You demand that everyone accept your definition of ethics, excluding moral luck from the subject, but you simultaneously demand that meta-ethics be defined by convention.
I said both of those points (but not their conjunction) in my previous comment, after explicitly anticipating what you say here and I’m rather annoyed that you ignored it. I guess the lesson is to say as little as possible.
Now just hold on a second. You are arguing by uncharitable formulation, implying that there is tension between two claims when, logically, there is none. (Forgive me for not assuming you were doing that, and thereby, according to you, “ignoring” your previous comment.) There is nothing contradictory about holding that (1) ethical theories that include moral luck are wrong; and (2) utilitarianism is an ethical theory and not a meta-ethical theory.
(1) is an ethical claim. (2) is the conjunction of a meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is an ethical theory”) and a meta-meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is not a meta-ethical theory”).
( I hereby declare this comment to supersede all of my previous comments on the subject of the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics, insofar as there is any inconsistency; and in the event there is any inconsistency, I pre-emptively cede you dialectical victory except insofar as doing so would contradict anything else I have said in this comment.)
OK, if you’ve abandoned your claim that I “consequentialism is not a meta-ethical attribute,” is true by convention, then that’s fine. I’ll just disagree with it and keep including consequentialism vs deontology in meta-ethics, just as I’ll keep including moral luck in ethics.
You demand that everyone accept your definition of ethics, excluding moral luck from the subject, but you simultaneously demand that meta-ethics be defined by convention.
I said both of those points (but not their conjunction) in my previous comment, after explicitly anticipating what you say here and I’m rather annoyed that you ignored it. I guess the lesson is to say as little as possible.
Now just hold on a second. You are arguing by uncharitable formulation, implying that there is tension between two claims when, logically, there is none. (Forgive me for not assuming you were doing that, and thereby, according to you, “ignoring” your previous comment.) There is nothing contradictory about holding that (1) ethical theories that include moral luck are wrong; and (2) utilitarianism is an ethical theory and not a meta-ethical theory.
(1) is an ethical claim. (2) is the conjunction of a meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is an ethical theory”) and a meta-meta-ethical claim (“utilitarianism is not a meta-ethical theory”).
( I hereby declare this comment to supersede all of my previous comments on the subject of the distinction between ethics and meta-ethics, insofar as there is any inconsistency; and in the event there is any inconsistency, I pre-emptively cede you dialectical victory except insofar as doing so would contradict anything else I have said in this comment.)
OK, if you’ve abandoned your claim that I “consequentialism is not a meta-ethical attribute,” is true by convention, then that’s fine. I’ll just disagree with it and keep including consequentialism vs deontology in meta-ethics, just as I’ll keep including moral luck in ethics.