ok, location relativism then. It’s doesn’t depend on your what’s going on inside your head, but it’s still relative.
But is anyone a location-relativist for reasons that don’t derive from being a cultural-relativist or a “sovereign-command” relativist (according to which the moral is whatever someone with lawful authority over you says it is)?
Now that I think of it, though, certain kinds of non-subjectivist relativism are probably very common, if rarely defended by philosphers. I’m thinking of the claim that morality is whatever maximizes your genetic fitness, or morality is whatever maximizes your financial earnings (even if you have no desire for genetic fitness or financial earnings).
These are relativisms because something might increase your genetic fitness (say) while it decreases mine. But they are not subjectivist because they measure morality according to something independent of anyone’s state of mind.
But is anyone a location-relativist for reasons that don’t derive from being a cultural-relativist or a “sovereign-command” relativist (according to which the moral is whatever someone with lawful authority over you says it is)?
Now that I think of it, though, certain kinds of non-subjectivist relativism are probably very common, if rarely defended by philosphers. I’m thinking of the claim that morality is whatever maximizes your genetic fitness, or morality is whatever maximizes your financial earnings (even if you have no desire for genetic fitness or financial earnings).
These are relativisms because something might increase your genetic fitness (say) while it decreases mine. But they are not subjectivist because they measure morality according to something independent of anyone’s state of mind.