Well, in the example he can decline, he will simply have to deal with the consequences.
Agree, but so what?
So the potential donor still has complete discretion and thus there is no reason for the doctor to lie.
Positive for what?
For compatibility as a donor.
What exactly is the flaw in your view?
Near as I follow your logic, the reason for lying is that the doctor is trying to protect the patient’s right to over what—if anything—is done with his organs. However, as I pointed out that right is not under threat, what is under threat is the patient’s “right” for his decision to have no consequences.
So the potential donor still has complete discretion and thus there is no reason for the doctor to lie.
I disagree. For example, the potential donor might want to lie to spare the feelings of his sibling. Or to forestall family members from getting annoyed at him.
In which case, what would he do if the tests came back positive?
Lie and say he was incompatible. That’s kinda the point of this subthread.
Near as I follow your logic, the reason for lying is that the doctor is trying to protect the patient’s right to over what—if anything—is done with his organs
Not exactly—the reason for the doctor lying is to prevent hurt feelings and family discord.
Sparing somebody’s feelings is a much worse reason for lying than protecting their right to bodily autonomy.
I don’t disagree with you . . . have I suggested otherwise?
I meant what would the donor do if the person refused to lie.
I don’t know, it would be up to the potential donor. But either way he gets to make his decision and nobody in this discussion is disputing that. Agreed?
ETA: Now that I have explained why medical personnel might lie about compatibility, is there any other flaw in your view? At this point, is there anything I have said which you disagree with?
However, as I pointed out that right is not under threat, what is under threat is the patient’s “right” for his decision to have no consequences.
For a consequentialist, having decisions have “consequences” should not be a terminal value. If decisions having consequences cause those decisions to not be made, that is good, but decisions having bad consequences is, in and of itself, bad.
For a consequentialist, having decisions have “consequences” should not be a terminal value.
But it is instrumentally useful if people’s decisions have consequences to the person doing the deciding that are correlated with the net affect of their decision.
Well, in the example he can decline, he will simply have to deal with the consequences.
In which case, what would he do if the tests came back positive?
I’m pointing out flaws in the rationalization for lying.
Agree, but so what?
Positive for what?
What exactly is the flaw in your view? I’m not saying there is none, I’m just trying to understand your position.
So the potential donor still has complete discretion and thus there is no reason for the doctor to lie.
For compatibility as a donor.
Near as I follow your logic, the reason for lying is that the doctor is trying to protect the patient’s right to over what—if anything—is done with his organs. However, as I pointed out that right is not under threat, what is under threat is the patient’s “right” for his decision to have no consequences.
I disagree. For example, the potential donor might want to lie to spare the feelings of his sibling. Or to forestall family members from getting annoyed at him.
Lie and say he was incompatible. That’s kinda the point of this subthread.
Not exactly—the reason for the doctor lying is to prevent hurt feelings and family discord.
Sparing somebody’s feelings is a much worse reason for lying than protecting their right to bodily autonomy.
I meant what would the donor do if the person refused to lie.
I don’t disagree with you . . . have I suggested otherwise?
I don’t know, it would be up to the potential donor. But either way he gets to make his decision and nobody in this discussion is disputing that. Agreed?
ETA: Now that I have explained why medical personnel might lie about compatibility, is there any other flaw in your view? At this point, is there anything I have said which you disagree with?
For a consequentialist, having decisions have “consequences” should not be a terminal value. If decisions having consequences cause those decisions to not be made, that is good, but decisions having bad consequences is, in and of itself, bad.
But it is instrumentally useful if people’s decisions have consequences to the person doing the deciding that are correlated with the net affect of their decision.