I still feel like we’re talking past each other. I made a straightforward empirical claim in my post. So all we need to do is find some empirical evidence. If you accept that SEP typically and in this case represents the academic state of the art and conventional usage, then look at the last section of the SEP article I linked to. It agrees with me (I think).
If you don’t think the SEP article represents the convention accurately, just say that and we can move on to another source. There’s no sense in arguing about whether or not the distinction between normative and meta ethics reported in the SEP article makes sense. I agree that it does not. But we’re not arguing about that. We’re arguing about what the convention actually is.
If you accept that SEP typically and in this case represents the academic state of the art and conventional usage, then look at the last section of the SEP article I linked to. It agrees with me (I think).
The SEP does not agree with you. No where in that section does it say that the “Why is murder wrong?” is a meta-ethical question. All it says is that while deontology does not assume a meta-ethical position, though certain meta-ethical positions are more hospitable to it. I agree with you and the SEP here.
I’m not saying deontology is a meta-ethical theory. It isn’t. As I said:
And yes, deontology does not presume any particular metaethics. Your error, as far as I can tell, is in not getting what counts as a meta-ethical question and what doesn’t. “Why is murder wrong?” is a straightforward question for normative theory.
By convention “why is murder wrong?” is a question for normative theory. Your sentence in the post, this one:
This is confused because the term ‘deontology’ in philosophical jargon picks out a normative ethical theory, while the question ‘why is it wrong to kill?’ is not a normative but a meta-ethical question.
is wrong. The SEP does not say otherwise. In any way. “Why is it wrong to kill?” is a normative question. Maybe what is tripping you up is this sentece from the SEP?
Likewise, a deontologist can claim that we know the content of deontological morality by direct intuition, by Kantian reflection on our normative situation, or by reaching reflective equilibrium between our particular moral judgments and the theories we construct to explain them (theories of intuitions).
I could see how that could be read as “reasons for the truth of deontological morality”. But these are questions actually about the epistemology of moral claims—“how do we know x is immoral?”, is actually different from “why x is immoral?” Obviously these questions are usually connected but they don’t have to be. It is logically possible to think that the Categorical Imperative makes murder wrong but that the way we learn that is by God speaking to us or by studying physics or whatever.
There’s no sense in arguing about whether or not the distinction between normative and meta ethics reported in the SEP article makes sense. I agree that it does not. But we’re not arguing about that. We’re arguing about what the convention actually is.
The distinction makes plenty of sense. It just isn’t what you think it is.
Great, I assume this means you think the SEP article is representing the convention. Let me know if that’s not the case, since if it isn’t, we’re wasting our time talking about my interpretation of it.
Anyway, suppose someone were to come along and say ‘Moral truths come primarily in the form of absolute injunctions!’ (or whatever would fix him as a deontologist). We ask him for an example of such an injunction, and he says ‘Do not kill.’ So far, we agree that this whole discussion has taken place within normative ethics.
Now we ask him ‘Why shouldn’t we kill?’ This is a pretty ambiguous question, and we could be asking a clearly normative question to which the answer might be ‘because there’s an injunction to the effect that you shouldn’t’. But this isn’t the kind of question I’m talking about in my (perhaps poorly phrased) initial post. What the confused person I discuss wants is not an answer to the question ‘what is right and wrong’, from the deontologist, he wants answers to questions like ‘what makes a particular injunction true?’ ‘How do you know this injunction is true?’ and so on.
What this confused person often complains about (I know you’ve had some recent experience with this on “Philosophical Landmines”) is that the only explanations they get, explanations which are obviously inadequate, are explanations like ‘Because God said so in the Bible’. In complaining about this, the confused person implies that this is the kind of answer they want, but that it’s a very poor one.
A deontologist who gives this kind of answer is, I think we will agree, endorsing some form of divine command theory. So what kind of a thing is ‘divine command theory’, and what kind of answer is ‘because God said so’? Is it meta-ethical, or normative? Well, the SEP article says this:
Deontological theories are normative theories. They do not presuppose any particular position on moral ontology or on moral epistemology. Presumably, a deontologist can be a moral realist of either the natural (moral properties are identical to natural properties) or nonnatural (moral properties are not themselves natural properties even if they are nonreductively related to natural properties) variety. Or a deontologist can be an expressivist, a constructivist, a transcendentalist, a conventionalist, or a Divine command theorist regarding the nature of morality.
Notice that Divine command theory is on the list of things next to ‘expressivist’, ‘constructivist’, and other meta-ethical positions, implying that ‘because God said so’ (the kind of answer the confused person is asking for) is not a claim within normative ethics (which would rather involve claims about what, exactly, God said), but a meta-ethical claim. After all, even if we accept we should do what God says, we have not yet committed to either deontology or consequentialism, much less any specific deontological or consequentialist claims like ‘do not kill’ or ‘minimize deaths’.
So I grant that ‘why is it wrong to kill’ was a poor phrase: this question is ambiguously normative or meta-ethical. If this is all you meant by ‘right in spirit but wrong in letter’, then I agree, and I’ll now try to come up with a way to make my post clearer.
Nevertheless, according to the SEP article anyway, I’ve correctly identified the conventional line between normative ethics and meta ethics, and so I’ve correctly diagnosed a confusion. What do you think?
Okay. I think I see what is happening. The whole issue get’s weirdly skewed by divine command theory, which is so simple it is hard to see the distinction and which implies a very particular formula for a normative theory. Let me outline the position:
Metaethics: Divine Command theory. In answer to the question “What is morality?” they answer “the will/decree of God”.
Normative Ethics: In answer to the question “Why is murder immoral?” they provide a proof that God decrees murder to be immoral, say, a justification for the Bible as the word of God and a citation of the Ten Commandments. Non-judeo-christian divine command theorists would say something else. Some normative theories under the umbrella of divine command theory could even be consequentialist, “God told me in a dream to maximize preference satisfaction.” These answers assume divine command theory but they’re still normative theory.
Now in a real life debate with a divine command theorist they may emphasize the “God said so part” instead of the “here is where he said it” part. But that’s just pragmatics: you don’t care about the normative proof until you share the meta-ethic so it is reasonable for a divine command theorists to skip straight to the major point of contention.
In the case of divine command deontology the “non-answer” issue is pretty much entirely about the meta-ethical assumptions and not the actual normative theory. So I can see why you were emphasizing the fact that deontology is logically independent of any particular meta-ethical framework.
It might be less confusing to just emphasize that “deontology” isn’t a particular normative theory—just a class of normative theory determined by a particular feature (just like consequentialism) and that there is nothing necessarily mysterious or magical about that feature; that that association is due to a particular sort of deontological normative theory which is popular among non-philosophers, a theory which assumes a stupid meta-ethics even though there is no need for deontologists to embrace that meta-ethics.
To summarize: I’m not sure that you’ve correctly identified the conventional line between normative ethics and meta-ethics, but I can see why the context of divine command theory makes the question “why is murder wrong?” seem like a meta-ethical one. When I said you were right in spirit I meant that I agreed that people were strawmaning deontology but disagreed as to the nature of the error. I don’t think it’s that “why is murder wrong?” isn’t a normative question. Rather, it’s that people assume deontology refers to a particular kind of deontology which assume an unhelpful and uninteresting metaethics and this leads that brand of deontology to be unable to given interesting answers to “why” questions.
Okay. I think I see what is happening. The whole issue get’s weirdly skewed by divine command theory, which is so simple it is hard to see the distinction and which implies a very particular formula for a normative theory. Let me outline the position:
I’m not sure that divine command theory implies “a very particular formula for a normative theory”. In practice, many divine command theorists pay a lot of attention to things like casuistry (i.e. case-based reasoning) and situational ethics. In other words, they do morality “case by case” or “fable by fable”. Surely any such moral theory must contain a lot of non-trivial normative content. It’s not at all the case that all arguing happens on the meta-ethical, “God said it” level.
Now we ask him ‘Why shouldn’t we kill?’ This is a pretty ambiguous question, and we could be asking a clearly normative question to which the answer might be ‘because there’s an injunction to the effect that you shouldn’t’.
The answer to this question actually depends on whether you are doing normative ethics, or talking about morality. In the former case, a sensible answer would be: “because, as a matter of fact, most individuals and societies agree that “non-killing” is a morally relevant ‘value’, where ‘value’ means a conative ambition (i.e. what “should” we do?). As a normative ethicist, I fall back on such widely-shared values”.
When doing morality in a sort of common-sense way, the answer is more complicated. Generally speaking, you’re going to find that such ‘values’ (or, again, conative ambitions of the “should” variety) are a part of the “moral core” of individuals, what they take their “morality” to be about. This moral core is influenced by many factors, including their biology (so, yes, they’re generally going to share most other humans’ values), society, perceived moral authorities, etc. It can also be influenced by ethical debates they take part in: most people can be convinced that they should drop some moral values and take up others.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
That is doubtlessly true, though I wonder if its an entirely fair criterion. While most ethicists would agree that the right view should reflect actual everyday moral judgements, nothing in particular holds them to that. It’s simply possible that no one is presently good, and that the everyday moral judgement people make are terribly corrupt and over-complicated compared to the correct judgements.
I still feel like we’re talking past each other. I made a straightforward empirical claim in my post. So all we need to do is find some empirical evidence. If you accept that SEP typically and in this case represents the academic state of the art and conventional usage, then look at the last section of the SEP article I linked to. It agrees with me (I think).
If you don’t think the SEP article represents the convention accurately, just say that and we can move on to another source. There’s no sense in arguing about whether or not the distinction between normative and meta ethics reported in the SEP article makes sense. I agree that it does not. But we’re not arguing about that. We’re arguing about what the convention actually is.
The SEP does not agree with you. No where in that section does it say that the “Why is murder wrong?” is a meta-ethical question. All it says is that while deontology does not assume a meta-ethical position, though certain meta-ethical positions are more hospitable to it. I agree with you and the SEP here.
I’m not saying deontology is a meta-ethical theory. It isn’t. As I said:
By convention “why is murder wrong?” is a question for normative theory. Your sentence in the post, this one:
is wrong. The SEP does not say otherwise. In any way. “Why is it wrong to kill?” is a normative question. Maybe what is tripping you up is this sentece from the SEP?
I could see how that could be read as “reasons for the truth of deontological morality”. But these are questions actually about the epistemology of moral claims—“how do we know x is immoral?”, is actually different from “why x is immoral?” Obviously these questions are usually connected but they don’t have to be. It is logically possible to think that the Categorical Imperative makes murder wrong but that the way we learn that is by God speaking to us or by studying physics or whatever.
The distinction makes plenty of sense. It just isn’t what you think it is.
Great, I assume this means you think the SEP article is representing the convention. Let me know if that’s not the case, since if it isn’t, we’re wasting our time talking about my interpretation of it.
Anyway, suppose someone were to come along and say ‘Moral truths come primarily in the form of absolute injunctions!’ (or whatever would fix him as a deontologist). We ask him for an example of such an injunction, and he says ‘Do not kill.’ So far, we agree that this whole discussion has taken place within normative ethics.
Now we ask him ‘Why shouldn’t we kill?’ This is a pretty ambiguous question, and we could be asking a clearly normative question to which the answer might be ‘because there’s an injunction to the effect that you shouldn’t’. But this isn’t the kind of question I’m talking about in my (perhaps poorly phrased) initial post. What the confused person I discuss wants is not an answer to the question ‘what is right and wrong’, from the deontologist, he wants answers to questions like ‘what makes a particular injunction true?’ ‘How do you know this injunction is true?’ and so on.
What this confused person often complains about (I know you’ve had some recent experience with this on “Philosophical Landmines”) is that the only explanations they get, explanations which are obviously inadequate, are explanations like ‘Because God said so in the Bible’. In complaining about this, the confused person implies that this is the kind of answer they want, but that it’s a very poor one.
A deontologist who gives this kind of answer is, I think we will agree, endorsing some form of divine command theory. So what kind of a thing is ‘divine command theory’, and what kind of answer is ‘because God said so’? Is it meta-ethical, or normative? Well, the SEP article says this:
Notice that Divine command theory is on the list of things next to ‘expressivist’, ‘constructivist’, and other meta-ethical positions, implying that ‘because God said so’ (the kind of answer the confused person is asking for) is not a claim within normative ethics (which would rather involve claims about what, exactly, God said), but a meta-ethical claim. After all, even if we accept we should do what God says, we have not yet committed to either deontology or consequentialism, much less any specific deontological or consequentialist claims like ‘do not kill’ or ‘minimize deaths’.
So I grant that ‘why is it wrong to kill’ was a poor phrase: this question is ambiguously normative or meta-ethical. If this is all you meant by ‘right in spirit but wrong in letter’, then I agree, and I’ll now try to come up with a way to make my post clearer.
Nevertheless, according to the SEP article anyway, I’ve correctly identified the conventional line between normative ethics and meta ethics, and so I’ve correctly diagnosed a confusion. What do you think?
Okay. I think I see what is happening. The whole issue get’s weirdly skewed by divine command theory, which is so simple it is hard to see the distinction and which implies a very particular formula for a normative theory. Let me outline the position:
Metaethics: Divine Command theory. In answer to the question “What is morality?” they answer “the will/decree of God”.
Normative Ethics: In answer to the question “Why is murder immoral?” they provide a proof that God decrees murder to be immoral, say, a justification for the Bible as the word of God and a citation of the Ten Commandments. Non-judeo-christian divine command theorists would say something else. Some normative theories under the umbrella of divine command theory could even be consequentialist, “God told me in a dream to maximize preference satisfaction.” These answers assume divine command theory but they’re still normative theory.
Now in a real life debate with a divine command theorist they may emphasize the “God said so part” instead of the “here is where he said it” part. But that’s just pragmatics: you don’t care about the normative proof until you share the meta-ethic so it is reasonable for a divine command theorists to skip straight to the major point of contention.
In the case of divine command deontology the “non-answer” issue is pretty much entirely about the meta-ethical assumptions and not the actual normative theory. So I can see why you were emphasizing the fact that deontology is logically independent of any particular meta-ethical framework.
It might be less confusing to just emphasize that “deontology” isn’t a particular normative theory—just a class of normative theory determined by a particular feature (just like consequentialism) and that there is nothing necessarily mysterious or magical about that feature; that that association is due to a particular sort of deontological normative theory which is popular among non-philosophers, a theory which assumes a stupid meta-ethics even though there is no need for deontologists to embrace that meta-ethics.
To summarize: I’m not sure that you’ve correctly identified the conventional line between normative ethics and meta-ethics, but I can see why the context of divine command theory makes the question “why is murder wrong?” seem like a meta-ethical one. When I said you were right in spirit I meant that I agreed that people were strawmaning deontology but disagreed as to the nature of the error. I don’t think it’s that “why is murder wrong?” isn’t a normative question. Rather, it’s that people assume deontology refers to a particular kind of deontology which assume an unhelpful and uninteresting metaethics and this leads that brand of deontology to be unable to given interesting answers to “why” questions.
Any of that make sense?
Yes, and I don’t think we have any further disagreement. Thanks for the interesting discussion.
I’m not sure that divine command theory implies “a very particular formula for a normative theory”. In practice, many divine command theorists pay a lot of attention to things like casuistry (i.e. case-based reasoning) and situational ethics. In other words, they do morality “case by case” or “fable by fable”. Surely any such moral theory must contain a lot of non-trivial normative content. It’s not at all the case that all arguing happens on the meta-ethical, “God said it” level.
This is a good point.
The answer to this question actually depends on whether you are doing normative ethics, or talking about morality. In the former case, a sensible answer would be: “because, as a matter of fact, most individuals and societies agree that “non-killing” is a morally relevant ‘value’, where ‘value’ means a conative ambition (i.e. what “should” we do?). As a normative ethicist, I fall back on such widely-shared values”.
When doing morality in a sort of common-sense way, the answer is more complicated. Generally speaking, you’re going to find that such ‘values’ (or, again, conative ambitions of the “should” variety) are a part of the “moral core” of individuals, what they take their “morality” to be about. This moral core is influenced by many factors, including their biology (so, yes, they’re generally going to share most other humans’ values), society, perceived moral authorities, etc. It can also be influenced by ethical debates they take part in: most people can be convinced that they should drop some moral values and take up others.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
That is doubtlessly true, though I wonder if its an entirely fair criterion. While most ethicists would agree that the right view should reflect actual everyday moral judgements, nothing in particular holds them to that. It’s simply possible that no one is presently good, and that the everyday moral judgement people make are terribly corrupt and over-complicated compared to the correct judgements.