The obvious answer is the mind-body problem, but since you asked I assume you don’t consider that non-trivial. So I would add the problems of intentionality and qualia and the now-debunked issues associated with phrenology.
Also, it’s important to note the difference between an “example of a non-trivial question which philosophy of mind addresses” and a problem in philosophy of mind which has been (mostly) solved. It could be easily argued that computationalism solves all of the problems above, at least as far as a pretty good number of philosophers are concerned, but these are still issues that are “addressed” in the sense that there is still philosophical literature being written about them.
Give an example of a non-trivial question which philosophy of mind addresses.
The obvious answer is the mind-body problem, but since you asked I assume you don’t consider that non-trivial. So I would add the problems of intentionality and qualia and the now-debunked issues associated with phrenology.
Also, it’s important to note the difference between an “example of a non-trivial question which philosophy of mind addresses” and a problem in philosophy of mind which has been (mostly) solved. It could be easily argued that computationalism solves all of the problems above, at least as far as a pretty good number of philosophers are concerned, but these are still issues that are “addressed” in the sense that there is still philosophical literature being written about them.