I’ll point out again that the phrase “moral reasoning” as you have been using it (to mean praiseworthy reasoning) is importantly different from how that phrase is being used by others.
That aside, I agree with you that in the scenario you describe, my reasoning at T2 (when E1 occurs) is not especially praiseworthy and thus does not especially merit the label “moral reasoning” as you’re using it. I don’t agree that my reasoning at T1 is not praiseworthy, though. If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
Sure, we agree there, I just wanted to point out that the, shall we say, ‘presence’ of the reasoning in one’s action at T2 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the action’s being morally praiseworthy if it’s good. The reasoning done at T1 is, of itself, neither necessary nor sufficient.
I don’t agree that the action at T2 is necessary. I would agree that in the absence of the action at T2, it would be difficult to know that the thinking at T1 was praiseworthy, but what makes the thinking at T1 praiseworthy is the fact that it led to a correct conclusion (“given E1 do A1”). It did not retroactively become praiseworthy when E1 occurred.
So you would say that deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical is, on its own, something which should or could earn the deliberator moral praise?
Would you say that people can or ought to be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolly problem?
I would say that committing to a correct policy to implement in case of a particular event occurring is a good thing to have done. (It is sometimes an even better thing to have done if I can then articulate that policy, and perhaps even that commitment, in a compelling way to others.)
I think that’s an example of “deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical earning moral praise” as you’re using those phrases, so I think yes, it’s something that could earn moral praise.
People certainly can be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolley problem—I’ve seen it happen myself—but that’s not terribly interesting.
More interestingly, yes, there are types of answers to the standard trolley problem I think deserve praise.
I’ll point out again that the phrase “moral reasoning” as you have been using it (to mean praiseworthy reasoning) is importantly different from how that phrase is being used by others.
That aside, I agree with you that in the scenario you describe, my reasoning at T2 (when E1 occurs) is not especially praiseworthy and thus does not especially merit the label “moral reasoning” as you’re using it. I don’t agree that my reasoning at T1 is not praiseworthy, though. If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
Sure, we agree there, I just wanted to point out that the, shall we say, ‘presence’ of the reasoning in one’s action at T2 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the action’s being morally praiseworthy if it’s good. The reasoning done at T1 is, of itself, neither necessary nor sufficient.
I don’t agree that the action at T2 is necessary. I would agree that in the absence of the action at T2, it would be difficult to know that the thinking at T1 was praiseworthy, but what makes the thinking at T1 praiseworthy is the fact that it led to a correct conclusion (“given E1 do A1”). It did not retroactively become praiseworthy when E1 occurred.
So you would say that deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical is, on its own, something which should or could earn the deliberator moral praise?
Would you say that people can or ought to be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolly problem?
I would say that committing to a correct policy to implement in case of a particular event occurring is a good thing to have done. (It is sometimes an even better thing to have done if I can then articulate that policy, and perhaps even that commitment, in a compelling way to others.)
I think that’s an example of “deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical earning moral praise” as you’re using those phrases, so I think yes, it’s something that could earn moral praise.
People certainly can be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolley problem—I’ve seen it happen myself—but that’s not terribly interesting.
More interestingly, yes, there are types of answers to the standard trolley problem I think deserve praise.