My impression of what happened here is something like: OP: “episteme of how the color wheel works, gnosis-claim that it’s useful” Chris: “I don’t see the episteme of why this framework is useful, and am pretty suspicious of claims that frameworks are useful.” Conor: “I made a gnosis claim, and you should update based on gnosis claims using a different mechanism. I agree that I don’t have the necessary support for an episteme claim.”
In that view, everything here seems right; the right way to update on the relevance of gnosis claims is indeed by querying your models of the person making the claim.
But I worry this comment will land poorly without that explicit framing, especially if a reader doesn’t see that the thing coming out of the other end is doxa instead of episteme or gnosis. That is, the end state of knowledge looks something like “some respectable people appreciate the color pie typology” as opposed to “the color pie typology is correct” or “the color pie typology is useful.”
I feel that this summary doesn’t quite capture what I was saying.
We should definitely be suspicious of anecdotal evidence of frameworks, but the core claim was that the particular structure of this framework made it more suspicious than normal (as described in my comment above). I provided the Myers-Briggs framework as a contrasting example where the structure of the claim made it less suspicious, ie. sort of an anti-prediction.
My impression of what happened here is something like:
OP: “episteme of how the color wheel works, gnosis-claim that it’s useful”
Chris: “I don’t see the episteme of why this framework is useful, and am pretty suspicious of claims that frameworks are useful.”
Conor: “I made a gnosis claim, and you should update based on gnosis claims using a different mechanism. I agree that I don’t have the necessary support for an episteme claim.”
In that view, everything here seems right; the right way to update on the relevance of gnosis claims is indeed by querying your models of the person making the claim.
But I worry this comment will land poorly without that explicit framing, especially if a reader doesn’t see that the thing coming out of the other end is doxa instead of episteme or gnosis. That is, the end state of knowledge looks something like “some respectable people appreciate the color pie typology” as opposed to “the color pie typology is correct” or “the color pie typology is useful.”
Loren ipsum
I feel that this summary doesn’t quite capture what I was saying.
We should definitely be suspicious of anecdotal evidence of frameworks, but the core claim was that the particular structure of this framework made it more suspicious than normal (as described in my comment above). I provided the Myers-Briggs framework as a contrasting example where the structure of the claim made it less suspicious, ie. sort of an anti-prediction.
Loren ipsum