For example, in a discussion of eugenics, I’d be quite fine with a position that implies I should be dead, and would much rather hear it than have others dance around the implication.
I’m fine with positions that imply I should never have been born (although I have yet to hear one that includes me), but I’d feel very differently about one implying that I should be dead!
Many people don’t endorse anything similar to the principle that “any argument for no more of something should explain why there is a perfect amount of that thing or be counted as an argument for less of that thing.”
E.g. thinking arguments that “life extension is bad” generally have no implications regarding killing people were it to become available. So those who say I shouldn’t live to be 200 are not only basically arguing I should (eventually, sooner than I want) be dead, the implication I take is often that I should be killed (in the future).
If someone tells me I should die now, I understand that to mean that my life from this point forward is of negative value to them. If they tell me I should never have been born, I understand that to mean not only that my life from this point forward is of negative value, but also that my life up to this point has been of negative value.
Interesting. I don’t read it as necessarily a judgment of value at all to be told that I should never have been born (things that should not have happened may accidentally have good consequences). Additionally, someone who doesn’t think that I should have been born, but also doesn’t think I should die, will not try to kill me, though they may push policies that will prevent future additions to my salient reference class; someone who thinks I should die could try to make that happen!
For my part, I don’t treat saying things like “I think you should be dead” as particularly predictive of actually trying to kill me. Perhaps I ought to, but I don’t.
I’m fine with positions that imply I should never have been born (although I have yet to hear one that includes me), but I’d feel very differently about one implying that I should be dead!
Many people don’t endorse anything similar to the principle that “any argument for no more of something should explain why there is a perfect amount of that thing or be counted as an argument for less of that thing.”
E.g. thinking arguments that “life extension is bad” generally have no implications regarding killing people were it to become available. So those who say I shouldn’t live to be 200 are not only basically arguing I should (eventually, sooner than I want) be dead, the implication I take is often that I should be killed (in the future).
Personally, I’d be far more insulted by the suggestion that I should never have been born, than by the suggestion that I should die now.
Why?
If someone tells me I should die now, I understand that to mean that my life from this point forward is of negative value to them. If they tell me I should never have been born, I understand that to mean not only that my life from this point forward is of negative value, but also that my life up to this point has been of negative value.
Interesting. I don’t read it as necessarily a judgment of value at all to be told that I should never have been born (things that should not have happened may accidentally have good consequences). Additionally, someone who doesn’t think that I should have been born, but also doesn’t think I should die, will not try to kill me, though they may push policies that will prevent future additions to my salient reference class; someone who thinks I should die could try to make that happen!
Interesting.
For my part, I don’t treat saying things like “I think you should be dead” as particularly predictive of actually trying to kill me. Perhaps I ought to, but I don’t.