Inverting the axis of causality would require inverting the probabilities, such that an egg reforming is more likely than an egg breaking.
I don’t think this is a coherent notion. If we “invert the probabilities” in some literal sense, then yes, the egg reforming is more likely than the egg breaking, but still more likely is the egg turning into an elephant.
Hm. This is true.
Perhaps it would be better to say “Perceiving states in opposite-to-conventional order would give us reason to assume probabilities entirely consistent with considering a causality in opposite-to-conventional order.”
Unless I’m missing something, the only reason to believe causality goes in the order that places our memory-direction before our non-memory direction is that we base our probabilities on our memory.
I don’t think this is a coherent notion. If we “invert the probabilities” in some literal sense, then yes, the egg reforming is more likely than the egg breaking, but still more likely is the egg turning into an elephant.
Hm. This is true. Perhaps it would be better to say “Perceiving states in opposite-to-conventional order would give us reason to assume probabilities entirely consistent with considering a causality in opposite-to-conventional order.”
Unless I’m missing something, the only reason to believe causality goes in the order that places our memory-direction before our non-memory direction is that we base our probabilities on our memory.