Now we ask him ‘Why shouldn’t we kill?’ This is a pretty ambiguous question, and we could be asking a clearly normative question to which the answer might be ‘because there’s an injunction to the effect that you shouldn’t’.
The answer to this question actually depends on whether you are doing normative ethics, or talking about morality. In the former case, a sensible answer would be: “because, as a matter of fact, most individuals and societies agree that “non-killing” is a morally relevant ‘value’, where ‘value’ means a conative ambition (i.e. what “should” we do?). As a normative ethicist, I fall back on such widely-shared values”.
When doing morality in a sort of common-sense way, the answer is more complicated. Generally speaking, you’re going to find that such ‘values’ (or, again, conative ambitions of the “should” variety) are a part of the “moral core” of individuals, what they take their “morality” to be about. This moral core is influenced by many factors, including their biology (so, yes, they’re generally going to share most other humans’ values), society, perceived moral authorities, etc. It can also be influenced by ethical debates they take part in: most people can be convinced that they should drop some moral values and take up others.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
That is doubtlessly true, though I wonder if its an entirely fair criterion. While most ethicists would agree that the right view should reflect actual everyday moral judgements, nothing in particular holds them to that. It’s simply possible that no one is presently good, and that the everyday moral judgement people make are terribly corrupt and over-complicated compared to the correct judgements.
The answer to this question actually depends on whether you are doing normative ethics, or talking about morality. In the former case, a sensible answer would be: “because, as a matter of fact, most individuals and societies agree that “non-killing” is a morally relevant ‘value’, where ‘value’ means a conative ambition (i.e. what “should” we do?). As a normative ethicist, I fall back on such widely-shared values”.
When doing morality in a sort of common-sense way, the answer is more complicated. Generally speaking, you’re going to find that such ‘values’ (or, again, conative ambitions of the “should” variety) are a part of the “moral core” of individuals, what they take their “morality” to be about. This moral core is influenced by many factors, including their biology (so, yes, they’re generally going to share most other humans’ values), society, perceived moral authorities, etc. It can also be influenced by ethical debates they take part in: most people can be convinced that they should drop some moral values and take up others.
All of this means that the real world is quite complicated, and does not fully reflect any of the “moral positions” that philosophers like to talk about.
That is doubtlessly true, though I wonder if its an entirely fair criterion. While most ethicists would agree that the right view should reflect actual everyday moral judgements, nothing in particular holds them to that. It’s simply possible that no one is presently good, and that the everyday moral judgement people make are terribly corrupt and over-complicated compared to the correct judgements.