I don’t know this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought well at all, but this seems to be a case where he was just completely wrong. What metaethics makes judgments based on whether some ethical system is more “vibrant” than some other? What does that mean? Can moralities really be consistently classified into “seeking” and “avoiding”? What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
One could see it as an extension of natural selection. I agree with you it’s odd- but metaethics is even more slippery than ethics, so I am reluctant to pass judgments instead of making descriptions.
What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
If I recall correctly, he had significant affection for the likes of Genghis Khan. I don’t think he would sympathize very much with the petty robber but considers the mighty and powerful as operating on a different level from normal people, with correspondingly different morality. But it’s been a while since I’ve read his work along those lines, and so I’m not entirely confident about that. I do recall a passage where Zarathustra claimed his favorite animals were the eagle and the snake, and he approves of predation in general, I suspect.
With due respect to your wit, I would point out that although Slytherin the fictional character lived centuries ago, he was, in fact, invented after Nietzsche, and it is possible the correlation is noncoincidental and begins with Nietzsche as a cause.
Interestingly, Nietzsche’s famous last rational action was interposing himself between a horse and its owner, who was beating it.
I’m a little leery of the whole idea that the powerful have a different set of moral standards applied to them (as opposed to their having a different morality, which seems psychologically likely). Praising the great and powerful no matter what they do while still condemning Leopold and Loeb as monsters is a very convenient stance to take.
I don’t know this aspect of Nietzsche’s thought well at all, but this seems to be a case where he was just completely wrong. What metaethics makes judgments based on whether some ethical system is more “vibrant” than some other? What does that mean? Can moralities really be consistently classified into “seeking” and “avoiding”? What happens if you replace “carnivores” and “animals” in your last phrase with “criminals” and “victims”?
One could see it as an extension of natural selection. I agree with you it’s odd- but metaethics is even more slippery than ethics, so I am reluctant to pass judgments instead of making descriptions.
If I recall correctly, he had significant affection for the likes of Genghis Khan. I don’t think he would sympathize very much with the petty robber but considers the mighty and powerful as operating on a different level from normal people, with correspondingly different morality. But it’s been a while since I’ve read his work along those lines, and so I’m not entirely confident about that. I do recall a passage where Zarathustra claimed his favorite animals were the eagle and the snake, and he approves of predation in general, I suspect.
So basically he’s the real-world version of Salazar Slytherin?
With due respect to your wit, I would point out that although Slytherin the fictional character lived centuries ago, he was, in fact, invented after Nietzsche, and it is possible the correlation is noncoincidental and begins with Nietzsche as a cause.
I lolled. Apparently, yes.
Interestingly, Nietzsche’s famous last rational action was interposing himself between a horse and its owner, who was beating it.
I’m a little leery of the whole idea that the powerful have a different set of moral standards applied to them (as opposed to their having a different morality, which seems psychologically likely). Praising the great and powerful no matter what they do while still condemning Leopold and Loeb as monsters is a very convenient stance to take.