Eliezer’s “metaethics” sequence, despite its name, argues for his ethical theory
Yes; what else would you do in metaethics? Isn’t its job to point to ethical theories, while the job of ethics is to assume you have agreed on a theory (an often false assumption)?
Ethics is the subject in which you argue about which ethical theory is correct. In meta-ethics, you argue about how you would know if an ethical theory were correct, and/or what it would mean for an ethical theory to be correct, etc.
First, is ethics only about decision procedures? The existence of the concept of moral luck suggests not. Sure, you can say lots of people are wrong, but to banish them from the field of ethics is ridiculous. Virtue ethics is another example, less clearly a counterexample, but much more central.
The three level hierarchy at your link does nothing to tell what belongs in meta-ethics and what belongs in ethics. I don’t think your comment here is consistent with your comment there and I don’t think either comment has much to do with the three level hierarchy.
Meta-ethics is about issues that are logically prior to ethics. I reject your list. If there are disagreements about the logical priority of issues, then there should be disagreements about what constitutes meta-ethics. You could have a convention that meta-ethics is defined as a certain list of topics by tradition, but that’s stupid. In particular, I think consequentialism vs deontology has high logical priority. Maybe you disagree with me, but to say that I am wrong by definition is not helpful.
Going back to Eliezer, I think that he does only cover meta-ethical claims and that they do pin down an ethical theory. Maybe other meta-ethical stances would not uniquely do so (contrary to my previous comment), but his do.
First, is ethics only about decision procedures? The existence of the concept of moral luck suggests not.
It may not surprise you to learn that I am of the school that rejects the concept of moral luck. (In this I think I align with Eliezer.)
Meta-ethics is about issues that are logically prior to ethics
This is unobjectionable provided that one agrees about what ethics consists of. As far as I am aware, standard philosophical terminology labels utilitarianism (for example) as an ethical theory; yet I have seen people on LW refer to “utilitarian meta-ethics”. This is the kind of usage I mean to disapprove of, and I hold Eliezer under suspicion of encouraging it by blurring the distinction in his sequence.
I should be clear about the fact that this is a terminological issue; my interest here is mainly in preserving the integrity of the prefix “meta”, which I think has suffered excessive abuse both here and elsewhere. For whatever reason, Eliezer’s use of the term felt abusive to me.
Part of the problem may be that Eliezer seemed to think the concept of rigid designation was the important issue, as opposed to e.g. the orthogonality thesis, and I found this perplexing (and uncharacteristic of him). Discomfort about this may have contributed to my perception that meta-ethics wasn’t really the topic of his sequence, so that his calling it that was “off”. But this is admittedly distinct from my claim that his thesis is ethical rather than meta-ethical.
Going back to Eliezer, I think that he does only cover meta-ethical claims and that they do pin down an ethical theory. Maybe other meta-ethical stances would not uniquely do so (contrary to my previous comment), but his do.
This is again a terminological point, but I think a sequence should be named after the conclusion rather than the premises. If his meta-ethical stance pins down an ethical theory, he should have called the sequence explaining it his “ethics” sequence; just as if I use my theory of art history to derive my theory of physics, then my sequence explaining it should be my “physics” sequence rather than my “art history” sequence.
You demand that everyone accept your definition of ethics, excluding moral luck from the subject, but you simultaneously demand that meta-ethics be defined by convention.
I said both of those points (but not their conjunction) in my previous comment, after explicitly anticipating what you say here and I’m rather annoyed that you ignored it. I guess the lesson is to say as little as possible.
Now just hold on a second. You are arguing by uncharitable formulation, implying that there is tension between two claims when, logically, there is none. (Forgive me for not assuming you were doing that, and thereby, according to you, “ignoring” your previous comment.) There is nothing contradictory about holding that (1) ethical theories that include moral luck are wrong; and (2) utilitarianism is an ethical theory and not a meta-ethical theory.
(1) is an ethical claim. (2) is the conjunction of a meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is an ethical theory”) and a meta-meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is not a meta-ethical theory”).
( I hereby declare this comment to supersede all of my previous comments on the subject of the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics, insofar as there is any inconsistency; and in the event there is any inconsistency, I pre-emptively cede you dialectical victory except insofar as doing so would contradict anything else I have said in this comment.)
OK, if you’ve abandoned your claim that I “consequentialism is not a meta-ethical attribute,” is true by convention, then that’s fine. I’ll just disagree with it and keep including consequentialism vs deontology in meta-ethics, just as I’ll keep including moral luck in ethics.
“In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics.
While normative ethics addresses such questions as “What should one do?”, thus endorsing some ethical evaluations and rejecting others, meta-ethics addresses questions such as “What is goodness?” and “How can we tell what is good from what is bad?”, seeking to understand the nature of ethical properties and evaluations.”
Yes; what else would you do in metaethics?
Isn’t its job to point to ethical theories, while the job of ethics is to assume you have agreed on a theory (an often false assumption)?
Ethics is the subject in which you argue about which ethical theory is correct. In meta-ethics, you argue about how you would know if an ethical theory were correct, and/or what it would mean for an ethical theory to be correct, etc.
See here for a previous comment of mine on this.
First, is ethics only about decision procedures? The existence of the concept of moral luck suggests not. Sure, you can say lots of people are wrong, but to banish them from the field of ethics is ridiculous. Virtue ethics is another example, less clearly a counterexample, but much more central.
The three level hierarchy at your link does nothing to tell what belongs in meta-ethics and what belongs in ethics. I don’t think your comment here is consistent with your comment there and I don’t think either comment has much to do with the three level hierarchy.
Meta-ethics is about issues that are logically prior to ethics. I reject your list. If there are disagreements about the logical priority of issues, then there should be disagreements about what constitutes meta-ethics. You could have a convention that meta-ethics is defined as a certain list of topics by tradition, but that’s stupid. In particular, I think consequentialism vs deontology has high logical priority. Maybe you disagree with me, but to say that I am wrong by definition is not helpful.
Going back to Eliezer, I think that he does only cover meta-ethical claims and that they do pin down an ethical theory. Maybe other meta-ethical stances would not uniquely do so (contrary to my previous comment), but his do.
It may not surprise you to learn that I am of the school that rejects the concept of moral luck. (In this I think I align with Eliezer.)
This is unobjectionable provided that one agrees about what ethics consists of. As far as I am aware, standard philosophical terminology labels utilitarianism (for example) as an ethical theory; yet I have seen people on LW refer to “utilitarian meta-ethics”. This is the kind of usage I mean to disapprove of, and I hold Eliezer under suspicion of encouraging it by blurring the distinction in his sequence.
I should be clear about the fact that this is a terminological issue; my interest here is mainly in preserving the integrity of the prefix “meta”, which I think has suffered excessive abuse both here and elsewhere. For whatever reason, Eliezer’s use of the term felt abusive to me.
Part of the problem may be that Eliezer seemed to think the concept of rigid designation was the important issue, as opposed to e.g. the orthogonality thesis, and I found this perplexing (and uncharacteristic of him). Discomfort about this may have contributed to my perception that meta-ethics wasn’t really the topic of his sequence, so that his calling it that was “off”. But this is admittedly distinct from my claim that his thesis is ethical rather than meta-ethical.
This is again a terminological point, but I think a sequence should be named after the conclusion rather than the premises. If his meta-ethical stance pins down an ethical theory, he should have called the sequence explaining it his “ethics” sequence; just as if I use my theory of art history to derive my theory of physics, then my sequence explaining it should be my “physics” sequence rather than my “art history” sequence.
You demand that everyone accept your definition of ethics, excluding moral luck from the subject, but you simultaneously demand that meta-ethics be defined by convention.
I said both of those points (but not their conjunction) in my previous comment, after explicitly anticipating what you say here and I’m rather annoyed that you ignored it. I guess the lesson is to say as little as possible.
Now just hold on a second. You are arguing by uncharitable formulation, implying that there is tension between two claims when, logically, there is none. (Forgive me for not assuming you were doing that, and thereby, according to you, “ignoring” your previous comment.) There is nothing contradictory about holding that (1) ethical theories that include moral luck are wrong; and (2) utilitarianism is an ethical theory and not a meta-ethical theory.
(1) is an ethical claim. (2) is the conjunction of a meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is an ethical theory”) and a meta-meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is not a meta-ethical theory”).
( I hereby declare this comment to supersede all of my previous comments on the subject of the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics, insofar as there is any inconsistency; and in the event there is any inconsistency, I pre-emptively cede you dialectical victory except insofar as doing so would contradict anything else I have said in this comment.)
OK, if you’ve abandoned your claim that I “consequentialism is not a meta-ethical attribute,” is true by convention, then that’s fine. I’ll just disagree with it and keep including consequentialism vs deontology in meta-ethics, just as I’ll keep including moral luck in ethics.
“In philosophy, meta-ethics is the branch of ethics that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. Meta-ethics is one of the three branches of ethics generally recognized by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics.
While normative ethics addresses such questions as “What should one do?”, thus endorsing some ethical evaluations and rejecting others, meta-ethics addresses questions such as “What is goodness?” and “How can we tell what is good from what is bad?”, seeking to understand the nature of ethical properties and evaluations.”