The epistemic failure would be to assume that if X is evidence for Y, it must be an overwhelming evidence.
As in: “the only reason why anyone would care about X is because they are Y.” (Common subtrope: “If you are not a criminal, you have nothing to hide from the government.”)
Sure, overreaction would be an epistemic failure—if it were genuine. But the whole point of this idea is that it’s not. It’s faked, based on correctly realizing that not overreacting is dangerous.
That’s not to say it isn’t a failure mode, just not an epistemic one. In any case, I was just curious if I had missed some relevant epistemic failure. Tapping out, unless you think there is such an additional failure and I’m just an idiot.
Exactly. It doesn’t sound like an epistemic failure, because it is, in fact, true.
The epistemic failure would be to assume that if X is evidence for Y, it must be an overwhelming evidence.
As in: “the only reason why anyone would care about X is because they are Y.” (Common subtrope: “If you are not a criminal, you have nothing to hide from the government.”)
Sure, overreaction would be an epistemic failure—if it were genuine. But the whole point of this idea is that it’s not. It’s faked, based on correctly realizing that not overreacting is dangerous.
That’s not to say it isn’t a failure mode, just not an epistemic one. In any case, I was just curious if I had missed some relevant epistemic failure. Tapping out, unless you think there is such an additional failure and I’m just an idiot.