True, SIA favours theory more likely to produce “me”. However in the context of SIA, it does not define “me” by the specific physical parameters. SIA does not concern about the physical parameter of the observer, but the subjective state. Take the simulation argument as an example. My existence favours there are many computer-run simulations of human civilization. The physical parameters of me is unknown. I could very well be a programme living in a simulation instead of a real human. Or use your example of intelligent octopuses. If a theory says there are many intelligent octopuses who each think they are a human being (maybe by octopuses-in-a-vet kind of experiment) , then SIA would still favour such a theory. And I could very well be such an octopus instead of a human physically.
In my past experience, SIA supporters not liking this often resolves to limit the reference class. Something like “I reject the possibility that I could be a programme” outright.
I agree with you completely on the infinity argument. I don’t think it is a valid defense of SIA. Yet I have seen it used from time to time by its supporters.
Yes, it’s “more likely to produce me” in terms of subjective experience that counts, but if one ignores simulation-style scenarios, octopuses and bipeds will of course have distinct subjective experiences of seeing their own arms.
In simulation scenarios, the simulated world needn’t have the same physical laws as the actual one (limited only by the imagination of the programmers), so people who think they’re intelligent bipeds could exist in an actual universe where only intelligent octopuses can evolve. But there are so many unresolved issues in such scenarios that I’m at a loss of how to think about them. (For example, once the programmer has written the simulation program, for a deterministic computer, is it necessary to actually run the program in order for the simulated people to exist?)
I don’t get the problem with octopuses here. What I am writing here is not causally connected with the number of my hands. Octopus-world-LW can have similar conversations. But as I find myself a biped, it a an argument that biped-world-LW are more often.
Sure, octopuses could write too. But you are not, in fact, an octopus (assuming reality is what it seems). So the evidence you have for evaluating cosmological theories does not favour universes/multiverses with large numbers of intelligent octopuses, since you have no evidence that intelligent octopuses exist. But you do know that you exist.
If you like, you can bump up the probability of cosmological theories that posit a universe with a large number of intelligent observers, whether octopuses or bipeds (SIA), but then you have to push down the probability of those theories in which most of these observers are octopuses, since you aren’t one (SSA). The net effect is to just favour cosmological theories that make it more likely that you exist.
Yes, I agree there are unresolved issues. There simply is no widely accepted way of reasoning about subjective experience. Given this, it seems more unreasonable to assert that simulation of subjective experience is absolutely impossible (prior probability=0). Yet even if we give a small prior to it, due to the overwhelmingly great number of human-like experience simulation theory suggests, SIA would push its probability to near unity. So many SIA supporters would make the above-mentioned assertion.
True, SIA favours theory more likely to produce “me”. However in the context of SIA, it does not define “me” by the specific physical parameters. SIA does not concern about the physical parameter of the observer, but the subjective state. Take the simulation argument as an example. My existence favours there are many computer-run simulations of human civilization. The physical parameters of me is unknown. I could very well be a programme living in a simulation instead of a real human. Or use your example of intelligent octopuses. If a theory says there are many intelligent octopuses who each think they are a human being (maybe by octopuses-in-a-vet kind of experiment) , then SIA would still favour such a theory. And I could very well be such an octopus instead of a human physically.
In my past experience, SIA supporters not liking this often resolves to limit the reference class. Something like “I reject the possibility that I could be a programme” outright.
I agree with you completely on the infinity argument. I don’t think it is a valid defense of SIA. Yet I have seen it used from time to time by its supporters.
Yes, it’s “more likely to produce me” in terms of subjective experience that counts, but if one ignores simulation-style scenarios, octopuses and bipeds will of course have distinct subjective experiences of seeing their own arms.
In simulation scenarios, the simulated world needn’t have the same physical laws as the actual one (limited only by the imagination of the programmers), so people who think they’re intelligent bipeds could exist in an actual universe where only intelligent octopuses can evolve. But there are so many unresolved issues in such scenarios that I’m at a loss of how to think about them. (For example, once the programmer has written the simulation program, for a deterministic computer, is it necessary to actually run the program in order for the simulated people to exist?)
I don’t get the problem with octopuses here. What I am writing here is not causally connected with the number of my hands. Octopus-world-LW can have similar conversations. But as I find myself a biped, it a an argument that biped-world-LW are more often.
Sure, octopuses could write too. But you are not, in fact, an octopus (assuming reality is what it seems). So the evidence you have for evaluating cosmological theories does not favour universes/multiverses with large numbers of intelligent octopuses, since you have no evidence that intelligent octopuses exist. But you do know that you exist.
If you like, you can bump up the probability of cosmological theories that posit a universe with a large number of intelligent observers, whether octopuses or bipeds (SIA), but then you have to push down the probability of those theories in which most of these observers are octopuses, since you aren’t one (SSA). The net effect is to just favour cosmological theories that make it more likely that you exist.
See my paper at http://www.cs.utoronto.ca/~radford/anth.abstract.html for a more extended exposition.
Thanks for the link. I saw your article before, but this explanation helps me to understand FNC better.
Yes, I agree there are unresolved issues. There simply is no widely accepted way of reasoning about subjective experience. Given this, it seems more unreasonable to assert that simulation of subjective experience is absolutely impossible (prior probability=0). Yet even if we give a small prior to it, due to the overwhelmingly great number of human-like experience simulation theory suggests, SIA would push its probability to near unity. So many SIA supporters would make the above-mentioned assertion.