If I’ve understood you correctly, the only question being discussed here is whether the label “moral reasoning” properly applies to what occurs at T1, T2, both, or neither.
You’ve understood me perfectly, and that’s an excellent way of putting things. I think there’s an interpretation of those variables such that both what occurs at T1 and at T2 could be called moral reasoning, especially if one expects E1 to occur. But suppose you just, by way of armchair reasoning, decide that if E1 ever happens, you’ll A1. Now suppose E1 has occured, but suppose also that you’ve forgotten the reasoning which lead you to conclude that A1 would be right: you remember the conclusion, but you’ve forgotten why you thought it. That scenario would, I believe, satisfy your description, and it would be a case in which your action is quite suspect. Not wholly so, since you may have good reason to believe your past decisions are reliable, but if you don’t know why you’re acting when you act, you’re not acting in a fully rational way.
I think it would be appropriate to say, in this case, that you are not to be morally praised (e.g. “you’re a good person”, “You’re a hero” etc.) for such an action (if it is good) in quite the measure you would be if you knew what you were doing. I bring up praise, just because this is an easy way for us to talk about what we consider to be the right response to morally good action, regardless of our theories. Does all this sound reasonable?
If what went on at T1 was fully moral reasoning, then no part of the moral action story seems to be left out: you reasoned your way to an action, and at some later time undertook that action. But if it’s true that we would consider an action in which you’ve forgotten your reasoning a defective action, less worthy of moral praise, then we consider it important that the reasoning be present to you as you act.
And I take it for granted, I suppose, that we don’t consider it terribly praiseworthy for someone to come to a bunch of good conclusions from the armchair and never make any effort to carry them out.
I’ll point out again that the phrase “moral reasoning” as you have been using it (to mean praiseworthy reasoning) is importantly different from how that phrase is being used by others.
That aside, I agree with you that in the scenario you describe, my reasoning at T2 (when E1 occurs) is not especially praiseworthy and thus does not especially merit the label “moral reasoning” as you’re using it. I don’t agree that my reasoning at T1 is not praiseworthy, though. If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
Sure, we agree there, I just wanted to point out that the, shall we say, ‘presence’ of the reasoning in one’s action at T2 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the action’s being morally praiseworthy if it’s good. The reasoning done at T1 is, of itself, neither necessary nor sufficient.
I don’t agree that the action at T2 is necessary. I would agree that in the absence of the action at T2, it would be difficult to know that the thinking at T1 was praiseworthy, but what makes the thinking at T1 praiseworthy is the fact that it led to a correct conclusion (“given E1 do A1”). It did not retroactively become praiseworthy when E1 occurred.
So you would say that deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical is, on its own, something which should or could earn the deliberator moral praise?
Would you say that people can or ought to be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolly problem?
I would say that committing to a correct policy to implement in case of a particular event occurring is a good thing to have done. (It is sometimes an even better thing to have done if I can then articulate that policy, and perhaps even that commitment, in a compelling way to others.)
I think that’s an example of “deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical earning moral praise” as you’re using those phrases, so I think yes, it’s something that could earn moral praise.
People certainly can be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolley problem—I’ve seen it happen myself—but that’s not terribly interesting.
More interestingly, yes, there are types of answers to the standard trolley problem I think deserve praise.
You’ve understood me perfectly, and that’s an excellent way of putting things. I think there’s an interpretation of those variables such that both what occurs at T1 and at T2 could be called moral reasoning, especially if one expects E1 to occur. But suppose you just, by way of armchair reasoning, decide that if E1 ever happens, you’ll A1. Now suppose E1 has occured, but suppose also that you’ve forgotten the reasoning which lead you to conclude that A1 would be right: you remember the conclusion, but you’ve forgotten why you thought it. That scenario would, I believe, satisfy your description, and it would be a case in which your action is quite suspect. Not wholly so, since you may have good reason to believe your past decisions are reliable, but if you don’t know why you’re acting when you act, you’re not acting in a fully rational way.
I think it would be appropriate to say, in this case, that you are not to be morally praised (e.g. “you’re a good person”, “You’re a hero” etc.) for such an action (if it is good) in quite the measure you would be if you knew what you were doing. I bring up praise, just because this is an easy way for us to talk about what we consider to be the right response to morally good action, regardless of our theories. Does all this sound reasonable?
If what went on at T1 was fully moral reasoning, then no part of the moral action story seems to be left out: you reasoned your way to an action, and at some later time undertook that action. But if it’s true that we would consider an action in which you’ve forgotten your reasoning a defective action, less worthy of moral praise, then we consider it important that the reasoning be present to you as you act.
And I take it for granted, I suppose, that we don’t consider it terribly praiseworthy for someone to come to a bunch of good conclusions from the armchair and never make any effort to carry them out.
I’ll point out again that the phrase “moral reasoning” as you have been using it (to mean praiseworthy reasoning) is importantly different from how that phrase is being used by others.
That aside, I agree with you that in the scenario you describe, my reasoning at T2 (when E1 occurs) is not especially praiseworthy and thus does not especially merit the label “moral reasoning” as you’re using it. I don’t agree that my reasoning at T1 is not praiseworthy, though. If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I’m not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.
Sure, we agree there, I just wanted to point out that the, shall we say, ‘presence’ of the reasoning in one’s action at T2 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the action’s being morally praiseworthy if it’s good. The reasoning done at T1 is, of itself, neither necessary nor sufficient.
I don’t agree that the action at T2 is necessary. I would agree that in the absence of the action at T2, it would be difficult to know that the thinking at T1 was praiseworthy, but what makes the thinking at T1 praiseworthy is the fact that it led to a correct conclusion (“given E1 do A1”). It did not retroactively become praiseworthy when E1 occurred.
So you would say that deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical is, on its own, something which should or could earn the deliberator moral praise?
Would you say that people can or ought to be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolly problem?
I would say that committing to a correct policy to implement in case of a particular event occurring is a good thing to have done. (It is sometimes an even better thing to have done if I can then articulate that policy, and perhaps even that commitment, in a compelling way to others.)
I think that’s an example of “deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical earning moral praise” as you’re using those phrases, so I think yes, it’s something that could earn moral praise.
People certainly can be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolley problem—I’ve seen it happen myself—but that’s not terribly interesting.
More interestingly, yes, there are types of answers to the standard trolley problem I think deserve praise.