stance to take.
I recommend you read taboo your words.
This doesn’t help. What do you mean by pain? For that matter what kind of entities can have experience?
Could you clarify what moral system you use without using pain, suffering or related words? (I honestly cannot think of a way to do so for mine, but that may just be me being new to the Taboo concept).
If your moral system doesn’t care about suffering at all (human or otherwise) than there is no contradiction.
Not at all. It would more sense to taboo ‘morality’ than ‘pain’, expressing everything in respect to preferences. “Pain” is fairly clear.
The thrust of my reply to these questions is that we don’t need to have fully general answers to them in order to be pretty sure—i.e., sure enough to stop doing it—that killing animals and eating them is wrong. All you need to know is that (a) you and your fellow humans experience the thing we call pain, (b) that it is wrong to cause other humans needless pain, and (c) that other animals are not sufficiently neurologically different from humans that you can be sure that killing them doesn’t cause them the same pain that it would be wrong to cause a human.
Your conclusion does not actually follow from the listed premises.
Then I’m either missing something or have explained inadequately. Please elaborate.
It is hard to explain a non sequitur. And the worse the reasoning used the harder it is to give an explanation more precise than “WTF? Um, no.”. Fortunately your argument is not that bad—it is just missing a premise “it is wrong to cause pain to animals”.
That’s the premise I am trying not to use, because I don’t think there is a supportable reason to draw a distinction between humans and animals when it comes to the acceptability of causing them pain and suffering. Let me rephrase.
I think it’s wrong to needlessly cause the-thing-we-know-as-pain to any creature capable of experiencing it. We know this includes humans, because we ourselves feel pain and can communicate that fact to others. We have every reason to think this includes a whole lot of non-human animals, because their physiology and behavior are similar enough to ours that it is very likely.
While we can’t live up to this moral guideline in every respect, some things—like not killing animals to eat them—are low-hanging fruit.
What’s the “same pain”? The same degree of pain? The same type? I think this might be a sticking point in your argument, along with the one wedrifrid has pointed out (unless it turns out that the answer to my question also clears up wedrifid’s objection).