What is generally meant is that having this gene induces a preference to chew gum, which is generally acted upon by whatever decision algorithm is used.
This is actually not what is meant when considering Solomon’s problem. They really do mean the actual decision.
This case is handled in the previous sentence. If this is your actual decision, and your actual decision is the product of a decision algorithm, then your decision algorithm is not EDT.
To put it another way, is your decision to chew gum determined by EDT our by your genes? Pick one.
wedrifid might well be making the point that your genes determine your choice, via your decision theory. i.e. Your genes give you EDT, and then EDT makes you not chew gum. I’m not sure how that affects the argument though.
This is actually not what is meant when considering Solomon’s problem. They really do mean the actual decision.
This case is handled in the previous sentence. If this is your actual decision, and your actual decision is the product of a decision algorithm, then your decision algorithm is not EDT.
To put it another way, is your decision to chew gum determined by EDT our by your genes? Pick one.
It can be both. Causation is not exclusionary. I’m suggesting that you are mistaken about the aforementioned handling.
No it can’t. If you use a given decision theory, your actions are entirely determined by your preferences and your sensory inputs.
wedrifid might well be making the point that your genes determine your choice, via your decision theory. i.e. Your genes give you EDT, and then EDT makes you not chew gum. I’m not sure how that affects the argument though.
The claim is generally that EDT chooses not to chew gum.
Thanks, fixed.
You’re saying EDT causes you not to chew gum because cancer gives you EDT? Where does the gum appear in the equation?