The article does give an example: cultural relativism.
That is not how I read it. There’s a big parenthetical aside breaking up the flow, but excising that leaves
An individualistic relativism sees the vital difference as lying in the persons making the utterance; a cultural relativism sees the difference as stemming from the respective cultures that the speakers inhabit. . . . In either case, it may be that what determines the difference in the two contexts is something “mind-dependent”—in which case it would be subjectivist relativism—but it need not be.
(Bolding added.) So, either individualistic or cultural relativisms can be subjectivist. That leaves the possibility, in principle, that either could be non-subjectivist, but the article gives no example of someone actually staking out such a position.
You continue:
Its objective in that it doesn’t depend on the mind of the individual, but it’s still relative to something: the culture you are in.
I think that cultural relativism is mind-dependent in the sense that the article uses the term.
ok, location relativism then. It’s doesn’t depend on your what’s going on inside your head, but it’s still relative.
But is anyone a location-relativist for reasons that don’t derive from being a cultural-relativist or a “sovereign-command” relativist (according to which the moral is whatever someone with lawful authority over you says it is)?
Now that I think of it, though, certain kinds of non-subjectivist relativism are probably very common, if rarely defended by philosphers. I’m thinking of the claim that morality is whatever maximizes your genetic fitness, or morality is whatever maximizes your financial earnings (even if you have no desire for genetic fitness or financial earnings).
These are relativisms because something might increase your genetic fitness (say) while it decreases mine. But they are not subjectivist because they measure morality according to something independent of anyone’s state of mind.
That is not how I read it. There’s a big parenthetical aside breaking up the flow, but excising that leaves
(Bolding added.) So, either individualistic or cultural relativisms can be subjectivist. That leaves the possibility, in principle, that either could be non-subjectivist, but the article gives no example of someone actually staking out such a position.
You continue:
I think that cultural relativism is mind-dependent in the sense that the article uses the term.
ok, location relativism then. It’s doesn’t depend on your what’s going on inside your head, but it’s still relative.
But is anyone a location-relativist for reasons that don’t derive from being a cultural-relativist or a “sovereign-command” relativist (according to which the moral is whatever someone with lawful authority over you says it is)?
Now that I think of it, though, certain kinds of non-subjectivist relativism are probably very common, if rarely defended by philosphers. I’m thinking of the claim that morality is whatever maximizes your genetic fitness, or morality is whatever maximizes your financial earnings (even if you have no desire for genetic fitness or financial earnings).
These are relativisms because something might increase your genetic fitness (say) while it decreases mine. But they are not subjectivist because they measure morality according to something independent of anyone’s state of mind.