Not really. Of that (relatively short) post, the only part that counts as a prediction is “you see it pretty much everywhere in the United States and the rest of the world; further, various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed”. And this is compatible with a non-genetic explanation: environmental in African countries, and from discrimination in rich countries. Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.
How does a world in which the causal origin of the black/white IQ gap is genetic look different from a world in which that gap has a different explanation?
Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.
I’d imagine there’s a pretty strong correlation between belief that race differences are largely innate and belief that gender differences are largely innate. Your point is unlikely to change any minds on either side of the issue.
I’d imagine there’s a pretty strong correlation between belief that race differences are largely innate and belief that gender differences are largely innate.
Assuming there is such a correlation, what kind of thinking would you expect it relies on?
What we really need to see, if this issue is to be approached in a Bayesian manner, is a fully laid-out hypothesis about the causal pathways that go from genes to race to intelligence to IQ, and which of these pathways bypass environmental causal links. If we do have this and are in fact approaching the issue in a Bayesian manner, then success or lack thereof in eliminating gender discrimination can be rigorously treated as evidence.
If someone has not formalized their hypothesis so as to make it testable, then their thinking is anyway of too low a grade to reach reliably correct conclusions based on the evidence, and it does not matter what evidence they look at, they’ll end up right or wrong purely by chance.
I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I’m less than impressed by your implication that I wasn’t careful then.
Your later expansion adds no new prediction beyond what I already conceded in the grandparent counts as a prediction. I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report. See also this comment.
I am disinclined to spend much more time arguing the issue with you. I’ll sit back and let others participate if they wish.
I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I’m less than impressed by your implication that I wasn’t careful then.
:shrug: I told you that I responded to your question and proceeded to give you a link. I suppose I should have explicitly told you that I had edited the post to respond to your question.
I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report.
Of course they can, just like you can use circles and lots of epicycles to model the orbits of planets.
ETA: I edited my post again to respond to your argument.
I love the epicycle metaphor and plan to use it in the future, but it’s not like there have never been ″overly simple″ explanations of phenomena in the past, either. Phlogiston, for example.
I think we need to specify what is meant by the phlogiston hypothesis. Fundamentally, the idea is that the burning of different materials, as well as processes like rusting, are all the same process. Which is basically correct when you think about it. Phlogiston is really the absence of oxygen from substances which can react with oxygen.
That said, I agree that it’s possible for a hypothesis to be too simple. It’s just that an overly simple hypothesis wears its flakiness on its sleeve . . . one can usually think up counter examples pretty easily. Which usually then starts the epicycle game.
I’m not sure what your point is. If he wants me to link to studies and articles, he can ask me. Before I did that, I would want to know what exactly he is disputing.
Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy. Ask yourself what kind of evidence it would take to convince you of this claim. Use that as a reference for the amount of evidence you should present for the claim that “a signifcant amount of the black/white difference in cognitive abilities is genetic in origin.”
The prior probability would be much lower in this case. Pretty and non-pretty people don’t form historically separated populations, and attractiveness isn’t known to be correlated with numerous non-superficial genetic differences the way race is (e.g. genetic diseases).
Those points are true, but I stand by my advice. I don’t believe the difference in the amount of evidence required is tremendous, and it is a natural tendency among humans to underestimate this amount in any case.
How do we recognize the remorseless? One of their chief characteristics is a kind of glow or charisma that makes sociopaths more charming or interesting than the other people around them. They’re more spontaneous, more intense, more complex, or even sexier than everyone else, making them tricky to identify and leaving us easily seduced.
I don’t know how much scientific evidence there is to back up the claims in this book but I remembered hearing about it when I read your post.
Hmm. My remark appears to have been overly strong.
It has no publicly-knownscientifically-rigorous basis in evidence—it may be true, but it’s not widely claimed to be. This is still sufficiently like unto brazil84′s claim to be comparable.
First of all, I wanted to create a claim which was similar in scope, strength, and kind. Pretty people are probably no more common than black people in the First World; the proposed difference is not an on-or-off switch, but a statistical distinction; and it relates to genetic effects on personality.
Second, I wanted it to be similarly provocative to brazil84′s claim. It is widely considered bad to call people stupid; it is widely considered bad to call people sociopaths.
Third, it is not inconceivable that someone could draw the conclusion. Numerous studies have shown that pretty people are considered better people than ugly people given the same actions; therefore it is possible for pretty people to get away with being worse.
Fourth, brazil84 is likely not to believe it is true—and, in fact, likely to believe it is unlikely. The point of the exercise is to suggest something which would require strong, non-obvious evidence to convince, precisely because the people brazil84 seeks to convince demand strong, non-obvious evidence.
Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy.
Am I allowed to assume that pretty people are far more sociopathic than others by pretty much every measure of sociopathy, and even from simple observation? And that prettiness is known to be 100% genetic in origin? And that sociopathy is known to be strongly influenced by genes?
Only if you also assume that there are many robust factors with long histories contributing to do the following:
1) Encourage you to think of pretty people as an out-group
2) Strongly bias you towards considering garden-variety not-niceness in pretty people indicative of sociopathy, while doing no such thing about garden-variety not-niceness in ugly people
3) Prompt pretty people to act more sociopathic in a variety of circumstances due to psychological factors working on them
4) Make examples of pretty sociopaths dramatically more accessible in media and public cached thoughts than examples of ugly sociopaths or pretty non-sociopaths
In that case, the proof which would convince me is if the sociopathy gap were universal and intractable in time and space while the factors you list were not.
Those variables are not changed in this hypothetical—the only variable that changes is that I propose that “pretty people are more likely to carry genes for sociopathy” in all seriousness, rather than counterfactually.
No, I am not. I don’t know how to explain it—what I am trying to describe is the number and variety of bits of evidence you need to overwhelm the beliefs of those who are disagreeing with you here. You need to present the kind of proofs which would convince you that something you currently doubt for good reasons, something which is not a simple slam-dunk “this happens” but a complicated “the statistical distributions have different means and variances” claim, is decisively true.
The example is of less than zero importance—it’s the standards of evidence I am trying to describe.
Not really. Of that (relatively short) post, the only part that counts as a prediction is “you see it pretty much everywhere in the United States and the rest of the world; further, various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed”. And this is compatible with a non-genetic explanation: environmental in African countries, and from discrimination in rich countries. Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.
How does a world in which the causal origin of the black/white IQ gap is genetic look different from a world in which that gap has a different explanation?
I’d imagine there’s a pretty strong correlation between belief that race differences are largely innate and belief that gender differences are largely innate. Your point is unlikely to change any minds on either side of the issue.
Assuming there is such a correlation, what kind of thinking would you expect it relies on?
What we really need to see, if this issue is to be approached in a Bayesian manner, is a fully laid-out hypothesis about the causal pathways that go from genes to race to intelligence to IQ, and which of these pathways bypass environmental causal links. If we do have this and are in fact approaching the issue in a Bayesian manner, then success or lack thereof in eliminating gender discrimination can be rigorously treated as evidence.
If someone has not formalized their hypothesis so as to make it testable, then their thinking is anyway of too low a grade to reach reliably correct conclusions based on the evidence, and it does not matter what evidence they look at, they’ll end up right or wrong purely by chance.
It seems you did not read my entire post.
Look again more carefully.
I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I’m less than impressed by your implication that I wasn’t careful then.
Your later expansion adds no new prediction beyond what I already conceded in the grandparent counts as a prediction. I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report. See also this comment.
I am disinclined to spend much more time arguing the issue with you. I’ll sit back and let others participate if they wish.
:shrug: I told you that I responded to your question and proceeded to give you a link. I suppose I should have explicitly told you that I had edited the post to respond to your question.
Of course they can, just like you can use circles and lots of epicycles to model the orbits of planets.
ETA: I edited my post again to respond to your argument.
I love the epicycle metaphor and plan to use it in the future, but it’s not like there have never been ″overly simple″ explanations of phenomena in the past, either. Phlogiston, for example.
I believe what Morendil et al. wanted was closer to this degree of analysis.
I think we need to specify what is meant by the phlogiston hypothesis. Fundamentally, the idea is that the burning of different materials, as well as processes like rusting, are all the same process. Which is basically correct when you think about it. Phlogiston is really the absence of oxygen from substances which can react with oxygen.
That said, I agree that it’s possible for a hypothesis to be too simple. It’s just that an overly simple hypothesis wears its flakiness on its sleeve . . . one can usually think up counter examples pretty easily. Which usually then starts the epicycle game.
Please respond to the second paragraph.
I’m not sure what your point is. If he wants me to link to studies and articles, he can ask me. Before I did that, I would want to know what exactly he is disputing.
Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy. Ask yourself what kind of evidence it would take to convince you of this claim. Use that as a reference for the amount of evidence you should present for the claim that “a signifcant amount of the black/white difference in cognitive abilities is genetic in origin.”
The prior probability would be much lower in this case. Pretty and non-pretty people don’t form historically separated populations, and attractiveness isn’t known to be correlated with numerous non-superficial genetic differences the way race is (e.g. genetic diseases).
They don’t have to be physically separated to be reproductively separated. I think there is some segregation on attractiveness, but not that much.
Of course it is! There is a huge correlation with health, often revealed through things like parasite and disease resistance.
Those points are true, but I stand by my advice. I don’t believe the difference in the amount of evidence required is tremendous, and it is a natural tendency among humans to underestimate this amount in any case.
I agree with this as a commensurate claim, but I’m curious about where the specific example came from.
I made it up to be commensurate—it has no visible basis in evidence. I could try to reverse-engineer the details of my thought-processes, if you like.
Are you sure? The Sociopath Next Door: The Ruthless Versus the Rest of Us
I don’t know how much scientific evidence there is to back up the claims in this book but I remembered hearing about it when I read your post.
Hmm. My remark appears to have been overly strong.
It has no publicly-known scientifically-rigorous basis in evidence—it may be true, but it’s not widely claimed to be. This is still sufficiently like unto brazil84′s claim to be comparable.
I would indeed so like, if it’s not too much trouble.
First of all, I wanted to create a claim which was similar in scope, strength, and kind. Pretty people are probably no more common than black people in the First World; the proposed difference is not an on-or-off switch, but a statistical distinction; and it relates to genetic effects on personality.
Second, I wanted it to be similarly provocative to brazil84′s claim. It is widely considered bad to call people stupid; it is widely considered bad to call people sociopaths.
Third, it is not inconceivable that someone could draw the conclusion. Numerous studies have shown that pretty people are considered better people than ugly people given the same actions; therefore it is possible for pretty people to get away with being worse.
Fourth, brazil84 is likely not to believe it is true—and, in fact, likely to believe it is unlikely. The point of the exercise is to suggest something which would require strong, non-obvious evidence to convince, precisely because the people brazil84 seeks to convince demand strong, non-obvious evidence.
Am I allowed to assume that pretty people are far more sociopathic than others by pretty much every measure of sociopathy, and even from simple observation? And that prettiness is known to be 100% genetic in origin? And that sociopathy is known to be strongly influenced by genes?
Only if you also assume that there are many robust factors with long histories contributing to do the following:
1) Encourage you to think of pretty people as an out-group
2) Strongly bias you towards considering garden-variety not-niceness in pretty people indicative of sociopathy, while doing no such thing about garden-variety not-niceness in ugly people
3) Prompt pretty people to act more sociopathic in a variety of circumstances due to psychological factors working on them
4) Make examples of pretty sociopaths dramatically more accessible in media and public cached thoughts than examples of ugly sociopaths or pretty non-sociopaths
In that case, the proof which would convince me is if the sociopathy gap were universal and intractable in time and space while the factors you list were not.
Those variables are not changed in this hypothetical—the only variable that changes is that I propose that “pretty people are more likely to carry genes for sociopathy” in all seriousness, rather than counterfactually.
I think you are saying “yes,” in which case the proof which would convince me is if the sociopathy gap were universal and intractable.
No, I am not. I don’t know how to explain it—what I am trying to describe is the number and variety of bits of evidence you need to overwhelm the beliefs of those who are disagreeing with you here. You need to present the kind of proofs which would convince you that something you currently doubt for good reasons, something which is not a simple slam-dunk “this happens” but a complicated “the statistical distributions have different means and variances” claim, is decisively true.
The example is of less than zero importance—it’s the standards of evidence I am trying to describe.