I think that if I were in Nazi Germany, it would be acceptable to forcibly show people videos of concentration camps to save Jews. However, if I were in Nazi Germany, it would also be acceptable to cheat, to destroy property, or even to shoot people in order to save Jews.
To a rational vegetarian who thinks that eating animals is as bad as killing Jews, it would be moral to do anything in order to prevent the eating of animals. However, such a variety of vegetarian is a menace to society from the point of view of other people who don’t share in his ideology, and would (according to those other people) need to be stopped—and rationality doesn’t really matter at this point; whether he is stopped would only be a question of who is more powerful.
Now, suppose that a vegetarian thinks that eating animals is only 1/1000 as bad as killing Jews. If it’s okay to do otherwise evil things to save a Jew in Nazi Germany, then this vegetarian ought to be willing to do them to create 1001 vegetarians. So vegetarians should be shooting people right and left (or doing other inherently immoral things) if they think it advances vegetarianism enough.
Of course, it’s not possible for a vegetarian to be absolutely certain about vegetarianism, and once he accounts for his own uncertainty about vegetarianism in the calculation, the possibility that he is wrong and will have committed murder makes it no longer palatable to kill people to create vegetarians even if you’re creating lots and lots of vegetarians.
(And if he then reasons “okay, I shouldn’t kill to create 1001 vegetarians, but my uncertainty about vegetarianism is so low that it’s okay to kill to create a million vegetarians, that still doesn’t work because he is also uncertain about what his uncertainty is.)
Doing an (otherwise) mildly immoral thing to create many vegetarians is similar, except that of course the acceptable bound on his uncertainty about vegetarianism is higher—maybe high enough that he actually could justify it. But then this brings in other considerations—if he can mildly hurt other people for vegetarianism, then others will also be able to mildly hurt him for their own pet causes, for instance, and things may be overall better off if nobody is allowed to hurt others for their causes.
As it turns out, I actually do think eating animals is approximately 1/1000th as bad as killing people.
I don’t go around shooting people, a) it’s a clear net loss to create a world where people kill for all their pet causes, b) it’s pretty obvious that when you’re trying to change a policy affecting the entire world, killing people will almost only hurt your cause.
“Don’t kill people” is a pretty obvious moral schelling point that everyone can agree on.
It’s dramatically less clear where lines are drawn with regards to emotional manipulation. The entire human experience is basically based around emotional manipulation (storytelling, fashion, advertisements, literature, tribal excitement at sporting events). Refraining from doing that won’t cause the rest of humanity to stop, unless you’re actively coordinating with people on a campaign to stop emotional manipulation.
So I’m not sure why I’d refrain from doing that, whatever my pet cause, unless my pet cause was removing emotional manipulation from humanity completely.
“Don’t kill people” is a pretty obvious moral schelling point that everyone can agree on.
So is “don’t inflict suffering”. At least some part of what people consider bad about killing is that it can be painful or that it causes sadness in others.
I find it interesting that when it comes to eating animals, people usually focus on killing, even though most veg*ans I know care primarily about preventing suffering.
I know zero people who would be capable of meeting that standard. On the other hand, “don’t kill people” is pretty easy. Schelling points are about actual behavior, not professed behavior.
Being uncertain about one’s uncertainty doesn’t mean you shouldn’t act according to your moral beliefs, the uncertainty can go both ways. You still have to assign probabilities in the end.
Assuming you attribute the same importance to reducing suffering, no matter in what type of being it occurs, it still wouldn’t make sense to “shoot people left and right”. People who care a lot about animals are already being branded as “extremists”, you’d have more impact by going about it with a more thought-out strategy like e.g. movement-building and / or high-earning and donating to the best outreach organizations.
But then this brings in other considerations—if he can mildly hurt other people for vegetarianism, then others will also be able to mildly hurt him for their own pet causes, for instance, and things may be overall better off if nobody is allowed to hurt others for their causes.
What’s the difference between a pet cause and a normal cause? Majority rule?
You still have to assign probabilities in the end.
True, except that one’s certainty about one’s certainty is typically not a large number. If you think that killing one person justifies creating 1001 vegetarians, are you even 50% certain about that number 1001?
it still wouldn’t make sense to “shoot people left and right”.… you’d have more impact by going about it with a more thought-out strategy
Yes, but “it makes sense to shoot people” is shorthand for “the moral reasons that normally mean we should not shoot people do not apply here”. It may still be impractical or suboptimal to shoot people.
What’s the difference between a pet cause and a normal cause? Majority rule?
Not majority rule, just a cause with a similar popularity to vegetarianism.
I agree that one has to adjust for certainty and overconfidence, and peer disagreement does seem like a good reason to downshift as well.
OK, I see your point about shooting, agreed.
Regarding popularity, if that’s the only criterion then also fAI would be a pet cause. I’d say it also depends on popularity among which group of people. Out of the smartest and most rational people I know, the majority of those who are interested in doing ethics, ie. in figuring out what “being altruistic” implies, would agree that animal suffering counts just as much as human suffering. And the smart and rational people who disagree are mostly not interested in doing ethics (in this way), as they just claim that it is all about “what they care about”, a selfish defense that could just as well be used to uphold racism or sexism.
So on the above grounds I’d object to vegetarianism being a pet cause.
I think that if I were in Nazi Germany, it would be acceptable to forcibly show people videos of concentration camps to save Jews. However, if I were in Nazi Germany, it would also be acceptable to cheat, to destroy property, or even to shoot people in order to save Jews.
To a rational vegetarian who thinks that eating animals is as bad as killing Jews, it would be moral to do anything in order to prevent the eating of animals. However, such a variety of vegetarian is a menace to society from the point of view of other people who don’t share in his ideology, and would (according to those other people) need to be stopped—and rationality doesn’t really matter at this point; whether he is stopped would only be a question of who is more powerful.
Now, suppose that a vegetarian thinks that eating animals is only 1/1000 as bad as killing Jews. If it’s okay to do otherwise evil things to save a Jew in Nazi Germany, then this vegetarian ought to be willing to do them to create 1001 vegetarians. So vegetarians should be shooting people right and left (or doing other inherently immoral things) if they think it advances vegetarianism enough.
Of course, it’s not possible for a vegetarian to be absolutely certain about vegetarianism, and once he accounts for his own uncertainty about vegetarianism in the calculation, the possibility that he is wrong and will have committed murder makes it no longer palatable to kill people to create vegetarians even if you’re creating lots and lots of vegetarians.
(And if he then reasons “okay, I shouldn’t kill to create 1001 vegetarians, but my uncertainty about vegetarianism is so low that it’s okay to kill to create a million vegetarians, that still doesn’t work because he is also uncertain about what his uncertainty is.)
Doing an (otherwise) mildly immoral thing to create many vegetarians is similar, except that of course the acceptable bound on his uncertainty about vegetarianism is higher—maybe high enough that he actually could justify it. But then this brings in other considerations—if he can mildly hurt other people for vegetarianism, then others will also be able to mildly hurt him for their own pet causes, for instance, and things may be overall better off if nobody is allowed to hurt others for their causes.
As it turns out, I actually do think eating animals is approximately 1/1000th as bad as killing people.
I don’t go around shooting people, a) it’s a clear net loss to create a world where people kill for all their pet causes, b) it’s pretty obvious that when you’re trying to change a policy affecting the entire world, killing people will almost only hurt your cause.
“Don’t kill people” is a pretty obvious moral schelling point that everyone can agree on.
It’s dramatically less clear where lines are drawn with regards to emotional manipulation. The entire human experience is basically based around emotional manipulation (storytelling, fashion, advertisements, literature, tribal excitement at sporting events). Refraining from doing that won’t cause the rest of humanity to stop, unless you’re actively coordinating with people on a campaign to stop emotional manipulation.
So I’m not sure why I’d refrain from doing that, whatever my pet cause, unless my pet cause was removing emotional manipulation from humanity completely.
So is “don’t inflict suffering”. At least some part of what people consider bad about killing is that it can be painful or that it causes sadness in others.
I find it interesting that when it comes to eating animals, people usually focus on killing, even though most veg*ans I know care primarily about preventing suffering.
I know zero people who would be capable of meeting that standard. On the other hand, “don’t kill people” is pretty easy. Schelling points are about actual behavior, not professed behavior.
Oh, thanks for pointing that out! In that case my example was indeed the opposite of one.
Being uncertain about one’s uncertainty doesn’t mean you shouldn’t act according to your moral beliefs, the uncertainty can go both ways. You still have to assign probabilities in the end.
Assuming you attribute the same importance to reducing suffering, no matter in what type of being it occurs, it still wouldn’t make sense to “shoot people left and right”. People who care a lot about animals are already being branded as “extremists”, you’d have more impact by going about it with a more thought-out strategy like e.g. movement-building and / or high-earning and donating to the best outreach organizations.
What’s the difference between a pet cause and a normal cause? Majority rule?
True, except that one’s certainty about one’s certainty is typically not a large number. If you think that killing one person justifies creating 1001 vegetarians, are you even 50% certain about that number 1001?
Yes, but “it makes sense to shoot people” is shorthand for “the moral reasons that normally mean we should not shoot people do not apply here”. It may still be impractical or suboptimal to shoot people.
Not majority rule, just a cause with a similar popularity to vegetarianism.
I agree that one has to adjust for certainty and overconfidence, and peer disagreement does seem like a good reason to downshift as well.
OK, I see your point about shooting, agreed.
Regarding popularity, if that’s the only criterion then also fAI would be a pet cause. I’d say it also depends on popularity among which group of people. Out of the smartest and most rational people I know, the majority of those who are interested in doing ethics, ie. in figuring out what “being altruistic” implies, would agree that animal suffering counts just as much as human suffering. And the smart and rational people who disagree are mostly not interested in doing ethics (in this way), as they just claim that it is all about “what they care about”, a selfish defense that could just as well be used to uphold racism or sexism.
So on the above grounds I’d object to vegetarianism being a pet cause.